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(IN~ERORGANIZaTIONAL COALITICNAL~
DECISION.'!"'MA!:ING): AN, EXPLORtt.TORY INVES'rI.GATION.
!

by
DENNIS BRIAN KEENAN

A. pract1cum report subm1tted In'' part1al fulf1ll

ment ot the requirements for the degree of
MASTER,. OF
SOCIAL WORK

l

Approved by

PREFAOE.

Th1s study is one of four exploratory stud1es
concerned with coa11tlons ot organlzations that are
tormed to plan and develop soclal welfare programs
within the local community.

Although each study was

conducted 1ndependent'ly, taken together, their major,
purpose was to develop some 1ns1ghts and knowledge
into the behavior ot organ1zat10ns a.nd the ways 1n
whlch they 1nteract as they work together to develop
community programs.

They are then, exploratory stu

d1es of lnterorgan1zatlonal behavior.
Each of the stud1es had a different tocus.

One

study attempted to 1dentl,ty the present areas of agree
ment and dlsagreement regard1ng interorgan1zatlonal
behavior by systematlca.lly rev,tewlng the literature
over the past ten yea.rs.

Another focused on.the sta.ges

ot development of the coa11tlon,:attempt1ng to deter.
mine 1f organizational coa11tions seemed. to follow si
m1lar developmental patterns as has been reported In:
the lltera.ture on small groups.

Another focused on the

decision-maklng patterns ln the coalit10ns by flrst
reviewlng the llterature and constructing a decls10n
mak1ng model and then nteating ft the model against.. a
set" of case histor1es.
grounded theory

The final study ,.~ following a

a.pproach,~

simply trled to 1dent1ty a

set of common varlables or ana.lytica.l ca.tegories wh1c,h
seemed to be

present~in

a number of coalit10ns.

Al.

11
though each of these exploratory stud1es was oonduct
ed Independently with a dIfferent emphasis and analy
t1cal focus, they each utilized the same data - a
of case h1stor1es of coa.1Itions.

se~

Consequently,:each

of the stud1es ·utilized a common set of data but

v1ew~

. ed the data trom. quite dIfferent. analyt1cal perspec
tives.
The particular focus of: this study fa upon the
declsion-mak1ng .patterns in' coali tiona.

In'; revIewing

the llterature,. formulating an:analytlcal model,: and
applying the same to the casestudles,:two principal
areas of concern are focused upon: decislon...malcing
power analysis and decision-making process analysis.:
The literature provided essent1ally no material orr
coa11tional decision-making as such.
broader category of organ1zational

Howev·eri: the

declsion-mak1r~

behavior did contain conceptual and theoretical no
tions which were app11cable to coal1tional decislon
:making bl means at inference and extrapolation: into
hypothet1ca.l propositions around power and process
issues.

These 2 dimensions were then expl;ored throue;ll'

the use ot these hypothetical propos1tiona by
lngt! them against the case history da.ta.
were then assessed with

8ubsequen~

oonceptual weaknesses were evident.

It

t'est~

The results

modiflcations where
A tinal cha.pter.· .

was included to relate what the researcher learned,
what other researchers might learn from that exper1enoe"

111.
and: whati,Soclal Work could 'learn from the study about:.

the area.· of coa11 tional dec1s1on!-making.,
There is nothing new aboutt, the concept. or: a c.o
a11tion of organizations.

Organiza.tional

coalltlon~

have been formed. and reformed ever since man began
working through organizationa.l structures.

They are'

oommon, everyday occurrences" yet. aurprisingly 11ttle'
1s known about them since much of the theoretical
work has fooused on coalitions of ind1v1duals·or small.
groups or on-' the alliances and coa11tiona of political
groups and nations.

Surpr1s1ngly little work has

been:~

done specifically on' organ1zational ooal1tions •.
A coa11tion of:- organizations is an
z.a'tional structure.

1nterorgan1~

That is,, a structure in' wh1ch two

or more organizations del1berately relate the1r baha- '
vior to. each other as when several organizations

Joint~

ly agree to plan some new program in the community.
They are alao unique structures in; that each of the
!organizatlons maintains its own autonomy, but for a
per10,d of time they work together around some commOll!
issue or mutual problem.
Coalltions"in'contraat to other types ot in'-!
terorganizatlonal structures such as councila or. fed-
eratlons, tend to be ad hoc and 1asue-oriented struc
tures.

That"ls,.there is little permanence to the

structure.

A group of organizations

round an issue"

mee~

joi~together

a

tor a period of time, and s1mply

disband or dissolve once the 1ssue 1s resolved.

~ey

are rather flu1d and amorphous structures but they do
represent one of the ways that organizat1ons'cooper
ate w1th each other.
W1thin recent years the coa11tion has been
v1ew~d

as a possible means to· coord1nate disparate

programs w1th1n the community.

The Office of Econo

m1c Cpportun1ty and the Un1ted Way of Amer1ca ha.ve
jointly sponsored a. project to examine the use of
coa11tion 1n:

~he

planning process.

TD. some degree

then, the coalition se·ems to be an 1ncreasingly 1m
portant struoture a.nd one that needs to be t.Ully un..
derstood by the planner if it is to be effectively
utilized.
Oonsequently"an increased knowledge'of organ
1zational behav1or,.expec1a.lly on'the relat10nship be
tween organ1zations, would not. only a1d the' plan.
ner in' his daily ta.sks but", a.t the same time contri
bute to the lim1ted knowledge ot interorga.nizational
behavior.

CHAPTER.l

Review

or

The L1terature

The l1terature reviewed was concerned with two pr1mary
areas of analys1s of decision-making: power and process.
I.

power Analysis Of Decision-Making
Wh1le tew of the works reviewed dealt primarily witb 1n

terorganizational coalitions, most ot them in some way were con
cerned with the issue ot power and 1ntluence in the decislon
mak1ng process, which otten secondar1ly related to· the 1ssue of
coal.1 tions.
ture,~and

These wr1 tinga focused on matters of theory, struo

exchange.

A. TheQretical:
Beoause of the general reoognition of the signifioance of
power.and influence in dec1sion-making, a rev1ew of methods of
power analysis and theory was regarded to be helpful.
quently. -:the-perspectives of four scholars of

powe.~

Conse

and 1nfluence

analysis will be br1efly summarized.
Interorganiz&tlonal coalit1ons, being an informal, tempor
-

-

ar,y ooalescence ot members from separate formal organ1zations

with their own respective interests, the relevance of power
theory 1s evident.

Terry Clark summarizes the three

analytl~a~

models which are most broadly used to ascertain the power struc
ture of dec1sion-making: ttposi tional," i'reputatlonal, It and ffde_
c1s1onal."

The "pOSitional method" attempts to dlscover commu

nity "leaders" through compiling a list of the occupants of the
top posit10ns in significant "community organlzations."1
the "reputational method" gathers a panel or community mem

2.
be~s

and asks them about the leaders in the community;

thiS, a llst of leaders· is developed.

and,~from

A variation of this method

ls the "lssue-spec1f1c reputat10nal method."

It asks 1nformants:

to s·core or rank 1nd1vidual commun1ty leaders wi th regard to thelr
power in "specif1c 1ssue areas." 2
The "decisional method" follows the history of spec1fic de
clsions or issue areas and seeks to identify the sign1ficant per
sons who were involved in the actual decis10ns and those whose
recommendat10ns were accepted.

It does not deal with

influence and value bias 1nfluences.

Indirec~

The decisional method can

be ref1ned further by tak1ng into account the 1mpact of past de
clsions upon current power atructures. 3
Three writers, Banfield, Dahl, and Polsby attempt to devise I
theoretical models of power-and- 1nfluence analysis 1n more
at10nal terms.

oper.~

The first of the authors, Edward Banf1eld, de

fines "influence" as the "ab1lity to get others to act. think.
or feel as one 1ntends. It

V1ewed wi thin a soclal or po11t1cal

context of "concerted" decision-mak1ng and activlty, Banf1eld
asserts that "Any cooperative

activi~y

- and so any organization,

formal or. informal, ephemeral or lastlng - may be viewed as a
system of 1nfluence." 4

To obtain an overv1ew of relevant ma

terial from Banfield. the study w1ll examine his analyt1cal mo
del for study1ng influence and secondly, h1s proposit1ons about_
the operations ot

inrluence~

the basic conceptual

s~heme

used by Banf1eld to analyze

-influence" in his casestud1es was constructed around four prin
cipal quest10ns I:

1. "Who has influence and who is subject to it?"
2. "How does 1nfluence work?"
3. "What are the terms upon which influence is expended?"
4. ~How is action';concerted by influence?" 5
.

From his analysis ot. . .oAsestudies through the use of the a
bove model, Banfield derived certaln baslc propositlons about the
processes of'influence.

Among others, these included:

1. The w1der the dlstribut10n of authorlty, the larger the

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

stock of power that 1s requ1red it proposals are to be a
dopted.
As the number of. autonomous actors 1n a sltuatlon increases,
the probablllty of adoptlons decreases.
As the number of' autonomous actors 1ncreases, c~ontrol tends
to become less structured.
'-. "
The more power an actor has, the less he wiil'be a.ffected
by uncert a 1nty in his efforts to secure control.
The more klnds of power an actor has, the greater the
probabillty that be can secure control ln a given case.
The probablllty of' adoptions (and the probablllty that
there wll1 not be much compromise) tends to increase as
the correspondence improves between the kinds of power
thatpo-werholders ha.ve at their dlsposal and the kinds to
wh1ch actors will resp'ond.
The neconom1es of scale" that arise f'rom ccntrolling a
structure and from hav1ng a large and varied "inventory"
ot power give a cumulative advantage to certa1n actors
and thus may lead to structural centralization.
In situatlons where there 1s a Shortage of power 1n rela
tion to profitable opportunitles for lts exercise (l.e.,
a Shortage of lnvestment capital), there will be a ten
dency to klll some proposals and to comprom1se others in
order to increase the supply of-power.
When public-regarding power does not sufflce to' meet the
needs of a system (elther because there is not enough of
1t or because those over whom control is to be establish
ed will not respond to it) there will be a te~dency to
employ pr1vate-regarding power in its place. 6
".

The second wrlter,.Robert Dahl also proposes a model for
analyzing power and its use.

For Dahl, power ls the capaC1ty ot

one actor to influence the other to the extent that the second
does 80methlng he would not do otherwise.
" certa1n propOSitions about influence.

Dahl then

dellne~tes

He maintains that there

are three essentlalooncep"ts or proposi tlons which serve 'to ex

4.
plain why some actors have more influence than others, as well
as, demonstrating the dIfference between "potential" and "actual
influence:
1,_ Some actors have more polit1cal resources at their dISpos-

&1 than others. Or
2. G1ven the resources at their dlsposal, some actors use
more ot them to ga1n political influence. Or
3. GIven the resources at thelr dlsoosa1 some actors use
them more SkIllfully or effectively than others do. 7

He also asserts the ex1stence of two baslc types of in
fluence: "coerclve Int1uence fl (negative, positive; pun1shment,
reward) and "rel1able influence" (high probab1l1ty of comp11anc.e). 8
A thIrd wrlter, Nelson W. Polsby, IS concerned with scru
tinlzlng the exlstlng power analysls approaches In terms of the
questlonable va11dlty of thelr methodology.

In hls analysls, he

def1nes power-as "the capaclty of one actor to do somethlng af
fect1ng another actor, wh1ch changes the probable pattern of
"apec1fled future events.« 9 There are three baslc questlons In:
1,he power analysls theor1es accordlng to'Polsby: n(l) the pro

blem ,of Ident1fying and characterizlng partlclpants In decIsion
mak1ng, (2) the problem of determ1nlng who g a lns and who loses
from outcomes of decIs1ons, (3) the problem ot

d1scoverlr~

what

makes for successful part1clpat1on 1n decls10n-makl~g." 10
Polsby assumes a plurallst notlon of soclety and commun1ty
power.

From stud1es ut1lizlng the above analytIcal framework

for 1nvestlga tlon, Polsby has drawn some general propositions a-.
'bout power in dec1s1on:mak1ng.

WIth respect to

nwho

governs," he

ma1ntains that decislon-maklng partic1pants are usually spec1al
1zed 1n::certaln "issue areas."

He holds that thls l1m1ts appll

cab111ty 01' an e11t1st model of power.

In the area of "who

ga1ns" and "who loses," Polsby cautions the un1versa11ty and re
l1abll1ty of these questions, because many value outcomes of

com~

mun1ty dec1sions are frequently distr1buted 1n "un1ntended, unan
tlcll?ated ways n_ and the powerful often intentionally "d1stribute·
values to the nonpowerful."

So, wh1le useful tor analyz1ng value

distr1bution, the above 1nqulry is not useful in disclosing po
wer structures.

The issue of "who succeeds" is approached by

the use ot three indices: "when an actor initiates some commun-
lty policy, meets with no opposition, and it is enacted; when an
actor prevents the poliCY of some other actor from being enacted;
and when an actor initiates a policy, meets with oppOSition, and
the polley 1s enacted. tt 11

One ot the usual methods whereby actors assure their suc
cess tor Polsby is through coalition

~ormation.

ed certain hypotheses about these coalitions.

He has develop
They are establish

ed by-actors to 1ncrease their resources to pursue their own ends.
Subsequently, actors with complementary resources otten coalesne.
Secondly, there needs to be compatibility of goals and strate
gles of members.

Subsequently, the larger the coalition the

more "fragile" it is and the more l1mited 1ts goals and viewpolnt. 12
Summar:y:~

Allot the authors above have concerned themselves with &
nalyzing power in decision-mak1ng in terms of what can be called
a "decisional model." It is one of the general methods described
In his terms, 1t consists of a history ot spec1f1c

by Clark.

l'

.

..
6.

dec1s1ons and 1dent1f1oat1on of those 1nvloved 1n the deo1s1ons
and those who were successful.

The other wr1ters, Banf1eld,

Dahl, ano..,to some extent. Polsby

ut1l1ze an analysis of dec1sions

and the1r opponents and proponents to assess power and 1nfluence.
They'all

~et1ne

"1nfluence" 1n terms of one actor being

tul in 1mpos1ng his
another actor.

dec1s1o~~~

succeS8~

1ntent1ons, and 1nterests upon

Polsby qual1ties this phenomenon w1th the assert10n

that, while th1s may be true, 1t rarely occurs as a zero-sum re
sult.

Banf1eld, Dahl, a.nd Polsby ma1nta1n that actors utilize

their·resources to attain the1r goals which means to 1ncrease
the1r interests or domain.-

In terms of d1fferences, Banf1eld

tends to Ident1ty 1nfluence w1th the possess1on of power re
sources; Dahl 1dent1fies 1nfluence with not only the possess1on
("potential") of resources but with whether and how they are
used ("actual"); Polsby identit1es influence with the

ac~ual

out.

come ot decisions which is usually coalitional shar1ng, 1nstead

ot zero-sum vanquished or Victor.
~

B. Structura.l:
The structural element of a power analysis of dec1s1on

mak1ng 1s bas1cally concerned with the 1nternal and external
er&tion and

order1r~

op~

of the power and dec1sion-making relation

ships ot the actors involved.
1. -Internal

The 1nternal structure of organizational power 1n decis1on
making w1ll be rev1ewed f1rst.

The views of five writers, Long,

Dror, Presthu8, L1ppett, and Lindblom will be considered.

In an'article concerned more with Intraorganizational de
clsion-making, Norton E. Long analyzes decls10n and pollcy-mak
lng as a polltlcal system.

He emphasizes that 'organizational

distribution of labor fosters the proliferatIon of expertise in:
specific problem areas to specific Individuals who become "vlr
tual representa.tIves of the problem area In the decisional process. II
Wlthin organIzatIons thIs leads to the departmentalIzatIon ot in
terests with the formatlon of "extra"';'organizatlonal constituen
cles."

The "speclalized" expert wlth1n the organlzation. acmes

to relle upon thls as a

U

po lltical base" to support "hls posl

tlon In the Internal decIs1on-making process." .13

The relevance

ot th1s political dyna.mic to Interorganizaticnal coalit1on mem
bers 1s ev1dent in their preservatlon.or promotion ot what War.
ren calls organizational "domaln. 11

This "domaIn" 1s analogous to

Long's departmentalized "lnterests" ot expert organizat1onal
actors.
Some notions about 1nternal structural declsion-mak1ng
variables ot broader applicatlon are presented by Yehezkel Dror.
Not all of Dror's propOSitIons will be mentioned, because h1s
pr1mary interest is 1n developing an "OptImal Model" for dec1
slon-making and several assertions a.re not relevant to the pur
poses ot this paper.

Those generalizatIons whIch are relevant will

be discussed according to Drorls arrangement of them in what he

regards to be the basIc units of systems of declsion-m a king: U!!!_
divldual, ,ma.ll-group, .,and organizational."
S1gn1ticant "Individual" decision-making subun1t charac
terist10s and intluenoes ot each decider include thelr: (1) Indi
v1dual characterist1cs, (2) "emotIonal-physical state", (3) op1n

)

8

ion giv1ng environment, (4) perception and availab111ty of the
data. 14
The only really sign1f1cant and relevant "small-group" sub...
unit decision-making characteristics and 1nfluences concern the
"group's "structure and history," the relationsh1ps among part-i
c1pants, group leadership, "the formal role-definit1ons of the
group, and the nature of the issue-to be dec1ded." 15
Useful "organizational" decision-making subunit character....
istlcs, processes, and structures include:
"

.;...

-

(3)

(4)
(5)

(6)

Few instances of "formal rules a.nd doctrines."
Only a. few "sophisticated off1cials" are conscious of and
able to manipulate decision-shaping forces •
Organizational decision-making generally "follows semi
structures, that are mainly informal, channels and modes"
ot "tradhtlons, power relations, and formal divis10ns of
work. II
_
Organizational decis10ns are the outcome of its many "sub
deciaionunits."
.
ItBar§aining and coalition formation."
Few clear operational goalsJ"~tllittle data" and "limIted
search for alterns.tives." 16
_
Also concerned with the internal structure and d.ynam1cs

organizational decis10n-making 1s Robert V. Presthus.

or

He 1s

primarily interested in organizational author1ty on the level ot
1nterpersonal relationships 1n organ1zat10ns.

He def1nes author

ity as a "transact1onal process" 01' "1nterpersonal relation
ships."

~n

this process authority 1s va11dated by leg1t1mat1ont

based on four var1ables: "techn1cal expertise; formal role or
position in the organiz a t10n's hierarchy; rapport with others;
and 1ndIv1dual psycholog1cal deference to author1 ty !'17

~h1s

approach talls to give considerat10n tQ maIl1 p"01fer val'lab1es.
~ther

psycholog1cal v1ew of authority processes whIch 1s

9.
de~ply

concerned with power relationsh1ps 1s g1ven by L1ppitt,

et. al.:
In groups a real consensus upon who Is powerful tends to
occur;
(2) A group member 1s more likely to, accept direct attempts
to 1nfluence hlm from a person he defines as powerful;
(3) The ·average group member wll1 tend to 1n1t1ate deferen
t1al, approval-seek1r~ behav10r toward h1gher power
cho1ces. 18
( 1)

Charles E. L1ndblom has analyzed decision-maklng cn the
level of polley formatlon 1n part 1n terms of authority and of
1nformal systems of cooperation.
L1ndblom's deflnltion of authorlty includes that ''If x
can routlnely exert power or Influence over y because y accepts'·
a rule that he obeI, then x has author1ty over y."

1s lim1ted and speciflc.

Author1ty

It Is also a "concesslon" to obey by

the "controlled" to the tfcontroller."

In sltuat10ns "Wbere it.

lacks authorlty over B, he wlll use his authorlty elsewhere to
ach1eve an Influence on B."

He further malnta1ns that struc-,

tural and rule changes tend to be revolutlonary 1f they are of
dras'Uc proportions.

Consequently, sta.tus qUO Influences usu

ally remaln predomlnant and changes -are typically "1ncremental."1~
Also related to decislon-making for Lindblom Is the s1gn1
f1cance of Informal systems of coOperatlon.

He pr1nclpally Is

concerned wlth the process whereby poliCY makers adjust their in
terests and goals mutually through informal processes".
thods

or

.

'rhe me

at

adjustment 1nclude: (1) "negotiat1on," mutual persua

slon" or exchang1ng "threats and prom1ses," (2) "creating and
.d1scharging obligatlons" - network of mutual "debts," (3) "thtrd
persons," (4.) "d1rect manipulatlon," - use of authorlty to in

10
tluence others, and (5) "adaptive adjustments" deter to those
with higher knowledge and authority. 20
Summary: The internal structuring of organizational dec1s1on
making is essent1ally concerned w1th two issues: leadersh1p and
process.

Long and Presthus both view expert1se as a source 01'

-organizational dec1sion-making author1ty.

In addit1on, Presthus,

as well as Lindblom, regard formal role and rule defin1ng author
1ty as another bas1s of leadership.

Bo,th Presthus and Lippett

recognize the s1gn1f1cance of individual deference to author1ty
among the less powerful.

Lippett maintains that authority also

results from group consensus as to who 1s most powertul.

In

coa11 tiona formal roles would tend to be m1nimized"because' ot 1ts
usuall,y being an informal group, and deterence to power would be
01' minor 1mpact due to the opera t10n of the pursuit of selt

terest.
most

1n~

This would tend to leave expertise and consensus as the.

11ke~y

sources of authority.

Struct~res

eVident in decision-mak1ng processes are

ed to by Dror and Lindblom.

allu~

They both regard the process to be'

highly 1nformal and characterized by bargain1ng and ma nipulat10n.
For Dror, the informality of structure extends to rules, roles,.
methods aDd operat10ns 1n dec1sion-makicg.

These seem qu1te con -

slatent w1th the concept of coa11tions as ad hoc, 1nformal ent1t1es.

2. External
'fhe
818

1mp~ications

of external structures 1n the power anal1

ot coa11tional decision-making will be considered next.

The

11.

wr1ters rev1ewed who discussed this- topic area iI,lcluded: Reid,
Zald, and Dror.
Wil11am Reid deals with external relationships on the
inter-organizational level.

He identities three possible

"modes~

of organizational co-exiatence: u independence, interdependence,
and conflict.
Organizations are independent of one another, when they do
'not need the resources ot the other to achieve the1r goals and.
when the other is not interter1ng in their "goal aChievement."
Interdependence exists when organizations see their own goals
'.

to be 'more eff1c1ently realized with the supplement of the re
sources ot the other.

Their goals need not be 1dentical,buu tha

perception ot the organizational interdependence must be
soious.

con~

Conflict arises when the goal attainment of one or more

organizations takes place at the cost of the goal attainment of
others. 21
xayer:N. Zald discusses the conditions affect1ns whether
formal organizations will be likely to co-ordinate and
ate wIth each other.

co-op~r

The grea.ter the margInal profits of an or

ganization and/or the greater the

symb1ot~relatlonship

agenCIes, the greater the likelihood of co-ordination.

between
The

greater an organization is committed to a set program and stra
tegy, the less the lIkelihood of co-ordinat1on. 22
He maintains that "Organizations, in attempting to aohieve

ends, form external al11ances, curry tavor, and conform to the re
quirements ot"agents having greater power."

The extent to wh1ch

these relatIons become stable tor a member organization (focal)

r.: .,

12

1s' important, because:
F1rst, the greater the sanction and resource control of the
other party, or the coalitional al11ance, the less the au
tonomy of the faoal organlzation •••
'
Second, the more a focal organization is bound into a stable
external political structure, the more areas of internal
policy-setting are influenced by the coalltion. 23
Dror 1s concerned about the significance of coalitions for
external pollCy execution.
sent1al in.-: thls regard.

He mainta1ns that coalit10ns are es

Some of the po1nts whlch he regards as

relevant to pollcy-maklng include::
The probability of form1ng a coalltlon-able to execute
a policy depends upon the characterlstlcs of the polioy,
power dlstributlon, and the structure and tendency to
torm coalitlons
by the "lnvolved soclal and political
institutlons. u
(2) Given number one, the format1on of a policy is slgnifl
cantly shaped by the need tor a strong enough execution'
coa11tion.
(3) The need to form a coalition llmits the posslble alter
natives but does not .eliminate the "freedom of cho1ce tf ot
polley-makers.
(4) Each potential coalition member decides 2wbether.to join
based upon power gain and value system. 4

( 1)

Summary: \ihile distinct in their approaches to the external
structure of coa11tional decision-making, there are definlte
llnks between the proposltlons of each author.

The common ele

ments dlvlde into the bas1s or motivation for lnterorganiz&tion.
&1 co-ordinatlon and into the implications for the autonomy of
members 1n decl·sion-maklns.
The commonly identified mot1ve for coalition formation 1s
se1tlnterest: either to expand or to protect one's doma1n.
Reid S&18 that independence exists between organizations when
they do not need the resources ot others.

On the other hand

Reld says that interdependence arises when organlzatlonal goals
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are reallzedor, protected better with the assistance of the oth
er's resources.

In l1ke manner, Zald sees co-ordinat1on:1n In

stances of marg1nal prof1ts where the resources of other organ
izatlons' are desirable.

Dror ma1ntalns that members Joln coall

t10ns tog&ln power, promote thelr value system or better assure
the successful execution of a polley.
The autonomy of coa11tlon members, accord1ng to Zald, 1s
limlted relative tQ the coa11t10n's control of resources and mem
ber lnvolvement ln a stableco&lltlonal, politlcal structure.
Dror, on the other hand, 'looks at the l1mltations of alternatives
the coalition can pursue as a whole, as the result of belng com

posed of members of var10us interests.
'0. Exbhapge:
The subject of exchange
declsion-makir~

in power analysls of coalltional

,w1ll be examined next.

set of varlables to be analyzed.

It provides a oomplex

Nuttall, Scheuch, and Gordon

present broad conceptualizatloDSof the ccnditions
and exchange.

~f

influence

Adrlan and Press present an analysls of cost,

while Clark, Reid, and Blau discuss types of exchange s1tuations.
1. ponditlons:

The flrst model to be rev1ewed whlch analyzes the area of

resourc.es and exchange is done by Nuttal, Scheuch, and Gordon.
Thelr model seeks a "conceptuallzation of condltions of 1nflu
ence."

Thelr typology of lnfluence is bu1lt upon two central

dlmensions of the actors: "(1) actual access to relevant re
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sources ••• and, (2) whether or not others in the system credit.
h1m w1th this possess1on." 25
Some ot the key concepts around resource access 1nclude
sanction, resource, and author1ty.

They define

sa~ct1on

as

"anything wh1ch can be applIed to a person, group or collectiv

.ity (an actor) whIch the gIven actor'subject1vely defInes as re-·
warding or harmful. n
lows one actor to

Resource is defined as "anyth1ng wh1ch a1-

~ontrol,

provide, or apply a sanctIon (pos1

t1ve or negative) to another actor. 1t

The actual process of

sanctioning 1s thus the "actual use of resources to reward or
harm another."

W1th1n th1s scheme authorIty Is "the leg1tlmated

'r1ght' Qt the cert1fied 1ncumbent of a poslt1on to make bIndIng
comm1tments regarding the collectiv1ty's polic1es and resources.:
and to direct the activ1tles ot hIs subordInates."

In the pheno

menon ot "influenc1ng the outcome of decision-mak1ng," the re
sources ot an

ac~or

are e1ther direct (own) or 1nd1rect (through

others) and the power (control) is "legitimated" (author1ty) or
Wnot

leg1 timated" (unauthor1zed, c.oerc ion or deterence).

The

strateg1es of Influence wh1ch they identify are: (1) "persuas1on,"
(2) "1nducement" (3) "1nvok1ng obligaticn," (4) "structuring" (a
va11able alternatives), (5) "man1pulating the perception of
th~se

alternatives," (6) "dlvert1ng the other's attentIon," (7)

·coerc1on."

imother key concept 1s "generalIty" ot resource wh1ch

"denotes the number of Situations (or contexts) and actors tor
wh1ch the very same resource Is effect1ve In·lnfluenc1ng."

In

an exchange of resources there are two actors: "one ot whom pos
sesses" and the other a "receptor." 26
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In order to analyze .a particular decision-making process
1 t 1s important to c cnsider:

It (

1) the types of resources each

actor possesses, (2) the presence ot receptors for them, and '(3)
.. ,

the type or mode of resources which·is crucial for the decis1on:
belng made."

Also the extent to whIch an actor ca.n transform

bis resources into other types is basic to his influence.

Fur~

thermore, in analysis, the typology which these writers propose
1s constructed around two :basic dimensions: "(1) the actual abil

ity to apply a resource in sanctioning l.f
- . payoff time comes, and
(2) the belie! of the other actors that the actor possesses or
~

controls the resource which would allow him to sanct1on.

The

cross-cutt1ng of these two dimensions results in four cate
gorles of 1nfluentials:

lOTUAL ACCESS
TO. RESOURCES

PERCEIVED ACCESS TO RESQURCES
Yes

Yes

No

Ho.

Ma.n! est. Influence Potential
Influence
Reputed Influenoe W1thou~.7,27

~h.

authors then state hypotheses about each category o.f

actor::
(1) "Actors 'Without Influence" ••• "will try to change the

mode or structure of a decis1on-making system."

(2) "Actors with reputed influence" a.nd who know it "W1ll try

to avoid a demand for pay-off sanctions." Also, in sys
tems with many cr1ses, few actors will have "reputed in
fluence" while decision-making systems with few recent
cr1ses w1ll have many actors with "reputed 1nfluence."
"Actors with potential influence" once they sanction u
sually are seen by others as having consumed their resource
and become f1without influence" or others bel1eve it 1s
consumed when it 1s not and the actor rema1ns 1n~a situ
ation of "potentia.l influence. 1t
(4) "Actors w1th manlf'est 1nfluence" wlll 1nfluence decls10ns
-'-..
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mostly by the "invocation ot resources." Whetherthey use
up a resource after a particular decision and hew others
v1ew.them will determ1ne in which ot the four categorles
they wl11 be. 28
.
Other key hypotheses Include:
(1) The order of readlness to sanction wll1 be "potentlal,"

"manl:test,11 "reputed."

(2) Except for actors whose §oal is to increase their Influ
ence, actors w111,avo1d pay-offs" unless they will 1088

Influence It they do not. 29

2 •. Costs::

. The next wr1ters. Charles R. Adrlan and Charles Press, are:
Interested In "declslon. costs in coalltions."

Wh1le the basls·

ot the discussion 1s coalltions.the maln focus Is on the costs
involved

~n

the formatlon and decislon-maklng of coalltlons.

'rhe notion of coalltlon whlch they use Is related to the notlon

ot a subun1"t of a larger formal body.
the dom1nant force In the formal group_

Thls subunit,

however,~is:'

They deflne' a "wlnning

coalltlon" as "any portlon of the group .that can declde to do or
not to do somethlng that Is on the agenda of the group and over
wh1ch 1t has competent authorlty."

Once the formal rules decide

what 1s needed for a wlnnlng coalltlon, the slze and composition

ot the coalitlon 1s 1n theory set by the total of the "declslon
costs 1nv<?lved tor partlc.ipants _tl

.

The "costs" are Influenced

primarily by three prlnclples; (1) "unanlmlty prlnciple" group
pressure tor unanlmlty (derived from small group theory), (2)
"s1ze principle" a.ttempt to achleve "mlnimal wlnning coalitlons"
to maximlze "payotts," (3) "lndlspensible membershlp princ1ple H
deals w1th the sltuations

In~which

certaln powertul parties must

be included for 1t to succeed. 30
The authors next are 1nterested in discussing
ent types of "decision costs."

These include: (1)

th~

d1ffer

't1nformatlon'~

costs," (2) "responsibi11ty costs," (3) t'intergame costs,·' (4)
"division - of - payoffs costs," (5) udlssonance costs," (6)
"InertIa costs," (7) "pressure - of - time costs," (8) "persua
sion. costs. It 31

3. Sltuat1ons:
!here are three authors who present somewhat differ1ng
VIews of the aitua.tion of exchange.

Clark characterizes it by.,

mutualit1,'while Reid and Blau contend that conflict and Ine
quality are

pr~dominant

in exchange situations.

For Clark the crucIal.stage of the formatIon and exercise

ot power occurs when "one actor is able to otfer to others some
kInd of commodity which places them in his debt. It

In situat10ns

of mutual, rec.1proca·lexchange, he has developed five possible
relationships: (1) "reciprocation in kInd, tt (2) "reciprocation

•••• ot an entIrely different sort," (3) "noblesse oblIge," (4)
instItut1ona11zed "altru~sm," and (5) "ciroular" t'pa.th" ot ex
changes. 32 He a.dds three qualif1cations of the exchange sys
"the more general the resource - ••• utIl1ty ••• di
verse •••- the greater the potential for extension of the ex
tem:

( 1)

"t~e.larger

change system;" (2)

the number of resources ••• :

~he;

more dIrect, complex, and extens1ve eXChanges 1n the system may
'becomej" (3) "the

sr~ater
:"~~~""4_!~"

the consensus among members of a

. ~

80

'c1&1 system on basiC 'values ••• the more extensive, complex, and
. ......
.

~\

:":'

ind1rect may be .the eXChange relationships among members of the
system." 33

For Clark, there are three basic categories of ex

change values of resources: "prestige value,u "institutionaliza

tion importance," and "power value." 34
·Reid's notions of exchange are derived from his interpre
tation· of ..inter-organizational conflict. The first type of con
fllet 1s the "competltive situa.tion" wherein there is a struggle
over acquiring scarce

tt~esource

inputs."

The second type is the

"bargaining Situation- wherein disagreement occurs over what and

how much of. resources are to

be

contributed by whom in exchanges:.

The third type 1s the "legitimacy issue tl concerned with disputes
over "output of resources" by one organization as defeating the
goals of another.

It this is done, organizations ca.n refuse to

legitimate one another's goals and domains. 35
Peter Blau's scheme assumes that inequalities in power
exist and develop among actors.

In instances of the exercise of

power by a more powerful actor upon a less powerful aotor, the
eXChange can be analyzed through the use of a model he has tormu
lated.

The key elements in this

comp11ance" (choices to

l~ss

struc~ure

are: "alternatives to

powerful for noncompliance), "cond1

tions of 1ndependence" (essentials to less powerful to be non
comp11ant), ·"requirements of power" (essentials for powerful to
torce comp11ance), and "structural lmpli.cat1ons" (areas involved

t.hat should be studled).

The scheme 1s as follows:

..

'

...
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Alternat1ves
to Compliance

Cond1tions ot
Independence

Requ1rements
ot Power

Structural
Impl1cations

1. Supply in-'
ducements

Strategic
resources

Ind1fterence
to what others
otter

Exchange and
distribution"' o:t
r.esources •

.
2. Obtain",
elsewhere

Available
alternat1ves

Monopoly over
what others
need

CompetIt1on'and
exchange rates..

3 •. Take by

Coercive
force

Law and
Order

Organizat1on
and d1fferent1
ation.

4.

Ideals
lessen1ng
needs

Katerialls
tic and oth
er relevant
values

Idealogy
format1on'

force

Do

Without:.

36

Summary: The section on exchange has had writ1ngs, which not so
, muoh disagree among themselves, as much as" they complement each
other.
Nuttall, et. ale present a model which stresses the condi
tions of influence and exchange, wh1ch are bas10 to power analy
sis.

The notions of perceived and actual influence are helpful

to coalitional analysis, especially Since coa11tions in the1r early
stages are characterized by a lack of inter-member familiar1ty"
which, in turn, would initially base a great deal on appear
ances.

A gamut ot strategies could also be utilized.

The three

analytical quest10ns perta1n1ng to resources are useful tools

and directly pertaln to the areas consldered by the other "ex_
change" writers.

These

~uestlons

concern: (1) each actor's re

8ourc·es, (2) presence of ' receptors for them, (3) type of resour
ces necessary for the declslon belng made.•
Adrlan and Press are concerned about the types of costs
incurred by declsions, whlch in turn requlre resources to sup
port them.

They are concerned with the feas1blllty and conse

quences ot coalltlonal decls10n costs and varlables influenclng
them, such as, the unanlmltyand s1ze pr1nclples and the lmpact

ot the 1ndlspens1ble member.
The only real area of dlspar1ty among the wrlters is found
,between Clark, and Reid and Blau.

Clark characterlzes eXChange

relatlonships as mutual eXChange and co-operatlon and consen
sus, whlle Reid and Blau malntaln that S.ltuatlons of exchange
. are based on inequallty and conflict among members.

In coali

tional behavlor, it ls conceivable that either consensus or con
flict relatlons could exist dependlng upon the level of scarCity

ot resources and interdependence or dependence of actors.
I~

Process Analysls

or

Declslon~Mak1ng

The actual process of decision-maklng
now be addressed.

i~coalitlons

The literature reviewed was ot abroad

will
scope~

and the authors d1d not speclfy coalitional dynam1cs for the1r
principal focus of analySis.

However, as with the writers re

viewed tor t.he sectlon on power analYSiS, these wrlters second
arily covered lssues relevant to coalltions.

The two ma1n areas

discussed in these works are declsion-making typo1og1es and
·phases.
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.6.. typologies:'

Th1s sectlon presents d1fferent schemes that ha.ve been
developed to

categor1z~

decision-types.

The authors who were

reviewed were: Braybrooke and Lindblom, William J. Gore, and
Harvey and M1lls.
Braybrooke and L1ndblom have formulated a typology that .
is constructed around two focal conoepts: (1) degree of' chanse
brought by decis1on, (2) adequacy of information and understand
1ng ava1lable to the dec1s1on-makers.

Their dec1sion types in-·

elude:
Ca) decis10ns that effect large change and are guided by ade
quate information and understanding; (b) decls10ns that et
fect large change but are not s1m1la rly gu1ded - hence, at .
an extreme, blind or unpredictable decisions; (c) decis10ns
that effect only small change and. are guided by a.dequa.te in
formation. a.nd understanding, and (d) decisions that effect
small change but are not simllarly guided, being therefore
subject to constant recons1deration and redirection. 37
Expressed in a grld box 1t appears as follows:

I NFOBMATI O!r

CHANGE

adequate

Large
Small

I
W1lliam J.

~

1nadequa.te

I

attempts to develop a typological model

wh1ch also addresses ltself' to the variable of "change."

It 1s

Gore's contention that "recurring" or "programmed" decis1cns

have been the only types of decisions studied while

nnonrecu~

r1ng" and "nonprogrammed" decisions have been left 'unanalyzed,•. 3S:
Be then del1neates a typology wh1ch attempts to 1ncorporate both
main categories of' decisicns in a three element continuum:

1. -Routine decisions," "correspondence between the prefab

ricated response and the response required by the s1tua
t10n. II
2. "Incremental change" and dec1s1ons t "to a.djust to an antl- ,
c1pated sta.te of affa1rs." Usually opera.tes by way of 1n
formal procedures based on experience. It 1s more apt to .
concentrate upon "negotIation and development of new un
derstand1ngs,1f because 1t focuses upon problems and not
tasks (rout1ne decis1ons).
3. "Innovat1ve dec1s1ons" concern a "major change 1n activ1ty
and operation wh1ch leads to a change 1n goals, purposes,;
or po11c1es." 39
!h1s model also 1ncorporates a.n analytIcal pos1tion on the
phases which these d1fferent dec1s10n. types tend to tollow.

This

will be'presented under the following sect10n on "phases."
Harvey and Mills have developed a typology ot deciaion
mak1ng s1milar to Gore's.

However, they reter to dec1sions as

solut1ons.

Their bas1c categor1es are rout1ne and innovat1ve

solutions.

In addition, they emphas1ze that wh1le rout1ne solu

t10ns tend to be \SEd for routIne problems and innovative Bolu
tions for innovative problems,routine solutions oan be used tor
1nnovat1ve problems and 1nnovative solut10ns for rout1ne problem. 40
They have also expressed this model 1n terms of phases wh1ch will
be d1scussed later.
Summary: There are connecting factors which run
cepts ot each of the above wr1ters.

tr~ough

the

co~

They are all concerned with

the·dec1s1on response in theIr typologies.

There are other com

mona11ties from author to author.
Bralbrooke and L1ndblom focus upon the variables of lntor
matlon.and Change.

Information can be adequa.te or 1nadequa te.

Change can be large or small. Gore 1s also concerned with change.
What Braybrooke and L1ndblom reter to as "large change," Gore
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'calls "innovative. II

What they designate "small change" is com

parable to Gore's category "incremental change," adjustment.
What"Gore calls

tf

ro\1t1ne," they do not have a des1gnat10n for,

but oonoeivably it would' be classified uno change."
Wh1le addressing the issue of change resulting from a de
cision, Gore does not discuss information, as do Braybrooke and
Lindblom.
Harvey and M1lls also are concerned with innovative

an~

routine decisions or "solutions" but draw a further distinction
which

no~e

of the other writers presented - 1nnovative and rou

tine problems.

The other authors appear to have assumed a

tinu1ty between problems and solutions.

co~

In add1tIon,llarvey and

KIlls' model does not refer to the variable of informat1on.
fakIng all of the autsors together, there emerge three
central variables: problem, information, and solution (decIsion).
If·the solut1on and problem types are expanded to 3 (rout1ne,
I

inoremental, and 1nnovative) and information to 2 (adequate and
Inadequate), then a rather extensIve typolog1cal scheme results.
It is feasible that coalItions

be1r~

informal and transc1ent

that all problems would tend to be innovative, but th1s is pro
bably only the case durIng the in1t1al phases of the group.
Oonsequently, problem type rema1ns a vIable factor.

If the var

1able "1nformation" 1s introduced into a typology with the var1

ables "problem" and "solution," the question arises as to which
or the two, it not both, does adequate and 1nadequate 1nformatlon
reter.

Braybrooke and L1ndblom appear to be referring only to

the "change solut1on," Since they do not even diSCUSS the var1

able "problem."

However, whether aotors have adequate knowledge

about the problem with which they are confronted, as well as, the
adequacy of the "dec1sion solution" chosen, seem to both bare a
signlficance In categorizing

~ec1s1on-mak1ng.

B.' Phas,es:
Thls section concerns itself with' models which deplct pos
slble stages through whlch coalitlons pass in their decision-mak
ing process.

Again, this material is of broader applicab111ty

, than coalitions, but 1 t will be assessed in terms of coali tiona'.
fwo writings ref'erre'd to under the sectlon on typologies ha.ve
phase models bul1t upon those typologies ( Gore, and Harvey and
Mi,lle).

Two other works focus on stages or phases of "rational"

decision-making (Brim and Glass, and Slmon).
~

typifies 'the overall prooess and interactlon of

rou~

tine, incremental, and Innovative dec1sions as a rhythmic move
ment.

"The essential rhythm of organizational adjustment is

from routlne to adaptive to routine; or from routine to adaptive
to innovative and back to adaptive a.nd eventually to routlne
again. It 41

Harvey and )1111s have formulated a sequential Upath-way"
model to illustrate the stage prooess.

Its phases lnclude: "Is

sue-perception and formation of goals," "search and the use of

eXpectations, tt "choice of solution," and

II

redeflnl t10n -" the

attempt by others to "evade or modlfy such outcomes.'" 42

The

attached 1llustrative flow chart will demonstrate these patterns.
It should be mentioned that for both rout1ne and innovat1ve prob

25
I

lem situations "Path 1 al 1s usually chosen by well-estab11shed
,"low-threat" organizations, "Path 3" by precar10usly existing
"high_threat" organ1zat1ons and "path 2" by organ1zat1ons at an

--

1ntermed1ate relation to threat. 43
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Brim, Glass, et. al, 1dentifyand discuss

declsion~procesB

phases which must be gone through rationally in situations and
problem areas that are new and not suited to routinized organ1
zational behavior.

They then. delineate six discernible phases

wh10h they emphasize are
cision.

applicab~e

to the analysis of any de

They also mention that every decision need not neces

sar11y involve all of the six phases if some of them have been
adequately accounted for previously.

The six phases in what

Brim calls their customary "sequence" are;
(1~1dentification

of the problem;
obtainir-g necessary information;
(3 production of possible solutions;
4~ evaluation of such solutions;
_ 5 selection of a strategy for performance; and
6 actual performance of an action or actions and subse
:·~quent learning and revision-. 45
(2

t

The same six phases are recognized by Terry Clark. 46
The second essentially rational model to be summarized 1s:
one by Herbert A. Simon.

He is concerned with rationally account

ing tor the environment and consequences of

He

decision-makir~.

concentra.tes on "means and ends," "alternatives and consequences,"
and "value and possibi11 ty. "

Simon· cautions sophist1cation

dealing with the "means - end" issue.

in-~

The d1recting principle

is that "efficiency" demands "attainment of maximum values with
lim1ted ends ." 47
"Alterna.tives a.nd consequences" involves speculating about(.
"behavior alternatives."

This includes: (1) listing ot

alterna~

tive strategies, (2) determining consequences that result from
each strategy, and (3) comparative evaluation_of these sets of
consequences.

The "time and behavior" var1ables can preclude

..
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certalnalternativas on the basis of time limitations and pre
vious decisions.

"Knowledge and beha.vior" concerns should in

clude establishing 'sets of expectations for the consequences ot
difterent strategies.

"Group behavior" involves getting to know

the strategies of the other group members and determining whe
ther their desired consequences are the same (cooperative sit
uation) or in oppos1tion(competitive Situation) with one's own. 48
"Value and posSibility" concerns making a determination of
preterences among consequences: "valuation."

This is done on

values of "utility" (acquiring the best exchange rate) and/or
the "relation of value, experience"behaVior."

This returns the

1ssue to means and ends; "a means-end chain is a series of a.ntl
c1patlons that connect a value with the Situations rea11z1ng it,
and these Situations, in turn, with the behaviors that produce
them. n 49
He concludes this approach with a definition of rational
1ty in

decision-makir~j

"rationality is concerned with the sel

ection of preferred behavior alternatives in terms of some system

ot values whereby the consequences ot behavior can be evaluated."
Be then relates that the rationa11ty is relative to whose system

ot values the goals are def1ned by. 50
Summary: ftbile Gore 1s basically dev1sing a ryhthmic movement ot
phases, Harvey and Mills' phases are concerned with represent1ng
•

the poss1ble m1xed comb1nations of innovative and routine problema
and solut1ons and the1r reconsideration 1n the decision-mak1ng
process.

Gore's model much more closely approximates actually

distinct phases In dec1s1on-making.
,The two ratlonal models conta1n phases whlch are qu1te
sim1lar.

It should be noted that Brim, Glass, et. al. consider

the "ratlonal" model to be applicable In nonroutinized decislon.
. sltuatlons.

The Brlm and Simon models both essentially contaln

the followlng phases: (1) Some review of informat1on and alter
natives, (2) determlning posslble solutions and consequences"

(3) comparatlve analys1s of (2), (4) choice among them, (5) per
formance of actlons.

They differ In that Brim lists an initIal

step ot problem Identlflcation, and Slmon does not.

Yet, 81moa

includes an analysls by each actor of the others' strategles and
goals so the group can assess their s1tuatlon as cooperative or
competitive.

Brim does not speclflcally mentlon this stage,

however/it may be Implled

i~ th~

phases which determ1ne and com

pare different possible stategies and solutions.
In coalitions" the internal sltuation (cooperatlon or
competit1on) could greatiy Influence whether a ratlonal model
w1l1 at all be feas1ble 1n the group's dec1s1on-making process •.
.l!lALYTICAL.. MODEL

Thls study wlll next present a theoret1cal model for analy
z1ng the decislon-maklng process in coalltions In l1ght of the
above read1ngs.

Th1s model Is not an hypothesls to be tested,

but rather"s scheme dev1sed to ascerta1n its app11cab1l1ty to
cas.studies as a step in theory bul1dlng and

explor~tory res~arch

in the area ot coalltional Interorgan1zatlonal behavior.

The a

bove 1itera.ture de11neates what other writers cons1der to be the.

/

process of decision-making and power in organizational and 1n
terorgan1zat1onal behavior by way of observation and hypothesiz
1ng. "Th1s study will draw from these works to formulate a model
that 1s regarded to be relevant to coalit1onal 1nterorgan1zatiom
a1

dec1sion-mak1~~.

The model w111 be presented according tocategor1cal areas
essent1ally the same as those ut111zed for structuring the ma
t,er1al in the rev1ew of

t~e

11terature: dec1sion-making power

"analys1s (theoret1oal, structural, exchange)" and decis1on-making
process analys1s (typology, phases).

I. Dec1sion-Making Power AnalysiS:

.

In analyz1ng power as related to the coa11t1onal deo1s1on
mak1ng field, there are essept1 a lly three analyt10al areas of
conoern.

These involve theoretical, structural, and exchange

quest10ns and issues.

A. Theoret1cal Issues:
In analyzing the o8sestud1es I an eal!ec'tI1c ,~, a.pproach ...,111

be taken to .ach1e"i:8"r:. a perspect1ve on what const1tutes the phen
omena of power and 1nfluence and their exercise.

Power w111 be

defined as' the ability to influence other actors to be in accord
w1th one's own pos1t1on and the extent to which an actor is able
to subsequently have h1B pos1t1on accepted.

~hese

dec1sion vic

tor1es w1ll not be based on-a zero-sum basls, but in terms of re
lat1ve success of members as the result of coalitional decislon'
arrangements.•

,~
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S1nce th1s proJect 1s utilizing casestudies (ex post,facto
interview data), the Interpretations ot those intervIewed about
all issues and actions may have been modIfIed by memory loss,.
selective recall, "output" but not "Input" and "process" vIew
poInts, ind1vIdual interests and their outcomes, etc.
tional method generally

lac~s

The posI

applicabIlity to interorganiz&

t10nal coalitions, Since they are characterized by minimal
nal formal structures.

Inter~

Furthermore, since the fife-span of coa

litions is transc1ent, reputational configurations resulting
from internal decision-making outcomes will be m1nimal, espe
cially' In:the early decISions of the coalition.

Therefore,

,while positions and reputations of member units might be useful
indices of power configurations, the "deciSional," or historI
cal, analYSis of issue areas-and decisions seems that It
more appropriate to the type of data involved.

w11~

be

Yet, in combin

ing a modified positional model and a decisional model. the pos
ition which a unit representative holds in his "parent organi
zation" and that 'In the

coalit~on

(it any) and his subsequent

level of influence in the coalItIon's decision-making could be
Significant.
B. Structural Issues:
1. External:

fhere are certain. questions which can be cons1dered or

"sought out" in the case materlal which could help extrapolate
the power structure of ,the coalitions studied.

Members (units)
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artt part of the coalition voluntarily as autonomous units who
Joined the coalition in order to expand or protect their domain
(selt-interest).

This may also take the torm of co alitien member

ship based upon the need to share in the resources ot tellow
members.

It appears that the autonomy of. coalit10n members 1s

lessened relative to the coalition's control of resources a.nd
soph1stication of internal organization.
It appears probable that a,considerable degree of the in
fluence exercised by one unit upon another could be the conse
quence ot extra-coalitional relations, as well as, the internal
structure (minimal) of the coalition.

Subsequently, it would be

useful to compose a network illustration ot member units' inter
relationsh1ps both within and' outSide (and prior to) the ooali
tion.

It would seem probable, that Since coalitions are con

cerned only seoondarily with issues outSide ot each unit's cru
cfal intra-organizat1onal systems, that the preservation and
promot1on of un1t lnterests (autonomous), including existing 10
terorganizational relations, would be ot primary concern for mem
bers ot coalitlons.

This could be modified ln lnstances where

,the issue betore a coalltion relates to the survival ot one or
more ot its members.
2. Internal:
Some internal power structure lssues need to be discussed.
These should be of minimal signiflcance, lt, 1n tact, units ot a
coalition invest 1t With little authorlty, leadership, and for
mal structural 'elements.

As a result, tormal coalitional roles,
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1t they were established, would carry little real power.

As

mentioned earlier, it is important to determine where each unit
stands within their own organization', because they might only be
representing a specific interest and segment of that '"parent or
gan1zation."

Special expertise on the part of certain members

could give them additional authority. and power in the group.
Members of the coalition will tend to develop a consensus about
who i8 more powerful in the group.

This could cbange consider

ably over the l1fe time of the coalition, s1nce different issue
areas will be considered in wh1ch different actors will have more
influence.

Also, if the actors are unfamiliar with each other

together as a configuration of different interests with differ
ent degrees and types of influence, only the actual testing and
sanctioning of power on i8sues:W111 familiarize each unit as to the
influence and power of each other unit, relative to one another.

From the above and also since coalitions are informal and
short term entities, 'it seems probtable that a considerable degree
of "testing" of one another's power will take place, especially
early in the coalition's history.

after this process, patterns

. of unequal influence within the coalition should more clearly
emerge.

If there is a single "leader" (forma.1 or informal) in

the coalition, it would indicate an "imbalance" of power hier
archically within the coalition.

"

If there are several centers'

of group leadership, it would indicate a more "balanced"dlstrl
bution or power among coalition members.
O~'Exchange

Issues

Ii

The dynamics of the power structure of coalitions is as
certainable from the actual systems and operatlons of exchange.
Wi thln the dynamlcs of exchange a resource Is ,a commodl ty pos
sessed and controlled by Indlvidual unlt members or actually or
potent1ally by the coalltlon as a whole, and It 1s valued (or
sought) by the coalltlon unlts.

Influence Is the use of a re

source of power by one unlt (lnfluencer) upon one or more other
un1ts(lnfluencee) to alter the lnfluencee~s positlon or actlon
so as to promote or favor the Influencer's Interests and goals.
Types of resources can include money, frlendshlps, jobs,
votes, informatlon, group structural controls, etc.

The more

general a resource Is,.the greater the number of s1tuations of
influence 1n which it can be ut1l1zed.

These resources can be

operat1onallzed by strategles toward other units of persuas1on,
ob11gatlon, induceme'nt (reward or pun1shment), structur1ng of
alternat1ves, manlpulatlon of perceptlon of alternatlves, d1ver
slon of attentlon, and coercIon.
The exIstence of a receptor Is.basiC to the exlstence of
1nfluence, because 1t makes'posslble. the control of one unit by
another.

The more un1ts are dependent upon each other's resources

for organizational unit goal attaInment, the higher the level ot
co-ordination and the more frequent the eXChange wlll be charac
·ter1zed by barga1n1ng.

The greater the co-ordlnation and interde

pendence, the more frequently relations will be characterized by
mutual eXChange.

The greater the slngular comm1tment to 1ndivi

dual unlt goals the lower the level of cooperation.

The

grea~er

the compet1tlon for resources Bought, the greater the group

co~

fllctl.- this Includes existlng resources and/or expansion of re
sources.

If,he higher the relatlonship between resources avail

able 'through membershlp In the coalition-and unit goals sought,·
the higher the level of that unit's involvement In coa11tional
operations.
The analys1s of the type or mode of resources
the dec1sion belng made is a complex question.

for

necessa~

In terms of gener

al compos1te coalitional resources, d1fferent issues often de
, mand different types of resources to be exerCised.

The types of

resource t'costs" that can be incurred by a coalition unit, sub
group of units, or full coalltional group can include: (1) in
form a t1on, (2) responsib1l1ty (for taklng a certain posltion),
(3),1ntergame, (4) dlvls1on,Ofpay-offs, (S) dlssonance, (6) in
ertia (1nternal restructuring of group)', (7) pressure of tIme,:
and (8) persuaSion to gain. support of needed vote or resource.
In addition, certain "dec1sion cost" princ1ples can alter the' de
gree of cost Incurred: size, unanim1ty, and indispensible member::
principles.
Units with fewer of the resources, which are

necessa~

for

a particular deCiSion, than one or more other units can moderate
their poslt1on of Inabil1ty to influence a decision by overcom1ng
the advantage of the more powerful.

~hiS

can be achieved by al

ter1ng in desrees the process of indebtedness and control, to a
Situation of reciproca.t1on and equality.

Where the more

power~

tul do not need the resources of the wea.ker, the potential re
ceptor(s) ma.y poss1bly involve thelr other resource potent1als a.s
commodities for exchange.

Where . t he more powerful control a re
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source needed by a potential receptor(s), the weaker un1t may pos
S1bly seek out alternative resources aside from the stronger coal
1t10n member un1ts.

These are possible phenomena to be observed

In analys1s of exchange 1nteract1ons.
Some
1.

mor~

spec1f1c

~est1ons

could 1nclude:

What were the power or 1nfluence resources of each unit?

'2. What were the power or influence resources relevant to
each decision 1ssue?

3. Who exerc1sed (or attempted to) 1nfluence upon whom 1n
~ach

4. What

dec1s1on 1ssue?
wer6~

resources of each un1t reapective to the

decis10n issue?

5. What was the outcome?
6. What pos1t1on did each un1t take on each dec1sion is
sue as compared to the outcome of the dec1s1on-mak1ng
process?

7. What weretne goals of each unit 1n Jo1ning the coa11t1on
and what was the actual outcome 1p terms of these goals.
II. Decision-Making Process Analysis
The study will now turn to the development of a model for
the analysis of the

dec1s1on-makir~

process 1n terms of typol

ogles 'and phases for 1nt.erorganlzational coa11 t10ns.
&.Typolostcal Issues
One possIble typological scheme for analyz1ng dec1sional
responses to problem s1tuat10ns 1s from gradat'1ons of organ1za-·

tional famlllar1ty.

Degrees of familiar1ty with problems and

w1th solut1ons (or decisions) are conceivable wIthin a contin
uum ot routine, incremental and innovative.

A rout1ne problem

or routIne solut1on would both have a h1gh familiarity rating
and can be characterIzed by the term task or1ented.

Incremental

has the connotat10n of be1ng adjustment or1ented, whIle Innova
tive problems and solutions are change oriented.

Wh1le routine

problems are usually responded to with routine solutions, 1ncre
mental or innovative solutions are also possible.

The same is

applIcable to incremental and 1nnovat1ve problems and solutions.
It tius model were to be expanded to include the var1able

ot Informat1on and understanding (adequate or

inadequ~te)

as to

the condItIons of a problem situat10n and problem solution a tar
more complex scheme emerges.
tIned as sufficient

In thIs case adequacy would be de

understandi~~

of the demands of the problem

situat10n and of the consequences of the problem solution for
what they are: Innovat1ve, incrementa.l, or rout1ne.

The model

would take thiS form.
PROBLEM SOLUTION'.'
~,

.

....

"

ROUTINE

INCREMENTaL

INNOVATIVE

blem
uation

I NFORMATICN adequa.te inadequa.te adequate inadequate adequate inadeouate

t1ne

a.deauate
inadeQ.uate

remental adeauate
inadequate
ovative

adequa.te
inadequate

----~

"

.

.~

....

t

! 1

The analytical usefulness and praot1cal app11cat1on'of
such a not1on of "lnformation adequacy" remains dubious, espe
c1ally 1n terms of casestudy data.

Another means of assess1ng

adequacy would be whether a solution

~as

successful 1n solv1ng

a,problem situation, or 1f there arose many consequences with
which the 'coa11t1on' apparently was not prepared to cope.
B. Phase Issues
The above typology 1nd1cates possible phases 1n app11ca
t10n to 1nterorgan1zatlonal coa.lit1ons.

It seems probable that

nearly all problem s1tuations and problem soluti.ons w1ll be 1n
novatlvely or1ented.

stages

or

Th1s w1ll be part1cularly true 1n the early

the operations of these groups.

Th1s 1s the case be

cause every problem s1tuation w1ll be new to the coa11t1on as a
group and their response wlll be new for the group.

Cnce cer

tain procedural ground rules are estab11shed and the coalltion
galns experlence, the other orientations w1ll become involved.
However, it 1s poss1ble for any comb1nation to result, but less
probable.
Certa1n procedures or phases 1n decision-mak1ng seem to be
relatively cons1stent in most

sltu~tions

where rationality (as

well as un1t group lnterest) 1s regarded as s1gnificant by the par
t1Cipants.

These are

dec1slon-makir~

steps or phases and should

not be confused with group developmental stages or:phases.
model

tOl-

One

compartmenta11zir..g this process as a rat10nal develop

ment indicates the presence of these steps 1n decis1on-making:
1. Issue or Problem 1dent1flcation.

2. Informat1on

gatherlr~.

3. Listing of alternative strategies and solutions.

4. Determination of consequences of eac.h stra.tegy or solut1on.

S. Comparative evaluat10n ot findings.
6. Oho1ce of strateg1es or solutions.
7. Enactment of strategy 'or solution.
The app11cab1l1ty of th1s model 1s probably relat1ve to the
degree ot cooperation or conf11ct ot goals and interests of the
un1ts comprlsing the interorganizatiqnal
coalitlon.
,
should be expected to exlst in decision-maklng.

Un1t b1ases

All seven of these.

phases should be examined (If poss1ble) from the perspectlve ot
the make-up of the coa11 tlon.• · However, issue and interest agree...
ment or d1sagreement among units are both compat1ble w1ththe
formation of a coalItion.
OASESTUDY

AN~LYTICAL

MODEL

)1aln Assertions.
I. Dec1sion-Making Power Analysis
A. Theoret1cal Issues:
1. Pos1t1onal

os..

Internal

b. External

2. Decisional - dyna m1cs of exchange
B. Structural Issues:'
1. External:

..

&. Coalition members join in order to expand or pro

tect their domain (self-interest).

1) This may take the form of coalit1on membership

. based upon the need to share 1n the resources ot
tellow members.
2) It appears that the autonomy of coa11tion mem
bers 1s lessened relat1ve to the coa11t1on's con
trol of resources and soph1st1cat1on of 1nternal
orga.n1zation.
b. It appears probable that a considerable degree of the

influence exercised by one unit upon another could be
the consequence of extra-coa11tional relations, as
well as, the internal structure (minimal) of the co
alit1on.

c. It would seem probable, that Since coalitions are u
sually concerned with 1ssues secondary to each unit's
cruc1al intraorganizational systems, that the prese%!
vat10n and promot10n of unit interests (autonomous),
including existing interorgan1zational rela.tions,_
would be of primary concern for members of coali
t1ons.
2. Internal:

a. Formal coalitional roles, if they are establ1shed"
carry l1ttle real power.

b. Each unit member may only be representing a specific
segment_ or interest ot 1ts nparent organizat1on."

c. Members of the coalition will tend to develop a con
sensus about who 1s more powerful in the group.
1) D1fferent 1ssue areas will be considered in which

. different actors will have more influence.

2) It seems probable that a considerable degree of

ntesting" ot one a.nother I s power will take place.,
espec1ally early in the coa11tion's h1story.

d. If there is a single "leader" (formal or 1nformal) 1n
the coa11t1on, 1t would ind1cate an "lmbalance l1 ot .
power hierarchically within the coalit1on.

e. If there are several centers of group leadership, 1~
would 1nd1cate a more "balanced" d1str1but1on ot po
wer among coa11tion members.

: i

.0. Exchange Issues:
1. Cond1tions:

a. The more general a resource lS, the greater· the num
ber ot s1tuat1ons of intluence 1n wh1ch 1t can be u
tlllzed.
b. The more un1ts are dependent upon each other's re

sources tor organizat1onal un1t goal attalr~ent, the
h1gher the level of c.oordlnatlon and the more fre.
quently the exchanges w11l be characterized by bar
galning.
'
1) .The greater the coordination and

1nterdependence,~

the more frequently relat10ns w1l1 be characterl
zed by mutual exchange.

c. !he greater the singular commitment to 1nd1vldual·u
nit goals, the lower the level of copperat1on."
d. The greater the compet1tion for resources sought, the

greater the group ccnf11ct - th1s 1ncludes existing
resources and/or expans10n of resources.

e. The higher the relationship between resources avail
able through membersh1p in the coalition and unit
goals sought, the h1gher the level of that unit's ln~
volvement in coa11tional operations.
2. Costs:

a. D1fferent issues often demand difterent types at re
sources to be exercised~
b. The types ot "costs" that can be incurred by a coa11
t10nal un1t, subgroup at units, or full coa11t1onal
group can 1nclude: (1) information, (2) respons1bil
ity,: (3) intergame, (4) divis10n of pay-offs, (5) dis
sonance, (6) 1nertia, (7) pressure at time, and (8)
persuasion.

c. Certa1n" "decls1on cost" prInc1ples can alter the de
gree ot cost incurred: s1ze, unan1m1ty. and lndispen
-.'"

.

slble member princ1ple.

. ....

{.

""

.~; .."':. ~

3. Situat1ons::
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\

a. Where the more powerful do not need the resources
ot the weaker, the potential receptor(s) may pos
sibly involve their other resource potent1als as
commod1t1es for exchange.

b. Where the more powerful control the resource need
ed by a potent1al receptor(s), the weaker un1t may
poss1bly seek out alternative resources aside from
the stronger coalit1on member units.

D. Analytical Questions:
There are scme spec1fic quest10ns wh1ch could be applied
~to

the analys1s of significant dec1s10ns of the coalltion:
'. 1., What were the power or 1nfluence resources of each un1.t.?

2. 'What were the power or influence resources relevant to
each decls10n issue?

3. Who exercised (or attempted to) influence upon whom
each decision.lssue?

~

4. What were the resources of each unit respective to the
dec1s1on issue?

.

5. What was the outcome?
6. What pos1tion' did each unit take on each decision is
Bue as compared to the outcome of ,the decislon-making
process?

7. What were the goals of each un1t 1n jo1ning the

coal~

tlon;and what was the actual outcome ln terms of these
goals?

II.

Decis1on~Making

Process Analysis::

A. TlpolOS1cal Issues:

Situations and solu.
tions (or decisions) are conceivable with1n a continuum;
ot routine, incremental, and innovat1ve.

1. Degrees of tamiliarity w1th problem

2. While rout1ne ,problem Situations are usually' responded

to with routine problem solutions, 1ncremental or innov.a.
tive solutiOns are possible. The same is applicable to
incremental and i~~ovative problems and solutions.

·
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3. The variable of adequate or inadequate informat1on is

related to the suffic1ency of understanding of the de
mands of the problem situation and of the consequences
ot the problem solution for what they are: innovat1ve,!
incremental, or routine.
'

~.

Phase Issues:
1. In application to interorganizat1onal coali tions, 1t.

seems probable that nearly ,all problem situations and
problem solut1ons-will be innovatively oriented.

2. Once certain procedural ground rules are estab11shed
- and the coa11tion gains experienc~ the other orien
tat10ns will become involv~d.

3. Oertain procedures or phases in decision-making seem
to be relatively consistent in most situations where
rationality (as well as unit group interest) is re
garded as significant by the pa.rticipants.

a. The app11cability of th1s model 1s proba.bly relative
to the degree of cooperat1on or conflict of goals
and interests of the un1ts compris1ng the interor
gan1zat1onal coalition.

4. In coa11tions, strong unit biases should be expected

to be operative 1n this process (dec1sion-mak1ng phases).

5. Issue and 1nterest agreement or disagreement among u-
n1ts are both compatible w1th the formation of a
coalition•.

OHAP.TER .2
Summary of Casestudy*
"Ohlld Advocacy Proposal"
The coalltion'was ln1tlated by the Metropolltan Neighbor
hood Ch1l4 Care Agency (MNCOA) executlve committee through the1r
executive d1rector Mr. H.
lng as

determinl~~ (1) l t

Mr. H. deflned the goals of the meet.
local agencles wanted such a program,.

(2) the geographlc target area, (3) the program proposal.

The

issue developed' out of the 1nterest'and avallab11lty of federal
funds for a chl1d advocacy program.

The 30 representatlves pre

sent agreed on the importance of the lssue and showed a general
agreeme~t

with the target area of the city suggested by Mr. H.

(South Clty).

Mr. H. proposed that a "plannlng commlttee" be

. estab11shed to develop a proposal.

Those who volunteered were

people dlrectly concerned with the geographic and/or program
area 1nvolved with exception of perhaps two organ1zations whlch
never became actively lnvolved.

The most sign1ficant members

were Mr. g. from the MNCCA and the local citizen neighborhood
poverty agency South C1ty people's League (SCPl).

~hls became~

the dec1s10n-making body.
There-1mmediately developed a conflict over off1cial

spon~

sorsh1p of the program with the two most powerful members, the
chlld care agency and the neighborhood poverty agency, be 1ng the
ma1n contenders.

No declslon was made at thiS polnt, but a

cha1rman was selected, Mr. J., who was an

all~

~

ot the poverty

agency•
• For purposes of conf1dentlallty,~ all authent1c personal and o~
ganlzatlonal names have been concea.led in all. casestud1es used •.

\1

Hr. H. at one polnt attempted to lnclude two more members:

ot h1s

ag~ncy

in the

plar~ing

process wlth apparent failure.

He

also tended to allenate the other "plannlng commlttee" members
'W1 th h1s aggresslve tactlcs of selt l·ntere·st.

Two lesser mem

bers ot the "committee" proposed an admlnlstrat10n separate from
tte two main members, but th1s'was rejected.
In the mean tlme, the chlld care agency board became hes1
tant about overextending its resources by becoming involved
the llroposed project.
,

In"'

Then ln the absence of Mr. H. the "planning

)

oomm1ttee" selected a proposal wh1ch des1gnated the nelghborhond
poverty agency as the formal grant agent.
Mrs. S., ,voted to approve the proposal.

Mr. H.'s

alterna~e,

The board of the poverty

"agency later officlally endorsed the proposal, but 1t lacked the
contact with the federal sponsor1ng body and had to rely upon the
ch1ld care agency for 11a1son.
A meetlng of the full coa11tlon was called upon Mr. H's
return trom talking w1th the granting body.

The motion was made

tor Mr. H. and the poverty agency to write .the f1nal draft, and
("".

1t was approved. "It was also agreed that the . tlnal draft'be
sent.to the member organ1zatlons for their support and comment.
The next day the chlld care agency board met and endorsed
the poverty agency a.s the gra.nt sponsor.

From this point on, Mr.

H. ceased h1s partic1pation and Mrs. 5 •. 'represented the chlld care

agenoy but, did not partiCipate 1n writing the flnal draft ot the
proposai.

The coa11tion never met again, and the proposal was

.subm1tted w1th the members' letters ot support.

I

I

CASESTUDY ANALYSIS
"Child Advocacy proposal"

I. Decislon-Making Power Analysis:
A. Theoretical Issues: This casestudy is best analyzed in terms

of internal and external positions of its influencial members,
as well as, the dynamics of the dec1s1on-making actors involved.
The p'osi tional issues will be delineated under an analysis of in

ternal and external structure, and the decisional variables will
be scrutinized under exchange issues.

The information available

1n the casestudy substantially limited analysis to. the two pr1n
cipal actors -MNCCA and SCPL.
B. Structural Issues:
B. 1. External:

B.l.a. Doma1n - the dimension of domain protection or advance
ment clearly appears to be a central factor in the involvement ot
the s1gnificant actors.

In this 1nstance"a maximum domain expan

sion of 1100,000 was available.

Cnae the initial decision was

made to restrict the potential receiving area to South City,

those seriously involved lessened to units that have territor1al
or program domains within or'encompassing that area.

While re

presentatives from. another poverty group and the local college

volunteered to work on the program, the casestudy indicates th&.t
they were not among the "core" comm1ttee me·mbers.

It can be Inter

red that thIS is directly related. to theIr unIt's havIng had no
selt-1nterest gaIns which cculd result from their .involvement.
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B.• t.a.1) Resource interdependence - MNCCA (Mr. H.) s~ems to have

needed the involvement of· other community agenc1es in the

pl~

ning prQcess in order to

It de

fulf~ll

application procedures.

t1nitely attempted to ignore their 1nput.

Furthermore, the

9th~r

member units, especially SCPL, depended upon MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s)
l1aison w1th Washington, as well as, its posit10n of established
1ntluence '.1n the ch1ld care realm, espectally Mr. H.' s. poSi tiOD
as looal Executive D1rector for MECCA.
B.l.a.2) Member autonomy - it appears that the coalit1on'

S

oon

trol of the resources was unclear and that the actors tended to
operate autonomously.
B.l.b. Extra-coalit1onal relations - Mr.'J.'s prev10usly exist1ng
pos1tion of relationship with SCPLseems to have estab11shed.them
as al11es.

MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) relationship with the fund1ng agent

was the key to his influence within the coalition.
B. 1 .0. Unit interests - the decision by the Board of Directors
~f ~~CCA

that their primary concerns and goals demanded all of

their resources to mainta1n their

ope~ations

and that the new

proposal was too secondary is significant in its cons1stency with
the analytical model.
B.2. Internal:
B.2.a. Formal roles - internal structural variables show consid
erable agreement with the model.

The two formal pos1t1ons in

the coa11tion's h1storyheld no s1gnificant power in themselves'
independent ot the personal1t1es occupy1ng them.

Mr. H. br1etly
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(and ae.1t-&ppolntedly) was "Cha1rman Pro Tem" and Mr. J. was the
regural cha.1rman by consensus.

B.2.b•. Rep£!sentativeness - Mr. H.'s inab1l1ty to galn support

tor h1s Itdecls1on" from h1s own organiz a t1onal un1t lndlcates a

clearlnstance of a coa11t1on member's represent1ng only a spe
c1f1c segment or interest of a "parent organizat1on" and not 1t
as a whole.
B.2.c.

Cons~nsus

- 1t 1s quite apparent that coalitional members

qu1ckly came to cons1der MNCCA (Mr. H.) and SCPL to be the two
most powerful group members.
B.2.c.1) ~ Different1al power - lt becameobv1ouB '. atter conslder

able testing tha.t SCPL was

~ore

dom1nant when 1 t came to ga1ning

the support of fellow coa11tion members, except tor MNCCA (Mr.
wh1le KNCCA (Mr. H.) had a dominant pos1tion with respect to

H~).

1~~

tormatiOnaJ. and organ1zational ties to the funding source.
B.• 2.c.2) Test11'lS - the testing process was quite apparen:t- espe

Cially in the early stages of the coa11tion.
~2.d.

and e. S1ngle or mult1ple leadersh1p - the emergence ot

two centers of real leadersh1p within the coa11t1on demonstrates
a relatively "balanced d1str1bution of power" between the

conteatants.

c.

ExchanS8 Issues:

C.l. Condit1ons:

maln~

0.1.a. Resource genera11ty - the two main actors, MNCCA (Mr. H.• »)
and SOPL", had resources of relat1 ve genera11 ty which they fre
quently ut1l1zed.

MNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) main resources were

mation and program l1a1son controls.

lnfo~

These resources were em

ployed in particularly cruc1al decisions, e.g. the tinal vote' ot,
HNCCA's board.

If the board had sanctioned Mr. H. with the full

use ot his potential resources, it appears that his 1nfluence
could have been dominant.
SOPL, on the other hand, relied upon the resources of
fr1endsh1p and votes.
the "planning
were

Mr. J. was closelyal11ed w1th SCPL., and

corr~1tteen

rel~tively

voted 1n SCPL's favor.

These resources

general and effective for 1nternal coalit10nal

dec1s1ons, but MNCCA' s (Mr. H.' S~) external resources tended to at
least be potentially decisive 1n that realm.
In add1tion, MNCCA (Mr. H.) had an estab11shed program do
ma1n 1n child care, while SCPL.. had established terr1 tor1al do
main 1n South C1ty.
C.l.b. Resource dependency - the degree of mutual dependency

~

mong this coa1i t10n I s members 1s somewhat.. vague1n view of the
above.

SCPL and MNCCA (Mr. 'H.) appeared to be interdependent

especially SCPL vis

~!1!.

clearly in open conf11ct.

l,

MNCCA.(Mr •• H~), yet the two were
If the assert10n of the model is vi

able, it may requ1re certain modifications to expla1n the dyna
mlcs ot this casestudy.

One possible solution is that SCPL and

the other coalition members, exclud1ng MNCCA (Mr. H.) tunction.
ed 1n an apparently consensus manner.

~hls

could be based upon
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their mutual dependence for internal coalitional resources.

On

the other hand, MNCCA (Mr. H.) was self-sufficient in external
resources and never attempted to bargain w.1th the other members
in terms of actually making the proposal application, other tha.n
pseudo consultation.

MNCCA (Mr. H.) did not involve itself in:

the 1nternal workings of the coa.lition, apparently view1ng their
re,sources' as unessential to attainment of its interest goal.

SCPL however, did attempt to bargain direotly with the MNCCA board
because of SCPL's position of considerable dependency in the area
of external resources to effectively 'influence the attaInment ot
Its goal.
O.1.b.1) Mutual exchange - the greatest mutual exchange took
place between SCPL and the other ooalition members, except MNCOA
(Mr. H•.>.

Wh1le the mutuality of the interdependence'might pe

questionable, there appeared to be a genuine mutual ,exchange
between the MNCCA board and the' "plannir..g coromittee. It
endorsed SCPL, while the

.l

The board

pl annlng commi ttee" provided a vehicle

whereby MNqCA would not over burden its own oommitments and, at
the same time, permitted it to promote community ohild care ser
vices.
0.1.c. Unit goals - SCPL and MNCCA (Mr. H.) both clearly demon
strated exolusive interests in attemptIng to expand their organ
izational domains, through seeking to obtai%?- program control,tor
each at their respective organizations.

This resulted in a low,

level at· cooperation. 'Two members with a lower degree of com
m1tment, Hr. A. and Mr. B., attempted a cooperatIve compromise
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ot establishing a separate adm1-nistrati9n,' but were un1nfluen
01&1 and unsuccessful.
C.l.d. Resource competi tion - Again, SCLP and Y1NCCA (Mr.

~.)

con

st1tuted the main contestants in competing for the potentially
available resources, and this provided the principal basis ot
the conflict w1th1n the coa11t1on.
0.1.e. Member profit - SCPL's main access to the program tunding
was 1n1tlally through the coalition" and later wi th the KNCeA·
board, and SCPL's coa11tional involvement was considerable.

How

ever, Y.iNCCA's (Mr. H.'s) best 'access to the'resources was from
outSide of the group and, ,consequently, 1ts actual involvement,
1n the coa11tion's operations was minimal and often token.
0.2. Costs:
0.2.a. Differential resource issues - as indicated above, C.1.b.• ,
there appeared to be two

~r1ncipal

areas of resource utilization

1n this casestudy - internal a.nd external.
wer~

Those dec1sions whIch

.

.

1nternally oriented, demanded the use of internal coalition-

al resources, and the member who had predominant assets in that
area

(SCP~)

was most successful in those Issue areas.

On the

other hand, external decisions required external resources and
the dominant member 1n that dimension, MNCCA (Mr. H.), was main

17 Buccessful in those decisions (until Mr. H. lost his sanction
to ut111ze those resources).
C.2.b. Costs incurred - the main "costs" incurred by MNCCA (Mr. H.)

\

I
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were 1ts "responslbility costs" and nintergame costs" tor ac
tions taken outslde ot the coall t1en 1tselt, whlch qulckly lost,
internal support tor its posltlon.

SCPL's maln "costs" were "in"",

formatlon" a.nd "lnter-game tt 1n 1ts dependence upon MNCCA(Mr. H.)
tor access to the fundlng source.
0.2.0. P'r1nclples - the t'unanlmlty pr1nc1ple" was operat1ve 1n

th1s coal1tion In that there ultImately was requ1red group con
sensus about the proposal to be submitted.

FuxJthermore, the tlin~

d1spens1ble member principle" was apparent with respect to MNCOA
and the pos1tion of its Board.

0.3. Sltuatlons:
0.3.&. Resource independence of powerful - while the Informatlon:
. ·ls insuffic1ent frcm the casestudy, 1t could be speculated that
the weaker coalition members sought to somehow influence the co
alIt1on's opera.t1ons through the use of theIr main resource,.
Yotes, and d1d th1s by jo1ning forces w1th the weaker of the two
most powerful coalition'members, SCPL, who was substant1ally depen
dent upon theIr resources, and whom they could more readily In
:fluence.

At,the, same t1me,SCPL externally weaker than MNOCA (¥r. H.)

utIlIzed 1ts maln resources - control of coalltion votes, :friend
Ship, and territorial domain - to match the resources of KBCCA

~

(Mr. H.).

0.3. b. Resource control by powerful - where MNCCA (Hr. If.) oon
trolled access to informat1on and the funding body, SCPL attemp
ted to ,go d1rectly to the MNCCA board to usurp

y~.

H.'s basls of

!

resource sanction.

When the group chose SOPL'to be the formal

grant agent, it was suggested that SCPL's director be in
with' Wash1ngton, as well as, Mr. H.

contac~

In the decis10n to choose

a committee to work on the f1nal draft, Mr. H. seems to have u

t1lized the non-planning oomm1ttee members to vote to include him
(interred trom casestudy data).

Also, after the meeting in which

Hr. J. was seleoted chairman, Mr. H. took it upon himself to call
another meeting and sent the notice to the "planning committee"
and to two MNCCA off1cials - possibly an attempt to call upon,.
more resources.

D. Analytical·Questions:

.

D.1. Power resources:
MNCCA (Mr. H~' and Mrs. S ~ )
Information:
Crucial external contacts
Program domain'
Vote

SCPL
Friendsh1p
Territorial doma1n
Vote
Control of votes

Others~

Votes
Program domain:

D.2. Main ooalition decis10n issues and relevant resources:
MAIN ISSUES

RELEVANT RESOURCES

1. Target: area

Votes, in1'ormatio.n·

2. Plapn1ng Committee

Votes, members, information,
program domain,territor1al
domain

3. Cha1rman
4~

Separate admin1stration

5. Formal grant agent

Votes, fr1.endship, control of

votes

Votes, territor1al doma1n"
program domain, friendship·
Votes, fr1endship, control

ot votes.

.
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6. F1nal draft comm1ttee

Votes, information, crucial
external contacts, control of
votes, fr1endsh1p

7. D1stribut1on of final draft

Votes, program domain

D.3. Influencer(s) and Influencee{s):
DECISION ISSUE:

t. Target area

INFLUENCER{S) INFLUENCEE(S)
MNCCA(Mr.H. )
SCPL"

Others(ttp.1an
n1~ commit
tee )
2. Planning Committee

MN:DCA(*r.H.)
SCPL

Others

3. Cha1rman

MNCCA(Mr.H. )
SCPL'

Others

Whole group
Whole group:.
Whole group
Whole group
Whole group
Whole group"
SCPL and o.thers
HNCCA (Mr • H. )
and others .
SCPL and MNCCA
(Mr. H.)

4. Separate Adm1nistrat1on

(Mr.A and
Mr.

5. Formal Grant

~ent

B.'

SCDL

MNCCA(Mr.H.),
SCPL, Others

-2

Others J XNc.cA
(:tIrs.a)

6. FInal Draft Committee

KNCCA(Mr.H. )

sept&..
Others

Whole group
Whole group.
Whole group

KNCCA(Mr.H. )

Whole group

7. D1stribution or F1nal
Dratt

D.'4. Issues acd relevant member resources:
DECISION ISSUE:-

1. farget area

RELEVANT MEMBER. RESOURCES
MNCCA(Mr.H. )

Vote, . into%!:"
mat10n

SCPlL

Vt>te

Votes
Others
Whole group(o- .
ther than above) Votes
2. Planning Comm1ttee

MNCCA(Mr.H. )

'. Vote, 1nfor
mat1on, PrCSram.
doma1n

SCPL

Others

3. Chairman

MNCCA(l-1r .H. )
SCPL_

others

4. Separate Administration

MNCCA(Mr.H.)
SCPt;,

O"thers-2
(Kr.A. and
)

5. Formal Gra.nt Agent

6. ,Final Dratt Committee

7. Distr1bution of F1nal Draft

Vote, terr1
tor1al domalln
Votes. program
doma.1n
Vote
Vote, friend
ship, control
ot votes
Votes
Vo..t e, . program
doma1n~

Vo te , terri,.
torial domain,.
tr1endsh1p
Votes, pro
gram domain:

Y...r.B~.

Votes"prograDl
domain:

SOPL.

Vote,; fr1end-,
sh1p" C on1iro l .
ot votes

Others

Votes

MNCCA(Mrs.S.);

Vote, Program
Domain,: crucial
contacts

MNCOA(Mr.H. )

Vote, infor
m&tlolt'1, cru
c1al external
contacts

SCPlL

Vote, control
ot votes,. fr1end~
ship

Others

Votes

Whole group

Votes

KNCCA(Mr.H~)

Vote, program

domain;

Whole group

Votes, "pro
gram domain:
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D·5· Outcome:
DECISION· ISSUES

DECISION CHOICE

1 • Target Area

South City

2. Planning Committee

Volunteers

3 • Chairman

Mr. J.

.4. Separate Adminlstratlon

.Rejected

5 •. Formal Grant Agent

5CPL,

6. Final Draft Committee

MNOCA(Y.r.H. ) and SCPL_

7. D1stribut1on of Final
Dratt

Whole Group.

D.6. Member Pos1tion on Issues and Actual Outcome: +

- =against, ? =not

= 1n·'tu'or"

known.

DECISICN CHOICE

MEMBER

1. South City

.'

POSITION~

kNCCA(Mr.H.)

+

SCPL.,

+

Others

+

Whole group(o- +
ther than above)
2. Volunteers

. MNCCA(Mr.H.)

+

. SCPL.

+

Others

+

Whole group
3. Kr. J ..•

4. Rejected

MNCCA(Mr.H. )

SCPL.

+

Others

+

MNCCA(Mr.H.)

+

SCPL~

+
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DECISION CHOICE

MEMBER POSt TION
Mr. A and
Mr. B

,

•

5. SCPL.

6. MNCCA(Ya-.H. ) and 5CPL

7.

D1str1bution of' F1nal Draft,_,

. D.7. Kember Goals Compared

~1th

Others

+

MNCCA(YJ.rs. s. )

+

SCPL

+

Others

+

)iNCCA(Mr.H. )

+

SCPL

?

Others

?

Whole group

+

MNCCA(Mr.H. )

+

All C.thers

+

Final Outcome:
PINAL... OUNCK&

KE}IBER
KNCC.t.\.(~lr. H. )

KNCCA Grant Agent

SCPL...

SCPL.. Grant Agent

O:thers

Not Known

Whole Group

Bot Known

SCPL... Grant.:.

Agent...

II. Dec1sion-Mak1ng Process Analysis: in order to assess the
casestudy in relat10n to typological and pha.se issues'

as·sertlon~"

each ma1n dec1sion (using above sequential numbers) will be placed
1na table and discussed later.

51
PROBLEM SCLUTION,

ROUTINE,
BW-i

U4.TION
TINE.

IBB.OVA'HYE

Information adequate inadequate adequate inadequate adequate inadequate
adequate
3.6.'5
7
Inadequate
!

RDiEN-

adequate
1nadequate

OVA,..

adequate
1nadequate

e

INCREMENTAL

2'
.. . ,
,

,

,

4

t
I

EXPLANi\.TICN:

:f;

1. The colce of a target area was an entlrely new problem for
"

this group and the select10n of South Clty was 1nnovative. Since
that section of the city had never had such a program.
2. The establishment of a planning commlttee is a problem wh1ch
.

,

developed (1ncremental) from the planning demands of
The solutlon

w~s

~

adaptive (incremental) based upon those becoming

1nvolved hav1ng a terrltorlal
-

~nd/or

program 1nterest.

3. ChoosIng a. cha1rman Is a r.outine 'occ'urrenc"e' '."
group's process.

proposal.

~~,

of th1s

The cholce (Mr. J.) reflects an adaptatIon (1n

cremental) to the Interests of the core plannIng commIttee mem
bers.

4. The proposal for seek1r-g a separate adminlstration ra1sed
an lr.novat1ve pro blem, ~ whlch was dealt with 1n a routlne manne%":
(rejection) with respect to the clearly ident1fled member inter
ests and resources.

5. The problem of choosing a formal grant agent 1s a
'P~~~, .(~~ut1n1~edl

'pr'ec.ed~

;,; Q.u.t.c~.$:, -of the plannlr..g process and the

,solutIon 1s 'an aq.aptatlcn tlncremental) of the formation of a
8ubcoalitlonal voting and interest block - as well as an adaptIv:e

5g
response to Mr. H.'s absence and the position ot the HNo:cA board.•.
There does seem to be a degree of 1nformational 1nadequacy wlth
respect to tal ling to know that the MNCCA board had not offici
ally flnalized thelr pos1tlon.

This inadequacy of information:

with respect to the problem sltuation and solution does appear,
to be marginal in this 1nstance.

6. The problem of appointing persons to develop a final pro
posal draft .tends to be a routine situation.

The solution of

, sele~ting MNCCA (Mr. H.) and SCPL seems to be an outgrowth

(ln~

, oremental) of their mutually necessary resources for this ta.sk
(1nformation and contact, grant agent).

7. The problem of d1str1but1ng a document is a routine matter,
and deciding to include all parties concerned is a routine solu
t10n w1th there being an adequate recognition of both dlmens1ons.
A. Typological Issues:

A.1. Problem fami11arity - these categor1es seem to be relevant
tor class1fy1ng the above dec1s1ons and problems wlth the one
condit1on that there needs to be a distinct10n w1th respect to
whether degree ot familiarity 1s to refer to each 1ndividual
member unit or to the group as an ent1ty.
A.2. Patterns - thls casestudy appears to haye a predominance

ot instances where'incremental problems were responded to with
incremental declsions,

but.~3:QUt

tion-types were the same.

.ot:7 where s1tuation and solu

5~

A.3. Informat1onaladequacy - seems to be a relatively insign1tl
,

cant~

(and d1ff1cult to assess) va.r1able

1n~th1s

casestudy.

L Phase Issues:

B.l. Innovat1on -

mos~

ot the problem s1tuations were

incremental,~

and" the solut1ons were 1ncremental•
.B~2.

Divers1ty - once the f1rst ma.jor dec1sion,was made (1nnoVA

tive - lnno.vat1ve)" the other o.r1entat1ons appeared to be exclu
s1vely 1nvolved.

&.3. Rat'1onal phases - the casestudy 1nformat1on 1s not- adequate.
to. determ1ne to what;,. extent.. rat1cnal dec1s1on-mak1ng steps were
involved

1n~

each dec1s1on, wh1le certain dec1s1ons do reflect-_

some ot the sta.ges.

The over-r1d1ng var1able

1nfluenc1~~

mak1ng appea.rs to be self-1nterest and not.. ra.tional1ty.

deo1sion.
In: this:

sense, rat1ona11ty could ha.ve proba.bly determ1ned calculated in
div1dual member dec1s1ons of selr-1nterest, but there was

no~

&

rat1onal, .. comppehens1ve' .rev1ew of alternat1ves 1n an unb1ased m&nl--
nero by all. members jo1ntly.
&3.a. Relat1ve appl1cab1l1ty - in:: cons1derat1on ot the above men
t10ned lack of casestudy 1nformat1on, 1t_1s d1fficult to assess the
1m~c~or

coalit1onal cooperat1on or conflict upon the

uti11za~lDn

o-r rat10nal dec1s1on-making steps" except. that.. contllct:. d1d ex1st-"
while ratlonallty was not '- very ev1dent:.

&.4.

Unit. bias -a constant

var~able 1n~dec1s1on-mak1ng

in.all 1nt

stances seems to be the member un1 t!s bias of selt-·lnterest. a.nd do
ma1n protection and/or expans1on.

th1s seems to be espec1a1lr the

. case with the deciSions ot the. n core" plann1ng committee that.. 1n.
,

.

f.Q this ex

v.olved the members with the greatest vested 1nterests.
ten~;their

decisions tended to be less rational in the obJectiv.e

sense, buti.. quite rat10nal in l1ght ot the1r own organ1zat1on's>
interests.

&5:. C:oalit1onal cohesiveness - 1ssue a.nd 1nterest,

agreemen~

and:

disagreement seem to be marginally oompat1ble w1th coa11t1on' for.
mation 1n":thls oase.

,Those who essent1ally agreed were act'ively
their

ma1n~&n

tagon1st:" MNCCA (Mr. H.), tended to be only per1pherally

1nvo~-v;ed

involved 1n the coa11tion

with the coalit10n.
the two

(SCP~

and Others).

Ye~

This appears·to be based upon where each of

str.ongest~members

had the dominant resources: scpn.-. 1nter

nally" ,MNCCA (Hr. H~) -' externally.'
C~QUB:

The analyt10al model seems to have had a general applioa

bility to th1s casestudy.
se~ent·.was

more

usetul,~

Generally speaking" the tlP.ower Analya1s"
wh11e the "Process AnalYSis" port1on 'tended

to be dlftloult,_ to apply,. pr1marily because off 1ts use of': tBrms wl:ilch
require further operatlonalizat1on and/or revision'.
Mo~speclfioally,-there

developed trom this case a need to

tinguish between Internal and

externa~

coalit1onal resources, and whQ

ls', most dominant., in eaoh and how th1s" 1n turn,) atfects the
t10nal process.

coalition~.

consensus,~barga1n1ng"

or dissensus

alsO,jthe role ot conf11ct as de11berately

ut~lized

o~

bf

members 1s not... tully acoounted for 1n the model.

Also, the disparity between" Mr •. H.
~p_arent

coall~

It: also raises the questIon it th1s alters whether'

a coa11t1onal group is ot a
entation.

dls~

fS

posit1ons a.nd tr.at of! li1s

organizat1on,:' makes 'quest10nable whether a

entL orga.nizaticn" can be tully identif1ed with 1ts

coalitiona~ ··p!iLn~
lndiv~idual

00&11-,·

6.1

tionaL r,presentatlve.

It

not~,

this inconsistency needs to be:

observed and analyzed.
!he eventual decision-making outcome (SCPlL'S be1ng the

gran~

agent . w1th MNCCA endorsement) ln this casestudy raises the ques
tion whether Polsby's notion of "plurality" is not more
ful' in this case than an' elitIst.. model.
not: to fully employ i ts

organ1zatl~nal

}!NCCA dld

meening~

1n~ tacti~

agree:

resources ot 1nfluence

~o

broa.den 1ts doma1n, but;, rather,~ decided to advocate- and promote a
shar1ng of resources wlth a weaker organizatlon
,not

mea.n,~

however,:. tliat MNCCA dId

resources.

(~Cp.L.).

notip.rofitwfrom~

Th1s does

thls sharing ot

I.t .. is conceivable that It .. was necessary that they en

courage such a project 1n order to mainta1n their position-: as the
, local promoter a.f' child care' in the eyes of the fund1ng a.gent.

A~

the same time,. they could not afford to deploy any of their own:
sources to d1rectly seek the resources to be funding

agen~

~e

themselves •

. Wlth respect to the "process Analysis tl model, the vagueness ot
term definitions and the tentative class1fication' of decisionsraises doub.ts as to whether coalitioJ?al problem Situations and
solutions are predominantly innovatlve (II.B.1.).

The 1ssues of'

internal and external resources and involvement (based

upon~case

study information) make questionable whether

formation

is independent of issue and interest
(ILB..5). ·

coa11tlon~

agpeement~o~ dlsagreemen~

CHAPTER 3
Summary of, Casestudy
"Black

Coalit10~'

Th1s coa11tion ot black organizations was the outcome of
rac1al and subsequent pollee inc1dents at a metropolitan high
sChool.

The local War on Poverty citizen organization 1n the

0-,

black community Equal Oppo,rtunity Now (EON) alterred an already
scheduled meeting to take up the school issue and invited par
ents of the school children and moderate and mi11tant black or.
ganizat1ons.

This was the start of the coalition.

Eventually a cha1rman (black poverty organization repre
sentative) was selected by the coalition.

They adopted the sug

gestion by the principal black militant group (Brothers) to boy
cott the schools and decided to establish an alternate school to
be run by the same m11itant group and a black studies program
from a local university.

They also chose to hold a community

rally to 1nform and unite the black community.

at the rally,

the earlier coalition decisions were approved by the 600 com
munity people present.
The bas1c method of internal procedure was agreed to be as
a un1t, but w1th a division of labor.

After awhile the chairman

had to resign, because be was an employee cf the school
and was under pressure.

ThIs also

'.~as:

d1stric~

the case w1 th two other

active coalition members, who were also employees of the local
federally funded community action agency.

The coalition's new
r'

,chairman, Rev~. C., was a representative of a ministerial organ1
zation

Unl~ed~Christian
,::..l' ' , '.,.

~;-

-

,

Front (U.C.F.) and was selected because
.~

..

-.
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of.h1S moderate image among blacks in a hope to unity the com
munity.

Two militant organizations claimed mutual leadership

w1th the new chairman evidencing a widening internal rivalry.
The community school became 1mmersed 1n problems.
lacked transportation, lunch, and teacher resources.

It

The two

ma1n mi11tant groups then attempted to conduct the teaching 
a11enating many parents.
The boycott was used by the coalition to make demands u
pon the school board.
ter group.

The board responded by setting up a coun

Dissension set into the coalition with disagreements

over what step to take next.

The moderate chairman, under pres

sure from the main mi11tant organization called for a citYWide boy
cott.
ey.

The strategy was to penalize the school its state aid mon
The boycott and coalition were rapidly dying.

Some members

met secretly with the school super1ntendent w1thout informing the
x-est of the coali t1on.

The community school closed and several

coalition members 4ropped out.

Without inform1ng the militant,

member, the boycott was called off by the chairman afterit was
about
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weeks old.

The main accomplishments of the boycott were an end to ra
clal trouble at the high school, a cbanged curriculum, increased
.respect by wh1te students, and the first effective unification

ot the black community.
CASESTUDY ANALYSIS
"The Black Coalition"
I. Decision-Making Power Analysis

·
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A,. Theoretical Issues:
The internal and external positions and structures of the
members ot the Black Coalition had considerable- impact in this
casestudy and an an&11811 of them would be useful. 'The deci
sional approach als'o has considerable, analytical meri t. especi
ally wIth respect ,to exchange and process 1ssues.
B. Struc,tural Issues:
B. t., External
B.t.a. Domain.- all of the organizations involved tn the coa.11
tion were based in a metropol1-tan black community and were con
cerned with protecting the interests of their people 1n the high
school.rac1al dispute and with protecting the1r organ1zation's _
legitimacy in the black community.

This was domaIn protectIon,

but it 'was also domain expansion when it came to their list of
demands wh1ch

sough~

to expand, as well as protect,; black in

fluence 1n the metropolItan school system.
B.t.a.t) Resource interdependence - there was . consld e r a ble.1n:terUEJ;8'1
dence among coalition members in face of the school system be
cause of 'ttheir position of relative weakness in resources a.s com
pared to theIr adversa.ry.

Th1s external imperative seems to have

necessItated a united front.
B.t.a.2) Kember autonomy - once the coalition began to operate
1t revealed l1ttle internal control of the needed resources,
whlch were most often based with external authorities e.g- com

/

munity action agency's withdrawal of school buses because of a
fear of suspension of its funds.

Also the internal organization:

of the coalition was not sufficiently sophisticated to assure
the group's autonomy.

Instead, it was victimized by internal

power struggles,

weakened the coalition in face of the re

w~~ch

latively monolithic organizational authority 'structure.
B.t.b. Extra-coalitional relations ,- probably the three most
influencial coalition members were the UCF,.the
81mba.

Brothers,~

and

A considerable degree of their influence was based upon

the1r extra-coalit1onal relations w1th d1fferent segments of the
black community.

UCF's constItuency and image was moderate; the

Brothers! and Simba's were mi11tantly based.

These were also

the centers of the coalition's real leadership: Rev. C. (UCF)

.



was coalition chairman; the Brothers and Simba conducted the com
munity school.
B.1.c. Unit interests - the impact of coalItion members attempt
ing to protect and promote their extracoalitional and unit in
terest's was an extremely crucial factor in this coalition.

Some

of the examples of how this greatly limited resources and cru
clal membership will be given.

Mrs. S. had to assume a "behind

the scenes" involvement, because she was employed by a federally
funded program.

The original chairman, Kr.ll. J had to reSign that

position, because he had been accused by the school system (his
employer) ot being in vlolat1on of his

contrac~.

Hr. D. also

w1thdrew from active support (providing SChool buses), because
he teared a loss of federal funding for the community action
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agency, of whIch he was executIve director.' Many blaok teaohers
-

who were to teach in the community school dId not, out of fear ot
losirig theI'r' jobs •.
B.2. Internal:
B.2.a. Formal roles - the few formal roles wIthIn the Blaok Coal
ition carried little real power.in themselves.

The group's first

cha1rm a n, Mr. L. of EON, exercIsed little real power in the coali
tion.

Yet,~the

fluent1al.

second chaIrman, Rev. C. of the UCF, was quite in

The organization and

seemS to have been
~rogram"S1mba,

deleg~ted

and Brothers.

oper~t1on

of the community sohool

to the local university Black Studies
While each played a role, the Bro

thers were most 1nfluencial In'its operatIon.
formal role was not as

sign~fIcant

Consequently, the

as the power and Influence of

the unit fIlling 1t.
B.2.b. Representativeness - most of the unIts appear to have re-
presented accurately the interest of their "parent organizatl'on,"
with .o·me exceptIons.

Mrs. S. and Mr. D., Communi.ty actIon agenc1.,.

represented .only a segment of their organIzation and its inter
ests.

~hiS

was largely responsIble for

oovert support.

the~r

wIthdrawal from

Rev. C., in decidIng to expand the boycott,) ex

tended himself beyond the interests and support of his-moderate
organlz a tioI.J,.
B.2.c. Consensus - from an aggregation' ot many organizations,
thre~

emerged as being recogn1zed as the most powertul and were

delegated more formal and intormal authority than the rest.

or

these three - UCF, Simba, Brothers - the UCF and Brothers were
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the most dominant.
B.2.c.1) D1fferent1al power - when it came'to be1ng able to ap
peal to broad community support, lea.dersh1p by UCF personnel was
more lntluenc1al.

However, when deal1ng w1th more cont11ctual

1ssues - rallies, the" r1val school - the Brothers and 51mba
were more influential.
B.2.c.2) Test1ng - early 1n the coalit1on, EON!s role as leader.'
wa.s eroded by 1 ts lack of genu1ne influenc,e and power resources.
While the UCF gained control of the
thers cla1med they also

le~d

cha1~an's

the coa11t1on.

posit1on. the Bro

Th1S challenging of

each other's power by the two pr1nc1pal units cont1nued through
out the coa11tion's h1story and was not confined to the in1t1al
period.
B.2.d. and e. Single or mult1ple leadersh1p- - the

concentrat1on'~

of most of the power 1n essent1ally two members resulted 1n a
part1albal&nc1ng of pO,wer 1n the coa11 t1en between the moderate
and m1l1tant overall factions.

c.

Exchange Issues:

0.1. Cond1t1ons:
0.1.a. Resource genera11ty - the Brothers' and Simba's main re
source was an emotional and 1deological appeal.

This resource

was effective in stirr1ng up support at rall1es, but lt was In
effective' 1n organ1z1ng the commun1ty sChool.
source was not general enough.

The1r main re

The UCF had a moderate 1mage

6.8

which gave it broader community appeal (its ma1n resource),

bu~

it"failed to be able to ,move' the commun1ty to radical and unified
m1l1tant, ~

~trike

with

with conflict tactiCs.

the~

action in boycott1ng the s'chools a.nd dealing
Their main

resource,~conse

quently, was also too narrow.
C.l.b. Resource dependency - the member units were very muoh de
pendent upon each other' s
cott.

resou~ces

to achieve an effective boy

Th1s appeared to only partially and temporarily prompt the

leaders of the two factions

~

UCF and the Brothers - to involve

themselves in coordination and bargaining.

The UCF took broad

coali tiona leadership, and the Bro'there assumed author1 ty over the
,community SChool.
tive areas.

They both proved ineffective

in~their

respec

Their ideologies were also allen to one another

and made coordination basically impossible.
G.1.b.l) Mutual exchange - there was little coordlnation, much
interdependence, and relatively inconsequential mutual exohange 
the early dividing of authority between, the UCF and the Brothers
belng the only real occurrence.
0.1.0. Unit goals - there was considerablecommltment to indiv
Idual un1t goals and ideologies and a low level of cooperation•.
e.l.d. Resource competltion - there was considerable conflict
between the

UC~ an~

the Brothers and 51mba to be recognized as

the prino1pal leader and spokesman

t~r

the: black community and for

the poss1ble expanded role of centrol of the sohool system.
O.l.e. Member profit - there was a definite relationship between'
ga1ning control of the coalition's existing and potential re
.

:'"
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sources and power through membership in a unified black movement,
and the goals of the t·wo key 'uni ts and fa.ctions to. be the bilack
oommunity's spokesman, and the high level of involvement

in~the

coalitlon's operations by the UCF and the Brothers.
0.2. Oosts:
0.2.&. DIfferential resource issues - the decisions of the Black
Ooalition demanded different types of resources.

In illustra

tion, the issue of choosing a chairman required an internally
noncontroversial figure acceptable to all members,if possible.
fhe issue of conducting a rally required the resource capacity
,to emotionally stir the community to support the decision to
boycott against a. common adversary.
0.2.0.

C~sts

incurred - the Brothers and Simba suffered the "re

sponsIbility costs"

for the outcome (failure) of the community

school, as did the UCF for their effort '(failure) to forge and
lead a viable black coalition.

Some coalition members became

Involved in the school system's own committee and this resulted
in heavy "lntergame costs" for the coalition.

Dlvldl!"..g up of

the coalition's leadership functions - the administering of the
community-school and the chairing of the coalition - resulted
ineffiCient "diviSion of pay-offs costs.1t

~

Perhaps the main coal

Ition decision costs were those incurred from 'its internal "dlaBonanae."
C.2.c. Pr1nciples - because of the Black Coalition's posltlon of
weakness, relative to the school system, they needed to attain:

a unanimously united front.

The aotual result was that this

"dec1s1on cost pr1nciple" - essent1al' to the coal1tion's po
",

tent1al success - was not atta1ned.
C.3. S1tuatlons:
0.3.a. Resource independence ot powerful - 1n terms of external.
issues, the school system.d1d

no~

need the" Black Coalit1on's re

sources ot emotional and ideolog1cal appeal 'and moderate black
co~unity

support.

However, through the boycott, the Black ao

" alition sought to undermine the f1scal support rece1ved by the
school system for the number of students and the days they attend.

By this, <the coalit1on was utilizing alternate resources as com
modit1es tor exchange.
C.3.b. Resource control

by

powerful - the SChool System control

led the schools with theIr author1ty to teach and to graduate or
not graduate students.

The coal1tion sought to develop an alter

nate resource through its "commun1ty school."

D. Analytical Questions:
D.l. Power Resources:
Un1ted Christian Front
(and other moderate
units)

Brothers (and other mIl1tant
units)

Membership
Votes
Following of moderate segment of black
community
Black parental support

Membersh1p'
Votes
Following of m1litant
ot blaok: community

segmen~

Contacts and rapport with high
school and college blaok
students

Consensus appeal
School transporta.tion

Emotional appeal
Contact with (potential)
teachers.
Abllity to identify enemy

D.2. Main Coalition Decision Issues and Relevant Resources:
RELEV~NT~RESOURCES

.

1. Choice

ot a chairman

2. Whether to boycott.

3. Children's education

4. Inform and unite

support of black
community

5. Function ot Rally
6. Internal Unit Operation

7. Need for new chairman
8. Extent of boycott 
9. Discontinuance (dur
'ation) of boycott

Votes, broad (consensus) coalltional
support.
Votes,.membersh1p, black parental
and student 'support" consensus (in
ternal) appeal and emotional appeal.
Votes, membership, following of
moderate segment of black commun-·
1ty, black parental support,: con..
tact with potent1al alternate ed
ucational resources.
follow1ng of moderate and mi11tant
segments of black commun1ty,
black parent and student support:,
membersh1p, votes, consensus ap
peal, emotional appeal, and al
ternate educational resources.
Same as issue 4 with much more em
phasis upon emot1onal appeal and
abi11ty to ident1fy enemy_
Consensus and compatib1lity of mem
ber un1ts (consensus appeal).
·Consensus (internal) appeal, votes~
, support ot moderate and militant
member units.
Same. as 1ssue 2 above.
Same as issue 2 and 8 above.

D.3. Influencer(s) 'and Influencee(s):
DECISION 'ISSUE
1. Cholce of chairman
2. Whether to boycot,t,

_. -

3~

Ch1ldren's educat10n

INFLUENCER(S)

INFLUENCEE{S)

Not given in casestudy
Brothers
Rest of Coalition
No more given in casestudy (unan1mlty
inferred) _
Black parents
Rest of Coalltion
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DECISION ISSUE
4. Inform and unite
.rest of blac~
community

5. Functlon ot
Rally

6. Interna.l unit

INFLUE,"'NCER(S )

INFLUENCEE(S)

Not given in casestudy (unan1mity
inferred) •
Black Coa11 tien·

Black communit,.

operation

Not given in casestudy (unanim1ty
inferred) •
7. Need for new chairman UCF
Coa11t1on
(Not.g1ven in casestudy but, Bro
thers oPPosition imp11ed).
Brothers
Coalition
8. Extent of boycott
Brothers
Black Coalit1on
Students
Black Coalition
9". Discont1nuance
(duration): or'
boycott
UCF.
. Coa11 tion'
D.4. Dec1sicnIssues and Relevant Member Resources:

RELEVANT

DECISION. ISSUES
i.

1. Choice of chairman

UCF

2. Whether to boycott

Brothers
UCF·

Brothers

3. Children's education

UCF

Brothers

~WER

RESOURCES
Votes, consensus
appeal
Votes
Votes,; member
ship, b lack~
parental sup
port., consen
sus (internal)
appeal.
Votes, ' members ,;
black student.
support, emo
tional appeal.
Votes, membership,
.
following of
moderate seg
'ment of black
commun1ty,~ blaok
parental support,
school trans
portation.
Votes, membership,
contact with'
potentia.l tea
chers.

7'
DECISION ISSUES

INFLUENCER(S}

INFLUENCEE(S)

4. Inform and unite
rest of black
community

5. Function of Rally
6. Internal unit,.
opera.t1on

Following ot mod
erate segment
ot black com
munIty, black
parental sup
port, member
ship, votes"
consensus ap
peal, school
transportation.
Brothers
Following of mil
1tant black
community,
black student
s\1pport, mem_
bership I . votes,
emotional ap
peal, potential
teachers.
Same as issue 4 above but with much
more signif1cance to Panthers' re
sources of emotional appeal and
ability to ident1fy enemy.
UCF

UCF
Brothers

Consensus appeal
Militancy (liabi
l1ty)
7. Need for new chairman UCF
Consensus (in
ternal appeal,
support ot mod
erates, votes.
'Brothers
Support of mil1
tants, irot~s.
Same as issue 2 above
8. Extent of boycott
9. Discontinuance (dur
Same as issue 2 above
ation) of boycott.

D.5. Outcome:
DECISICN ISSUE
1 •.

DECISleR· CHOICE

Choice of cha1rman·

Mr. L.

cott:.

Coa11tion affirmation to boycott

cation

Community SChool.

"'2. Whether to boy

3. Children's edu

DECISION ISSUE
-4. Inform ~nd un1te
rest of black com
mun1ty
5. Function of
rally

6. Internal unit
operat1on

DECISION CHOICE

Rally
Community endorsement of dec1sions
1-3.
Operate .as a. un1 t .

7. Need for new·chairman Rev. C.
8. Extent of boycott
City wide boycott.

9. Discontlnuance (dur-~,
ation)L6f boycott

j

Boycott termination'

D.§., Kember Position on Issues and Actual Outcome:

=agaInst,

~

? = not known.

DECISICNCHCICE
1•

MR;L.

2. Coalition at

3.
4.
5.
~.

7.
8.

...

= 1n-tavor--;,

+

flrmation_' to
.
boycott
Community school
Rally
CommunIty endorsement
of dec1sions 1-3.
Internal unit
operation
Rev.C.
Clty wIde'boy
cott

9. Boycott termination

MEMBER POSITICN
? (unanIm1ty 1nferred +)
? (unanimity 1nferred
-1 ~unanlmltY inferred
1 una.n1mity inferred

Bla.ck Coalit1on

:}

+

? (unanimity inferred +)
UOF
+

VOF

Brothers
UCF
Brothers

-.+
+

- (but not pre
sent. for dec1
slon~)

D.7. Member Goals Compared W1th Final Outcome:

. UCF'

OU~CME

GoALS

PINAL,

Protect black
students and
expand. own or
gan1zation's in-.
tluence in.. school_
system and com
munity' •

End of school.
trouble,: curr1.
culum cha.nges "
some new respect
by wh1te students
of blacks, and
f1rst effect1ve
un1ty of blacks.
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e_MiXBEll'.
aQ,thers

GOALS

FINAL CUT-COME

Protect '_ black
students and
expand own organ1
zat1on's influence
'1n school system
and commun1ty.

II. Dec1sion-Making Process Analysis: 1n order to asses the cas.
study 1n relat10n to typological- and phase issues I, assertions:; each:
ma1n decis10n (us1ng above sequential numbers) w1ll be placed 1n:

a table and discussed later.
PBOBLEM SOLUTION,;

blem
uation
t1ne

Informa.tion

Routine
adequate inadequate

Incremental
Innova.tive
inadeQua.te adequate ina.dequate

ade~uate

~dequate
~nadequate

remental ad.equate
inadequa.te
:;,vative adeqU8-te
lnadequate

1

5.7.9

8

: "fi

;

4

Explanation:
1. The need for a chairman seemed to be a~-.procedural:r~sponse~ (»ou

,t1ne) to the group's emergence as a coa11 tion seeking to organ1ze.

The choice of Mr. L. appears to be a consequence of the coa11tion's
need for broad support from the black community.

Their assess

ment ot the Situation as requiring a chairman reflects adequate
1nformation, but their selection of Mr. L·. seems to have been in

adequately based in v1ew of Mr. M.ls subsequent res1gnation-be
cause 01' his Job's l1ab1l1ty.
2. Cons1der1ng and affirming the strategy and program of boycot
t1ng the high school was a definite departure trom the usual gr1e

;c ,rj'

.

..
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vance processes.

Their fallure to recognize the community's

In~

ternal dlssension and lack of unity in carrying-out an effective
boyoott was not adequa.tely reoognized in the situation and solu
tion assessments.
I

3. The slt.uation of providing a satisfaotory eduoational alterna
t1ve and the development of a community

~ohool

were innovative.

As in number 2, the assessment of community resources was highly
1nadequa te.

4. Using a rally (solution)" to unite and inform the black com
munity (Situation) was unusual.

The recognition of such a

prob~

18m Situation seemed valid and the oholce of a rally as & means
appears marginally ade"quate.

. 5. The

tunotio~

of this rally a.s a means to also galn community

endorsement ot the coalition's decisions seems to be an outcome

ot the1r recognition of the need for broad pub11c support and
pub11c acceptance ot their representativeness.

The Situation

and solution seem to have been adequately appraised.

6. The s1tuation of needing'an internal structure for

operatlr~

and the solution of doing this as a Single unit are a conse
quence (inoremental) of the groupls development as an organ1za
tion.

The need 1s an adequate observation, the solution is

1~

adequate 1t the nature of thIs groupls members had been accur
ately recognized.

7. With the res1gnation ot Mr. L. a new chairman needed to be
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chosen to adapt (1ncremental) to this s1tuat1on, and the selec
t10n of another moderate was a result of the ear11er pollcy and
a recogn1t1on of the

coalition'~

need for unity.

The situat10n

'and solut1on analysis seemS perceptive.

8. The need for a new strategy developed (1ncremental) from the
c,oalition's difficulties, but the solution of extending the boy
cott to c1ty-wide was radical (innovative).

,Seeing'tha~

the

si~

uation required a new strategy was accurate (adequate), but,
when. the coalition was beginning to collapse from ineffective
ness, expanding its demands was an inappropriate assessment (in
adequate) and response.

9. The subsequent fa1lure of the new strategy necessltated (in
cremental) a reconsideration, and the solution ot terminating
the boycott seemed an appropriate consequence (incremental) to
confirm formally what had already occurred in tact. ' These both
reflect accurate analysis and adequate information.
A. Typolos1cal Issues:
A. 1. Problem familiari ty - the categories in the 'above table'
seem to be useful but require a degree of arbitrariness 1n ap
plication.
A.2. patterns - sevea of the nine main issue areas had identical
problem s1tuation and solution types.
A.3. Informational adequacy - the concepts ot adequate and 1n
adequate information added clar1ty in interpreting the

main~de-
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c1sion~

issues and choices.

R. Phase Issues:
....

R.l. InnoY&t:1on: - only_ three out of nine of the main
.

coalitiona~

.

pro_b~em

situations and solutions' were innovatively oriented._

B.. 2. D1versity - of the maln- 1ssues cons1dered" none were regard
ed as routine.

Decisions 2, and 3, and 4 were innovat1ve, and the

rest. were incremental.

There appears to be someth1ng of a trend

from innovative to the other or1entat1ons.

&.3. Rational phases - this casestudy manifests little use ot a
rational dec1sion-making model.

This is reflected in poor as

sessment ot alternatives and consequences of' strategies and pro
grams.

Decisions were made without exploring whether the coali
neces~a.ry

tion had the resources

for successful decision execution-.

bo examples are the commun1ty school and the expansion of the
boycott.

There were other goals (e.g. changes ill! schools"

un1~-

1ng black commun1ty), however, which were achieved raising the

issue of whether these were-perhaps the main goals of' a rationally
used conflict strategy.

B.. 3.a. Relative applicability - this group was characterized by
_internal

conflict~and

B.4. Unit bias.-

un1~

a lack of ratlonal-decislon-maklng.
b1ases were apparent_throughout this case

study and were s1gn1f1cant 1n the coa11tion's relat1ve lack of
- success-.

The coa11 tlon process was marked by internal dissena1ol.t"

e .8. Brothers c la1med the cha1rmanship along with the DOlt even!
though the UCF's Rev.C.• was the only elected offioer.
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B.S. Coalitional cohes1veness - the degree of

1ntere8t~asreemena

and d1sagreement varied,with the issue, but_the basic s1tuation:

ot 1nternal d1sagreement tended to dissolve the coa11t1on.
Crit1que: The a.nalyt1c a l modells use of decis10nal analysic
presented some lim1ta.t10ns 1n-the way 1t could be uti11zed w1th
the

casestu~y

available.

Th1s restr1cted the dec1s1ons to be

analyzed "to the ma1n' 1ssues,. and this d1d not lend 1tself to.
1nterpreting routine coa11t1on problems.

This 1s more

o~

a 11

m1tat1cn of the data than the 'model •
.

~he

c'asestudy reveals that there is no necessary connec

tion between those in pos1tions ot formal and 1nformal power.
However, as the group developed, those with real power did 1n
fact control actual f'ormal

aut~orlt,y

(UCF. and Brothers).

It seems

to have also been the case that when a formal leader was also an
1nformal leader,' then the formal role provided access to addit1on
al power (UCF and Brothers).

However, when the for,ual leader

had few1nformal power resources, then the formal leadersh1p pos
1t10n had little power (Mr.n.).
w

Part1ally in exception to assert10n (1.B.• ~.Q.2)" the mem
ber un1ts were testing each other

thr~ughout

the coal1t1on's

history.
Ass&rt1ons I.B.2.d. and e. (leadership d1str1bution) can'
poss1bly be comb1ned 1n analyz1ng casestud1es.
~e

f1ndings seem to 1ndicate that this coal1t1on's main:

issue areas and decis10ns were not overWhelm1ngly 1nnovatively
or1ented" challenging assert10n II.• B. 2.
The f1nd1ngs also appear to contradict assert1on-II.B.S.
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that substant1a.l 1nterest: (and 1deolog1cal) d1sagreement.

served to tragment_ and destroy the Black Coa11ticn-: 1n-stead ot
be1ng compat1ble- w1th its existence.

This did,; however, prov'ide

tor a test1ng of the pos1tions of one another among members ot
the black community and ot the use of a black coalition.

CHAPTER. 4
SUMMARY OF
~est

CASESTUDY

End Community Mental Health
Center Plann1ng Project"

·,·The West End Commun1ty Mental Health Project Coa11tion.
grew out of earlier unsuccessful attempts to find 1nnovat1ve
alternat1ves to the present approach to mental health 1n a
metropo11 ta.n area.

There was also c.oncern about the state t s

lOBS of federal funds 1n mental health, becaus-e of a lack of
proposals.
The key leaders, ttold steer1ng comm1ttee," of this pre
vious group eventually sought to 1n1t1ate a proposal by.com
mun1ty based agenc1es.

They called together key West End a

gency execut1ves who agreed

on~develop1ng

the propoaal and

send1ng the1r own representatives to that undertak1ng.

t~

The "old

steer1ng comm1ttee" leaders, on their own, pre-selected a cha1r
man and vice-cha1rman, who were later nom1nated and elected by
the coa11tion.

The deference of the" new members to these lead-

era was alao evident 1n the1r acceptance of their plan for pro
ceed1ng, the1r working model, and their organ1zat1onal format.
The coa11t1on later chose to 1nclude the P. d1str1ct 1n
the project.

They also agreed to the need and requ1rement to

include commun1ty involvement, and set up a committee to eval
uate th1s.
A crucial planning conference was selected as a means of
organ1z1ng and prepar1ng the project.

There was a move by the
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'"old" leaders to restr1ct attendance, but the 1nsistance of the
other coa11t10n members led to the open1ng of it to all members.
The "old" leaders organ1zed the tasks and the d1scuss10n groups
for the conference, as well as, cha1r1ng all the d1scussion groups.
The conference chose a set of goals and pr1nc1ples, on organiza
tional struoture, and a plan for commun1ty 1nvolvement.
There was later on an expans10n of the execut1ve comm1ttee
trom three of the "old steer1ng committee" members to 1nclude
"task force" leaders 1n the new group.

A t1nal draft of the team' plan was also subm1tted.

It

1n~.

corporated many of the pr1nciples agreed upon at the planning
conference.
CASESTUDY ANALYSIS
"West End Commun1ty Mental Health
Center Planning Project"
. I. Dec1s10n-Making Power Analysts

A. Theoretical Issues:
Because ot the apparent ,unan1m1ty on most de01s10n 1ssues
and the substant1al use of formal internal structures, this case
study will requ1re cons1derable emphas1s upon pos1t1onal analysis
and struotural issues.

DeciSional analys1s and exchange

m1cs, however, will also be of considerable analytical
ness.
R. Structural Issues:·

dyn~

userul~
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B.t. EXternal

B.l.a. Domaln .. all of the members of the coalltlon were elther.
based or Involved In the West End sectlon of a metropolltan area
in the fleld of soclal servlce, expeclally mental health.

All of

these agencles had the posSlbl1lty of acqulrlng addltlonal statt
members or fundlng through 1nvolvement In the proposed federall!,
funded community menta.l health center project.

The best way to

assure thelr involvement would be through influencing the plan
nIng of the program.

Not to be a part of such a program could

even dIminish their exlstlng communi ty role by their belng out,
performed by a more comprehensive and effective program.

B.1.a.l) Resource interdependence - the members of the coalItion
were unable to achieve the project's development, approval, and
goal wIthout the resources of the other members.

The orig1nal

-steering comm1ttee" planners (Mr. R., Mr.Y., Dr. S, Mr. M., etc.)
had been unable 1n the, past to develop,_ a successful program, and
they needed the resources, ideas, and comm1tment of trkey" commun...
1ty (West End) agenCies to esta.blish-this program •. At the same
tlme, the agenCies did not

hav~

the background and contacts of

the "steerlng comm1ttee," nor the Individual resources (most mem
bers were narrowly speciallzed, e.g. residentia.l treatment for
dlsturbed chlldren, visiting nurSing care, 'etQ) ·to sponsor a
oomprehensive community

men~al

health program by themselves.

B.l.a.2) Member autonomy - the Internal organiz a t10n of the
alltion was h1ghly formal and sophlst1cated.

00-

It made consider...

able use of "task force" committees, marathon work sessions, and
a very d1rect1ve executive committee.
ably lessen member autonomy.

Thls seemed to ccns1derp

The coa.li tlon collect1vely contro.l

led extenslve community social resources with no apparently
pletely domlnant or
ber or members.

~elf

com~

sufficient (as regards the project) mem

The potential resources of federal fund1r.g were

completely attached to coalltional membership and activity •.
B~

1. b. 'Extra-coali tional relations - the relatlonships of the ori

ginal "Steering Commlttee ff group which existed pr10r to the West..
End coallt1on"were cruc1al 1n determlnlng the "core" of leaders
1n the actual coalition.

Those 1n thls previous, and continu1ng,

relatlonship were: Mr. O. (Community Councll), Mr. Y.• (State

M~H~

.'

,

Dept.), Mr. R. (County Mental Health Bureau), Dr. S. (State Ked-
lcal Affairs Assoclation), Mr. M,. (Nelghborhood Action Center NAtt), and Mr. G.

(Metropo11ta~

Chlld Care Cllnic).

Even during

the cruc1al coalitlon planning meeting at the Sunray meeting
grounds, these prior relatlonshlps contlnued - the planning
group dlscussion leaders were: Dr.

S.t~Mr.

Y., Mr. G. and Mr. R.

The extra-coalltional relations of the other organlzatlon mem
bers were not eVident 1n the casestudy materlal, however such
organlzatlons as public welfare and C'ommun1 ty Nurses are cert-a1n
to have previously existing relationsh1ps, but to what extent

these contacts had upon the

00&11 t1on' s

process

18

not ev1dent:.

trom the casestudy data.
B.l.c. Unit interests - there was evidence that at least some ot
the coalit1on's part1cipants clearly regarded their 1nvolvement
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as secondary to their unlt interests.

Charlty Hospltal was cau

tious ln reviewing how their commltment to the program would re
late to their over'all program and goals.

The chairman, Dr. S.,

appears to have regarded this coali tion as a secondary matter t:o
hls own interests as indicated by his posslble lessenlng of In.
volvement upon his appointment to a new posltion with the State.

ot more apparent evidence is the concern with the promotion ot
unlt interests by the coalit1on's members.

probably the best

and most comprehenslve illustration of th1s was the pattern of
volunteers for the commlttees on the areas of concern tor the
projec~.

People volunteered for the comm1ttees wh1ch concerned

their organization's lnterest, e.g. Mr. J., Alcohollsm and Drug.
Services; Rev. N. t Geriatr1c Services, etc.

They were thus seek

lng to prlmarily promote ana protect their organization's inter
ests inlleu of a' perlpheral concern.
B.2. Internal:
B.2.a. Formal roles - the formal roles in this coalltlon were
extremely important and influent1al.
sign1ficantly lnfluenced the

~ower

Dr. S.'s becom1ng chalrman

structure of the coalltion.

It was not only h1s formal positlon, however, but how he defined
and utilized it ("d1rective" leadersh1p) which resulted in 1ts
belng a position of power.

The vice-chairman, Mr. G., was In.a

simllarly lnfluential positlon, but of less impact.

Their ac

tlvlt1es and pos1tions w1th the "Steerlng Commlttee" enabled
them to set up thelr own elections by the new coa11tlon.

They

also determ1ned the major 1nit1al input of members (letters by
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participants).

At the secend meeting, it was their meeting

pla~

and organizational format (committees to study program areas)
which determined the course of action.

Dr. S. also established

the tour main tasks to be achieved at the Sunray conference.
Dr. S. and.Mr. G. were also responsible for drafting the "comll!ll
munity team" model to be completed by a special commlttee.
along w1th a few others, were appolnted to

~n

They,

executive committee

that;,.had the power to act between meetings ln the program plan!--"
ning.
The, other important formal coalitional positlons were var
ious comm1ttee chalrmen and members.
mined the components of the proposal.

They

signif~cantly

deter

The entlre process work

ed within a "highly structured system ,cf an executlve comm1ttee..
and task force committees.

B.I.b.

Representativeness - the "parent organizatlon" of some

members was· somewhat nebulous, e'.g. County poverty Agency,
County Mental Health Project, County Famlly Mental Health Bureau"
and County Publlc Health Bureau.

Whether thelr "parent organ1za

tion" was the dlvision, clinlc, etc. or the oounty determines it
these people represented the county as a whole (whatever
or that divlsion, etc.

th~t_i8)

The tendency would 'probably be to pro

mote the lnterest of' the lower level segment, but evidence 1s

lacking 1n the casestudy to clar1ty th1s.
a

mov~ment

There did seem to be

at Sunray to seek out the County's relatlonship w,l th

the project, lncluding the possibllity of lts belng the tlscal
agent.

For the coalition generally, there is no clear ev1dence
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indIcating unIt representatives substantially

from

d1gress1~~

"parent 'organization" 1nterests.,
'B.2.c. Consensus - to the date that the casestudy covered, the
most powerful members of the coalition tended to be recogn1zed as
those in formal coa11 t10nal roles, e. g. cha.irman, v1ce-cha1rman,:
and task force comm1ttee cha1rmen.
w1th the

c~a1rman

and vice-chairman.

This was espec1ally th, case
There was also the recog

n1tIon of Char1ty Hosp1tal as a powerful member, since 1t was re
qu1red as the 1npatient fac11ity 1n the proposal.
B.2.c.1) D1fferent1al power - .the structural a.nd procedural 1s
sue areas were dom1nated by the two elected off1c1als.

The 1s

sue ot agency inclus10n in the plann1ng process (comm1ttees and
Sunray) were greatly influenced by all concerned coa11t1on agencYI
and cit1zen members.
B.2.c.2) Testing - Since no substantive doma1nc.1ssues had as yet:
arisen, l1ttle testing had occurred within the coa11t1on.

One

except10n was the conf11ct over part1cipat10n at the ,cruc1al
Sunray, plann1ng seSSion 1n wh1ch the "leaders" attempted to re
str1ct attendance and coalit1on members Bought an open meeting
and won.

There was also the conflict by the c1t1zen based groups

over Q1t1zen-1nput.
B.2.d. Single leadership - the formal coa11 t1cnal lea.dership.-was
essent1ally controlled by one (poss1bly two) person, Dr. S.

He

also controlled the process of the group 1n a d1rect1ve manner.
While the formal leadersh1p wa.s "1mba.lanced," the 1nformal lead
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ership had not as yet emerged (hypothetically it might never
emerge) - so the structure of that dIstrIbution of power had
yet become apparent.
wer~·

no~

Some pOSSIbIlIties of other canters of PO-·

include Charity Hospital, the State, the .County, CitIzen parr

ticipation organlzat1ons, resident1al and out-pat1ent faci11ties.
All of these members have substant1al resources.
B.2.e. Multiple leadership - the formal group

le~dership

somewhat centra11zed and Imbalanced, however the

is

dIstr1bution:o~

info'rmal power resources among several part1cipants indicates a
posSibility of the future development of several centers of group
leadersh1p.

c.

·Exchange Issues:

0.1. Cond1tions:
0.1.a. Resource generality - the resource of formal organ1zation
al centrol of the coalit1on was a very general resource

frequen~

17 and effectIvely used by the formal coalition leaders.

The

applicab1l1ty of thIs resource would probably tend to decrease,
once the stage of concrete proposal make-up and proposed
subcontractIng was InItiated.

projeo~

Informal power resources would

then probably tend to be domInant.

Coa11tIon members w1th

more~

specIfIC resources wIth lower genera11ty include CharIty Hospi
tal's control of the only viable

inpatl~nt

faCility, and its re

lat1ve oontrol of that port1on of the proposal.

Another Illus

tration is the centrol 'of the c1tizen participat10n segment by
those agenc1es and reSidents with that organizational and per
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interest.

There was also program and knowledge control bJ

agencies specialized 1n certa1nproblem areas.
~.1.b. R~8ource

dependency - the process of this coalition has

generally been characterized by cooperation.

This has largely been

determined, by the pervas1veness of the project which requ1res the
resources of a broad divers1ty of local West End ,communityagen
cies.

The result 1s that the members of the coalition' need the

resources ot each other to successfully attain the overall pro-
posal's acceptance wh1ch is constituted by program components
concerned with member interests.
0.1. b.1 ).Mutual exchange - there appears to be a relat1vely high

level of member co-ordination and interdependence, as well as"
apparent mutual exchanges.

~heBe

exchanges have occurred 1n

task torce comm1ttee deployment accord1ng to volunteers.

Th1s

allowed those with special interests in certain program top,1c
areas to help determine the outccme of that segment of the pro-·
Ject.

While' structured by the leadersh1p, the Sunr,ay work con

ference d1d include all those interested - after
sured that leadership.

The leaders were

st1l~

membe~s

pres

to determ1ne the

conference structure, while all members were allowed plann1ng
1nput.

The product of that conference was also the result of a

mutual exchange of 1deas and 1nterests.

As part of 1ts l1st ot

13 priorities, 3 specifically protected the mutual role of

Yolvement for ex1st1ng West End community 'agencies.
~luded

prov1s1ons

to~

and spec1ficat1ons

o~

which the community "teams" could draw upon.

~

It also

~

"spec1a11zed services"
These 1ncluded

ma~

ot the program areas of member agenc1es, e.g. "1npat1ent services"

· - Charity Hosp1tal, "childrenls res1dent1al ca.re" - Children's:
Home, but did not spec1fy the contract agenc1es.
O.l.c. Uq1t goals - there appeared to be comm1tment to unit
goals~(degree

to which not

clear~ ~

to th1s p01nt, atta1nment

ot those g.oals required cooperat10n as 111ustrated by the Sun..
ray conference plan wh1ch broa.dly prov1ded for the involvement.
of most of the concerns of the member agenc1es.
e.l.d. Resource compet1t1on - the coalition was not as yet h1ghly
character1zed by considerable competItIon for resources and sub
sequent group conflIct.

This could be because the areas of re

source compet1tIon and allocatIon were st11l latent and had not
as yet become man1fest.
C.l.e. Member prof1 t

~

sInce the coali tion 1s the veh1cle for

mt,mber part1Cipation and determ1nation of resource distributI0'n,<
they seem generally to be Intimately Involved 1n 1ts process, espe
c1ally in the

plar~1ng

portions which directly concern the1r agen

cy's area of interest.
0.2. Costs:
0.2.a. D1fferential resource issues - this coa11t1on gives evi
dence.of

d1rferen~issues

demand1ng different resources.

EX&m~

ples include Mr. Y.'s posItion w1th the State as provIding him
with the key resource of assemb11ng the coa11tIonal participants.
Dr. S. and Mr. G.ls resource of program area familIar1ty and
prior acceptance by old

I1

s teering comm1ttee" members greatly

enabled them to secure the central formal leadership P9 s 1tIons

or

9J,

the coa11tion.

The issue of who was to attend the Sunray confer

ence was by no means. a si tuation that control of the formal (,oal
1tlona1 structure could determine; it requIred full 1nvolvement.
of all the community agencies with their respective cruc1a1 pro-·
gram resources.

Subsequently, the conference was opened to all

ooa11tion members.
C.2.b. Costs incurred - some of the costs incurred by this co
. ali t10n inc lude tf111fonnatlonj" controlled by old' "steering com
mittee" members; "intergame," need to approach the County about
1ssue of f1scal agent; "d1vision of pay-ofts, II (somewhat poten
tIal) inclusion of provisions 1n proposal for services prov1ded

by coa11t10n members; "dissonance," inclusion ot all members in::
planning conference; and "pressure of t1me," October 1" dead11ne
and other future deadlines.

0.2.0. Pr1nciples - certain "decision cost" principles seem to
have been opera.tive 1n thls group.

"Slze" 1s a factor to the ex

tent that the "minimum w1nning" member number Is large,) because

ot the requirements of the proposal.

This large number of re

quired part1Cipants, because of their crucial resources, seems
to have demanded rela.tive "unanlmity t. of group members.

This

also has meanlng for an "1ndispensa ble member,« slnce sO'many,
agency resources are cruclal, e.g. "old steerIng committee"
knowledge and crucial 1ia1son, Char1ty Hospital centrol of only
viable lnpat1ent facility, etc.

0.3. Situations:
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0.3.&. Resource independence of powerful - in'·this coalition-:

the weakness and strength of most members 1s relative to the
uatlon·at hand.

The tendency seems to have been for the agencies

to be most influencial 1n areas of thefr own interest.
outcome was

sit~

essentia~11

So the

one of exchange among relatively equal

members, by each having cons1derable control-over the1r interest
area through task force. committees.

In the instance of who was:

to part1cipate in the Sunray conference, the leaders had con
trol of arranging the conference and determining attendance.
The reaction of the other coalit1on members, holding key program
resources, forced recons1deration and eventual inclus10n ot

them.
C.3.b. Resource control by powerful - alternative resources were
sought by the members who d1d not hold formal leadersh1p pos1
tions by going outside of that group, in essence, and mutually
sought to

cha~e

a tentat1ve attendance dec1sion·for the confer

enoe.
D. Analytical Questicns: because of the extremely large number of
partiCipants (approximately 50), the part1c1pants will be refer
red to in more collective terms unless the issue specifically in
volved a

limit~d

number of identifiable acotrs.

The main:categor

les will be "old steering comm1 ttee and "agency representatives. It

D.1. power Resources:
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"OLD STEERING COMMITTEE"
Crucial liaison with
funding a.gents .
Knowledge of proposal
requirements
Control of formal
coalitional
positions
otficia~ standing ot
leadership and author
ity ona broad com
munity or governmental
base
Votes
Relative neutrality in
possible agency fund
ing
Previous experience with
project

"AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES"
Cruclal proposal component re
sources, e.g. (1) staff, (2) fa
c1lities, (3) programs. Exam
ples of (1), (2), and (3) in
clude professional personnel,
knowledgable citizens, hospital,)
residential care facilities,
homemaker programs, community·
participation functions, etc~
Votes.

D.2. Maln coalition decision issues and relevant resources:
MAIN· 'ISSUES
1. Need to coalesce

main West End
community re
source agencies'.
2. Whether to pro
ceed on a coor
dinated basis on
a proposal.
3. Assurance of agency
cooperation and in
fluence on proposal.

4. "Old steering com

mi t tee It seekir.g to
control coalition
leadership.

5. Coalition's need

tor formal leader
ship.

6. Need for proposal

planning and inltial
organizational struc
ture

RELEVANT RESOURCES
Prest1ge sufficient to assure a
response from key community re
source representatives.
L1aison w1th funding agents,
knowledge of proposal require
ments, crucial proposal component
resources, votes.
Crucial proposal component re
sources, liaison with funding &
gents,. knowledge of proposal
requirements.
Liaisen with funding agents, know
'ledge of proposal requirements,
relative neutrality in possible
agency funding, previous exper
ience with project,~votes.
Liaison with funding agents,
knowledge of proposal requirements,
relative neutrality 1n possibly
agency funding" previous experience
with project, votes.
Knowledge of proposal requirements,~
relative neutrality,~previous exper
lence with proJect, control ot formal
organizational positions.

7. Need to staff

"task force"
committees.
8. Whether to in
clude P. district.

9. Need to develop

effective com
munity participation.

10. Attendance at cru
Qial plann1ng con
ference.

11·. C.ontrol of conference

Crucial proposal component re
sources, control of formal or
ganizational positions.
Crucial proposal component re
sources, knowledge of proposal
requlremer.ts.
Crucial proposal component re
sources (c1tizen participation),
knowledge of proposal require
ments.
Cruc1al liaison with funding a
gents,. knowledge of proposal re
quirements, control of formal
coalitional positions, relative
neutrality, previous experience
with project, crucial proposal
component resources.
Control of formal coalitional
positions

Decision-issues 12 - 14 were products of the planning conference.
1.2. 'Goals and operational

principles.

13. Organizational
structure (Board, com
m1ttees, fiscal agent,
staft, Mental Health
Team, additional ser
vices).
.
14. Oommunity
involvement.
15. Need for expanded

leadership of coali
tion.

Knowledge of proposal require
ments, relative neutrality, pre
vious experience with project,
crucial proposal component re
sources, votes.
Sam~ as number 12.

Orucial proposal component re
sources (Citizen participation)"
knowledge of proposal requ1re
ments.
Knowle~e and control of the co
alition s crUCial proposal compon
ents. (new resource).

D.3. Influencer (s) 'and influencee (s):
DECISION~·ISSUE

1. Need to coalesce

main West End com
munity resource a
gencies.

INFLUENCER(S)
"a.ld steering
comm1ttee"

INFLUENCEE(S) ;

Main West End
community re
source agen
cles
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2. Whether to

proceed on~&
coordlnated
baSls on: a.
proposal.
Assurance
of
3.
agency cooperatlon
and influence on'

4.

~roposal.

O~d steerlng
comm1ttee"
seeking to con
trol coa11tlon
leadersh1p.
5. Coallt10n' s
need for formal
leadershlp.
6'. Need.for proposal
planning and lnltial . organlzational
structure.
7. Beed to staff'
"t~Sk force"
·commit tees.
"I

8. Whether to include
P. dlstrict.
9. Need to develop
effective community part1clpation.
10. Attendance at cruc1al plannlr.g conterence.
11

~

Control of confer
ence

"old steer1ng
committee"

C.ommun1ty resource
agenc1es

"Old steer1ng
comm1ttee"
. Indlvidual &
§encies
Old steerlng
comm1ttee tt

Agencies

"Old steerlng
committee"

Agencles

COalitlon
Agenc1es

"Old steer1ng
Agenc1es
comm1ttee"
(especially c.
and v .-0.)
Indlv1dual &Coa11t1on
Agencies
'. genc1es "old
steer1I".g com
m1ttee"(esp. c.
and v.-c.)
. Indivldual agen- RestL ot C.oa11t1ott
cles wlth 1nter
ests 1n P. (1nferred)
Ne1ghborhood
Ooalit1on
poverty pro.
~ram

Old steer1ng
comm1ttee"
Agencies and
residents

Agenc1es and res1
dents
"old steerlng
comm1ttee"

It'Old steer~ng
Coa11tion.
comm1ttee tt
Not given in'casestudy

12. Goals and op
eratlonal pr1n
ciples.
13-. Organ1zatlona.l
Not g1ven in casestudy
structure (Board,:
committees,)fls
.cal agent ,staff"
Menta.l Health '.ream, ~
addit10nal serv1ces).
14. Community involvement. Ne1ghborhood po- Rest ot coalit1on
verty programs (e)
and residents
Agencies
Citizen advocates

15:~

Need to r expanded
leadership of·co
&,11t1on.
.,'

Not given in', casestudy but infer,~" '
red::
Bew leaders(com
,Rest ot ooa11
mittee chairmen)
tion'~
Old leaders
Rest .of ooa11
tiolr.

D.4. Decision1ssues and relevant member resources:
.

,

DECISION. ,ISSUES
1. Need to coalesce

ma1n West End
'communi ty re
source agenc1es.,
2. Whether to pro
ceed on a coor
dinated basis on
a proposal

"

RELEVANT MEMBER

"Old steering
committee"
.

~

"Q.ld steering
committee"

~"
!

RESOURCES

Standing ot leader
ship and author~tl
: "'on governmenta~ ,
,:base.
Lia1son with
funding agents,
Knowledge of pro
posal requirements"
votes.
Crucial proposal
component resources"
votes.
L1a1son with tund
1~~ agents,: Know
ledge of propo.sal
requirements.
Crucial proposal
component resources •.
Lialsonwith fund
ing agents,. know
ledge of proposal
requlrements~ re
lative neutrality,·
in possible agency~,
fund1ng J" preylous
experience with project.
Same as number 4.
Knowledge ot pro
posal requ1rementsJ~
relative neutrality,~
previous experience
w1th proJect,; COn
trol of' formal
organizational
posit1ons.

DECISICNISSUES

7. Need

to~'start

"task force"
committees. .

8. Whether to in

clude P. d1strict.

RELEVANT

Indiv1dual
agencies

:ME~IBER

RESOURCES,

Crucial proposal com
ponent resources.

"Old
Control of formal
steering
organizational
comm1ttee"
positions.
(~Bp. c •. and
v.-c.).
Individual
Crucial proposal con.
agencies
ponent resources.,.
.......
with inter-'
ests in P.
"Old steerKnowledge of proposa~
ing committee'f, requirements.
Neighborhood Crucial proposal com
poverty
ponent resource (Cl~
program
izen partic1pation).
"

9. Need to develop

effective com
munity partici
. pation.
10. Attendance at
cruc 1al plan
ning conter
ana'e.

"Old steer
ing comm1t
tee"

,-""

Knowledge ot proposal
requirementB.,cruc1a.l
liaison with funding
agents, control of for
mal coa11tional pos1
tions, relative neu~ral
ity,:prev10us experlenoe
w1th proJect,:cruc1al
proposal component re
sources.
Control of formal co
alItional posit10ns.

·nOld steer
ing commi t-'
'tee," (esp.
c. and v. - e • )
12. Goals and operat1on-' "Old steer
Knowledge of proposal
al principles.
reqUirements, relative
ing commit
tee"
neutrallty,:prev10us
exper1ence with pro
Ject, votes.
Agencies
Crucial proposal compo~
nent resources.
Same as number 12.
13. Organizational
structure.
NeIghborhood Crucial proposal com
14. Community in
volvement
poverty :pro ponent resources (citi
grams (2)
zen" participation)"
t 1. Oontrol of
conference

and resi

dents
Agenc1es

15. Need for ex
panded leader-,
ship of coa11-.
t10n

Ex1sting
leaders
and main
existi~..g

comm1ttee
cha1rmen

knowledge of proposal

reqUirements, votes.
\GoUnter resources of
centrol otcomponent
resources, and votes.
Knowledge and contro~
of the coa11tions pro
posed components.
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D.S. Outcome:
DECISICN' ISSUE
1. Need to coalesce

main West End com
mun1ty resource a
genc1es.
2. Whether to prooeed on
a coord1nated bas1s on
a proposal.
3. Assurance of agency
ooopera.t1on and 1n
,fluence on proposal.
4.' "Old steer1ng comm1 ttee tt
,seek1ng to control co
a11t10n leadersh1p.
5. Coal1t10n's need tor
formal leadersh1p.
6. Need for proposal
plann1ng and 1n1t1al
organ1zat1onal
structure.

7. Need to starf "task
force" comm1ttees.

8. Whether to include

P. d1str1ct.
9. Need to develop et
fect1vecommunlty
part1cipat1on.

10. Attendance at cru

cial plann1ng con
terence.
11. Control of con
terence ..

12. Goals and op

erat10nal pr1n
c1ples.

13. Organ1zat1onal
structure.

DECISION:CHCICE
Oal11ng of meet1ng by Mr. L
State'M.H. Dept.

ot

Proceed on" a coordinated pro
posal.
Each agency to send one or two
representat1ves.
pre-select Dr. S. cha1rman and
Mr. G~. vice-cha1rman.
Dr,. So. and Mr. G. nom1nated and

elected same as in number 4.
Acceptance of Dr. S. and Mr. G.'s
plan of procedure, Dr. 5.'s pro
posal model, and Mr. G.'s organ
1zational format (task force com-'
m1ttees).
.
Volunteers from agency represen
tatives to committees relevant
to their knowledge and, above all"
1nterest.
Inclusion of P. d1strict.
Acceptance and apPointment ot an
ad hoc comm1ttee to study (made
up of c1tizen part1cipation ori
ented program representat1ves).
All members of coa11t1on and re
Sidents •
steering ccmmittee tl members
to lead discussion groups, chair
man to determine agenda and tasks.
A.pproval of same. inc ludll'..g 3
(numbers 1.7,8) which spec1f1
cally 1nvolve serving the i"nter-
ests of the existing agenc1es.
Creat10n of: a board made up of
,1/3 residents. 1/3 agenol people"
1/3 "community-at-large;1 standing
operat1ng comm1ttees; fiscal a-.
gent (non-:prof1t corporation or
,the County);~executive staff;
ne1ghborhood mental health team
(at least one psychiatrist, plus
"O~d
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DECISICN) IS8UE

-....

-

'DECISION CHOICE

-.

other profess1onals and para
professionals, additiQnal spe-
cia11zed and extended services
including many'dlrectly related
to functions ofcoalitlon agen
cles, e.g. lnpatient faclllty"
resldentlal treatment, alcoho
l1ctreatment"etc.).
1/3 of board members (not con
trol), a "Communi ty Review Com
m1ttee" - advlsory only.
Steering Comm1ttee formed from
Old Execut1ve Committee (Dr. S."
Hr. G., ~ Mr. Q.; sec.) and "Team"
Oomm1ttee chairman Mr. E., Man.
'agement Commlttee chalrman Mr. ~'.,
and two poverty program person
nel, one belng chairman of Com
munlty Revlew Commlttee Mrs. ~

14. Community in
yolvement.
15. Need for expanded
leadership of
coalition.

D.6. Member Pos1tion on Issues

- =aga1nst, ? =not

'and

Actual Outcome: +

= ln' favor,,,

known
",

DECIS,ION
•

...

.. '

_. ~

... •

CHOICE

POSITION
,

4> '

1. Call1ng of meeting by

?

Mr. Y. of State M.R.
"Old
'Dept.
2. Prpceed on a coordinat-.
?
ed' proposal
3. Each agency to send one
?
or two representatlves
4. frs-select Dr. S. chalr~
t
man and Mr. G. v1ce-cha.lr- "Old
man
?
5. Dr•. S. and Mr. G. noml~
nated and elected the
"Old
same as ln number 4.
6. Acceptance of Dr. S. and
?
Mr. G.ls plan of procedure,
Dr. S.' s proposa.l model,~
and Mr. G.ts organlzatlon-,
. al format «(task force com
. mlttees).
7. Volunteers from agency
?
representatlves to com
m1ttees relevant to thelr
knowledge and, above all,:
interest.

.

(unanimity 1nterred+)
steering commlttee lt members
(unanimity inferred +)
(unan1mity

1~~erred

+)

(unan1mity interred +)
steering comm1ttee" members
( unanim,l ty lnre rred +)
steer1ng committee" members

(unanimi ty lnferred +),

(unanimity interred +)
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DECISION CHOICE

MEY.J3ER

8. Inclusion' of P.
d1strict.
9. Acceptance and
apPointment of
an ad hoc com
m1ttee to study
etfect1ve com
mun1ty particI
'patlon (made up
ot cItizen particl
.R8.t1on oriented
program repre
sentatIves).
10. All members 'of coa
lition and res1dents
.11. "Old steerl.ng com
m1ttee" members to
lea.d discusslon
·groups, . cha1rma.n to
determine agenda
and tasks.
12. Approval of goals
~nd operatIonal
principles.
13. Approval of organ1zational structure
.14. Approval of plan
for' community in
volvement.
15~'. Expansion of ex
,cutlve comm1ttee

?~I

(una.nimity interred +)

?

(unanimity inferred +)

1

"Old steer1r.g comm1ttee l '
+
Agenc1es and res1dents
?.
(unanIm1ty 1nferred +)
"o.ld steering committee" members

-

?

(\1nanimity inferred +)

1

(unan1mity 1nferred +)

?

(unanimity inferred'tattsr
,comprom1se +)

?~

Unanimity interred +)

The three most controversial and signifl.cant declsions ha.d

not as yet been made by the coalition: (1) speciflc fiscal

agen~J'

(2) spec1fic initial serVices, and' (3) specific service subcon

tractors.

D.7. Member Goa.ls·ComparedWlth Final Outcome:
GOALS
..

"Old steering
commlttee"

..

Development and
fundlng of a.n inno
~atlve communlty
mental health plan

FINAL. OUTCOME
Flna.l outcome ot
this coalition was
not as yet attained.
It had completed an.
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MEMBER

GOALS

FINAL

tor West End ot
Metropo11tan
Area.
Protection and
promotion of
own agency in
terest and do
main~ 1ncludlng
provisions for
funding tor
these agenc ies, .
1ncluding, ac
cording to in
dividual agency
interest,. resi
dential treat
ment. alcoholic
treatment, inpa
tient care,. etc.

Agenc1es

OUTCOME:~

overall outline
tor an innovative
commun1ty mental
health plan tor
West End Metropo
litan Area, with
provisions cover
l'ng and promoting
essent1 a llyall:of
the member agency
interests.

II. Dec1s1on-Making Process analySiS: in order to assess the case
study 1n'relation to typological and phase lss,ues' aS8ertion~"
each main decision (using above sequential numbers) will be plac
ed in a table and discussed later.
PRCBLEM

SCWTION,.

blem
ROUTINE
INC.RElvIENTAL
INNOVATIVE
uatlon lnformatlon adequate ina.dequa.te '~dequate lina.dea ua te adeguate inadequa.te
,tine
11
~dequate
r7.•5.l2~13t 14
emental
vatlve

~nadeJiuate
ade~uate

inadeguate
adeia ua te
inadequate

6~8.2

_,,±~,15~

,,3.,10

1~2

EXPLANATION: .
1. The "old steering committee's" assessment ot the situation as

requiring an unprecedented move (innovative) of calling together
.

.

all West End community mental health resources seemed to be an
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adequate solution response to the s1tuat10n.
2,. The assessment of the a1 tuation as warrant1ng a coord1nated
effort (g1ven the level of agency 1nterdependency) just1fied
the1r aff1rmat10n of that solut1on.

Th1S s1tuation and solution

were very innovative for the 'soclal serv1ce agencies involved.'
3., The realization of the need, to assure coa11 tion member cooper.
ation and influence seemed to be a reasonable outgrowth (incre
mental) and assessment (adequate) of the Situation.

The dec1s1on

-

to send representat1ves was also a reasona.ble dec1sion and an
accurate assessment.
4. The de,sire of the "old steer1ng committee" to develop a plan

to mainta1n leadersh1p was an adaptat10n to the

ex~ans1on

of

t~e

coa11tion and an accurate realization from their perspect1ve.
Thedec1s10n to apparently pre-plan the elect10n was an 1nnova
tlve response to this s1tua.tion and demo,nstrates a clear analy
Sls of the group and the probab1lity that their solut10n wo'uld
be successful.

5.

~he

coalit1on's recognit1on of a need for formal leadersh1p

was a procedural oonsequence "trout.1.ne ), of the
ganize

.
the

new coalit1on.

ne~d

to or

The solution of elect1ng the hand

picked "old steer1ng committee" members was a logical solut10n

and outcome,' because of the new members' own lack of exper1ence,.
liaison', etc.

The1r understand1ng o,f how the election was man

1pulated was apparently non-existent.
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6. The coa11tlon's reallzatlon ot a need tor a plan tor proce
dure was a result (incremental) of thelr seeking to develop a
proposal.

Their response of deferring to the flold steerlng com

mittee" plans had become somewhat routlnized at thls pOint, and
reasonably so •.

7. The reoognltion of the need to statt the committees, whlch
were part of the plan accepted ln declslon 6, seemed routlne and
accurate.

The declsion to allow those to join the commlttees

wh1ch they were Iflnterested" and knowledgable ln seemed to be
an adaptive and adequate response to the problem s1tuatlon of
need1ng to till the posl tlons BDi havlng

peop~e

of matchlng In;..

terests in the group (also a good way to assure the ,sallency of
the project to coa11tlon members).
8. The fact that the P. dlstr1ct had not been automatlcally In
cluded in:the project area, indlcates that the problem of whe-·

M

ther to lnclude it was an outgrowth (incremental) of the effort(
to be comprehens1ve geographlcally, as well as, program wIse.
The recogn1t10n of the need to

resp~nd

seemed to be accurate.

The declslon to 1nclude the P. distr1ct appears to be routlne itt
vIew of the lnclus10n of other areas.

Thls seemed to be an ade

quate analysls.

9. The 1nformatlon about the requlrement of cltizen

partlc1patlon~

1I.a8 a result (lncremental) of the co alitl on I s app11catlon for fed
eral funding (1nclu41ng their regulat1ons), as well as, lnternal
'pressures.

The' establishment ot an ad hoc committee seemed to

be a routlne response for thls coalltion, which already had es
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tab11shed this method as 1ts bas10 procedural approach.. The' 1m
oluslon of c1t1zen partlc1pat1onoriented comm1tteemembers
seemed

reasonabl~

•.

10. The problem of Whom.to 1nclude at the "oruc1al plann1ng con;..

terenoe" was a oonsequence (1noremental) of the expanded agency
1nvolvement and influence.

The coa11t1on leaders d1d not recog

nize th1s; the agency members d1d.

The final dec1sion to 1n

oiude all coa11t1on members was a reasonable way ot adapt1ng (in
oremental) to the new-s1tuat1on.
1t. The situat10n

ot

dete~ining

the leadership for

~he

plann1ng

conference was a routine matter of having deoided to hold the
sesslo~.and

there seems to' be"· recogn1 tion of th1s.

The deterrence

to' the "old steer1ng committee" (espec1ally the coalit1on's exe
cutive leaders) was a routin1zed solut1on for the coa11t1on by
now.

Th1s seemed a reasonable react1on.

12-14. Hav1ng e~tered a oommun1ty plann1ng and federal proposal

writ1ng proJect, there are oertain rout1ne, rat10nal procedures
. wh1ch are requ1red.

The estab11shment of goals and operat1onal.

pr1nc1ples, organizational structure, and community 1nvolvement
prov1s1onp are rout1ne procedures, wh11e the manner and content
of how th1s coa11t1on solved these requ1rements was h1ghly adap-
t1ve (incremental) to its pecu11ar organ1zational compos1tion
and its network of 1nterests •. The1r observations and solut1ons
seemed qu1te adequate and accurate.

15. The need tor expanded leadersh1p was an outgrowth (1ncremen
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ta~)

of

t~e

increased complexity of the project components and

the division of labor.

This was recogn1zed in ra1sing the 1s

sue of the need to expand the leadership.

The dec is ton to do

. so might seem incremental, but it was more probably incremental
1n~view

of the "old steering committee's" here-to-tore monopoly

of formal coali t1ona.l leadership and the impact thiS' could br1ng
to the leadersh1p of the group.

The .solut1on does seem to be

8.

reasonable response to the demands of the changed Situation.
A. Typological Issues:

A.1. Problem fa.m1llar1ty -

~he

categorles seemed to be helpful.

There d1d seem to be an appllcab111ty ot the dec1sion types"
w1thout belng overly arbitrary •
.~ A.2. Pa.tterns - seven out of the f1fteen ma1n'dec1s1on issues
'h.ad 1dent1cal problem ai tuatlon· and solution types.
A.3. Informatlonal adequacy - the applicability of the variable
of adequacy of 1nformation seemed to be limited, because it was
. never really cr1t1cally employed in analyz1ng th1s casestudy.
B. Phase Issues:

B.1. Innovation - there were only two instances· out of f1fteen
ma1n dec1s1on 1ssues 1n which both the problem situation and
problem solut10n were 1nnovat1ve.

There were add1tional issues

wh1ch had incremental s1tuat1ons and innovative solut10ns.
B.2. D1versity - the f1rst two of the fifteen problem s1tuat1ons
a.nd solu,,!lons were both inno\tative, and after them both 1ncre-

106

mental and routine (mixed) orientations entered into the process.
,

.These later insta.nces did apparently occur ina ra.ndom fashion
from 1ncremental, rout'ine, and even innovative (solutions only»).
There were, after the first two 1nnovative - innovative

areas,~

tw.o:·.. -.:· incremental - incremental, one routine _. routine,;. three
incremental (situation) - routine

(so~ution.), t~ve

routine 

inoremental, a.nd two increme'ntal - innovative.

B.3. Rat10nal phases - there seems to ha.ve been a general use
and reliance upon rationality in decision-making in thiS case

study,

eve~though

selt interest was clearly operative.

A

trac-

ing ot the stages or phases ot a rational process model in this
casestudy in an overall perspective could include:
(1) Issue or problem identification: need for improvement or

community mental heaith through an innovative, comprehen
s1ve neighborhood program.
(2) Information gathering: ass1gnment of

If

task force" commi

ttees.
(3) L1sting of alternative strategies and solut1ons,

-

(4) Determination of consequences,
(5) Comparative evalutat1on, and
'(6) Oho1ce of strategy or solution: the "crucial planning

conterence" allowed for thiS process.

(7) Enactment of strategy and solut1on - not to date of case-
study_
It should be noted that many indiVidual dec1sions could be
assessed in a s1milar format of the rational phase model.
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B.3.• a • Relative app11cab1lity - this coalition was marked by a
high degree of cooperation and consensus, with definite instances
of bargaining and exchange.

It also used a rational,process me

thod.
B.4-. Unit bias - unit b1ases were very much 1n ev1dence 1n th1s
coalition trom the pattern of volunteers tor the "task force"
commit'tees relevant to a uni t' S interests to the 1nterest laden:
propoeal,Model,which resulted from the 'plann1ng conference.

An:

illustration is the strong role taken by the cit1zen based pover

·ty program. to be the chief advocates for citizen participation.
B.5. Coa11tional cohesiveness - this coalition had members who
-

.

had issue and interest differences and d1sagreements (relatively
mild), but this did not preclude the possib1l1ty of form1ng a
-

workable and workingcoalit1on.
Critique: The usefulness and applicab1l1ty of the decisional me.
thod seemed to be of rela.tively lessened value, largely because

ot the lack of more specific casestudy

dat~

on'al11gnment of

mem~

bers on lssues, and the fact that the coalition had not as yet
finalized its work.
A more specific criticism concerns assertion I.B.2.a.,
which maintains that formal coalitional roles carry little real
ppwer.

The aasestudy material 1nd1cates that the coa11t1onal

leadership poSi t10na of the "old steering cO.mmi ttee lt members were
instruments ot considerable influence.

'rhe coalit1onal "ta.sk torce"

committee chairmen also had considerable 1mpact on the plann1ng
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process and th1s eventually assured them pos1t10ns on the execu
t1ve commIttee.
Another crit1c1sm is of assertion 0.1.c., which maintains
that the h1gher the commitment to indiv1dual unit goals" the less
the cooperation.

The

casestu~y

implies a defin1te commitment.. by

un!ts to the1r goals, but.. oooperat1on did take plaoe beoause ot"
unIt.1nterdependence.

ThIs poss1bly indicates that.interdepen.

dence may preclude. at_least .. blatantLpursu1t:.of self interest.
noth~r po~s1ble

A

motIve for .thls ,degree of apparent cooperat16n:

could have been for external goals of coal1t1on-, members.

Being

,

a member of the coa11 t1on' In. 1tee If could have been a resourc.e
sought among other poss1ble

goals~

e.g. enhanoement

o~

resources

1n another a.oa11tion·' or 1n the eyes of oonst1tuents.
Wh1le assertion II..A.2. maintains that problem,

situatlon~

and solution' types are usually Ident1oal"the data from the
. oasestudy revealed that only' 6 out of 15 of the dec1sion' Issues
were of thIs type.

Subsequently, they were not the usual case.

the var1able of informat10n adequacy II.A.3. was of l1ttle
use 1n:th1s casestudy.

Th1s, however,; may be more attributable

toethe lack of casestudy data than-to a

derect~1n

the model.
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CHAPTER 5

Summary of Caseatudy
"Project Rap"
This coalition was developed by representat1ves of social
service agenc1es around the 1ssue of estab11sh1ng a preventive
program for pre-alienated youth in a metropo11tan area.

The

coalition arose from the merger of two previously separate at
tempts in the area.

One was an attempt by a drop in center for

alienated youth through the public schools (which rejected the
proposa.l).

The second sroup was initiated by Family Service·
.
Agency A •• ~·which involved three other Family Serv1ce agencies.
.

,..

...

This group then asked the Drop in Center representative to

meet~

with them and later was asked to jo1n the group.
The coal1tion eventually dec1ded upon a focus for a pro
posal to the school system for setting up a preventive program
tor

pre-al1e~ated

responsibil1ty

youth.

accord1r~

The dec1sion' was made to divide the
to member interest: Drop in Center was

to tocus on drop 'in centers for youth and Family Service agenCies
"

on drop in centers' for the parer..ts •

Initially, Some concern a

bout the consequences upon community support by including the
controversial drop in center member was expressed by the Fam1ly
Service members.

However, it was Boon recognized that the Family,

Serv1ce AgenCies needed the Drop in c.enter's rapport with youth"

.



and the Drop in Oenter needed the Family Service Agenoies· rap
port with other itestablished" agenCies and their public image of
respectability in order for the program to work.
The proposed plan was accepted by the coalition atter each
member's respective "parent organization" approved 1t.

Family
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Serv1ce Agency A. cha1red the group and the Drop 1n Center re-
presentat1ve largely wrote the proposal w1th ass1stance from a
member of Agency A.
The proposal was rejected by the school board wh1ch was
the t1me fac1ng a

bon~

a~

elect1on, and whose super1ntendant was

under pub11c cr1t1c1sm tor h1s proposed reorgan1zat1on of the
school d1str1ct.

One cr1t1c1sm ra1sed by the board was the

fa1lure to 1nvolve Bchool counselors 1n the project.
The coalit1on developed a six week, summer p1lot project
through the park

dep~rtment,

wh1ch they dec1ded was a fa1luve

because of 1ts poor 10cat10n and shortness of time.

The coa11tion then init1ated an 1ntensive 10bby1ng etfort..
with school board members.

~he

controvers1al representative from,

the Drop 1n Center d1d not participate 1n this eff'ort 1n order
to avoid further hiS alienating ot the school board members.
Shortly after this, the proposal was resubm1tted and was ac
cepted by the board.
This was followed with the ooalition's establishment of a
decision-making execut1ve board and an implementing project co
ordinator.
The members of the coa11tion felt that generally the group.'
was cooperat1ve.

There was considerable d1screpancy among re

source contributions of the members.

The FamIly ServIce Agency

A., one ot the other Fam1ly Service AgenCies, and the Drop 1n.
Center contr1buted the most.

The only area of internal conflict.

arose over the type otpub11City and image given the 'project once
it was under way_

The Drop in Center representative and

seve~al
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other coalition.members felt the focus had been switched from"
eduoation and prevention to problem cases.
rais~d

The contention was

that this was a consequence of shifting program author

ity away from the professional agency staff to lay execut1ve
board members.

Th1s is challenged by the fact that the exe

cutive board members were the same people 1nvolved 1nthe ori
ginal

p~anning

committee.
CASESTUDY ANALYSIS
.

,

·project Rap"

I. Decision-Making Power Analysis:'

A. Theoretical Issues: Th1s casestudy can be, analyzed with.re
ference to the internal and external positions of each of its
members.

This is especially' eVident in the external and inter

nal structural issues of this coalition.

The assessment .. of de

cisional dynamics also is sign1ficant and the nature'of "ex_
change" appears to be directly influenced by.the structural is
sues of this case.
B. Structural Issues:
B'.1.

Ext'ernal

-B.l.a. Domain - both initial proposals (Drop in Center [Mr. A.]
and the agency!sponsored one) were concerned with expanding

pr~·

gram domains iAto ,the area of "pre-alienated youth."
B. 1.a. 1) Resource interdependence - the internal

resource~

of

each of the two proposa.l groups was regarded to be inadequate
without the inclusion of the other.
....

,..

i

The established agencies
:'.

.::...
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needed the Drop 1n Center"s (Mr. A. 's) rapport w1th a11enated
youth, statt t1me, and.tunds.

The Drop 1n Center needed the a

genoy resouroes of'pub110 respectabIlity, staff time, and funds.

B.1.a.2) Kember autonomy - the ooa11tion does not seem to have
restricted the usual operations. of 1ts members.

The ooaliton

itself utilized very limited internal and external resouroes

,
and had no

.

.

real organizational:sanotions upon its members.

B.l • b. Extra-ooalitional relations - a oons1derable degree of the

.
. tntluenoe exeroised by the Drop in Center upon other ooa11tion

·members was based upon 1ts extra-coa11tional relations with the
metropolitan alienated yo·uth.

On the other

hand~

the estab11sh

ed.agenc1es based much of their influence in coa11tional act1v""
ity upon their extra-coalit1onal relations w1th the "establish-
ed" commun1ty and as being a "respected" member of the community.
B.l.o. Un1t interests - membership 1n the coalition does not ap-·

pear to pose a threat tQ any

exlstir~

1zat1onal relat10ns ot its members.

1nterests and

inter-orsa~-

There 1s referenoe to some

1n1t1al degree ot ooncern by the established fam1ly serv1ce a
gency members about including a ccntroversial program such as
Drop 1n Center 'as a member.

Th1s was based upon the tear ot

lOSing oommun1ty support from suoh an al11ance.
B... 2. Internal:
B,2.a. Formal roles - there did not appear to be o'onsiderable lm:
tluence vest'ed 1n formal ooa11 tional roles.
ed to res1de in resource control and use.

The real power seem
There was some 1nfluence
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1n that Fam1ly

5e~vIce

Agency A. controlled the pos1tion of cha1r

man and was intimately oonoerned about the formation and d1rec
tion,,'of the project.

The Drop in Center was also responsible for

draft1ng the proposal ..w1th aome assistance from, Agency A.
B.• 2.b. Repres'entativeness - the'members involved appeared to be
without internal conflicts with respect to accurately
ing the

ove~

represent~

all interests of their "parent organizations"

~

this project •
. B·~2.c. Oonsensus - while this case is generally characterized
by group consensus and cooperation, there developed a

tion of
B~2.c:.1)

degree~

of influence

amor~

~ecogni

coalition members.

Differential power.- in the issue area of having con

tact with the client populations (prealienated youth and the1r.
pare.nts) J there wa.s a recognition that Drop

in~

Center had more

influence with the former group and the fam1ly service agenc1es
with the latter.' In addItion, the family service agenCies clearJ..1;"
emerged as more influential overall by their capability of dealing
w1th cruoial external organizaticns (school board).
lL2.c".2): Testing ---there was an early testing of member power and
influence in ··the ooa.l1tion around the issues of mutual dependence
and resource capabil.i tles in the main areas of decision Influen.

c Ing (B. 2. c. 1 ) •
B';'2.d. and e. Single or multiple ·leadership. - the

coallt1on.~is

composed of several leaders of cons1derable internal influence"

!

1l~

but the. serv1ce aSency group1ng tends to be more frequently in
fluent1al and dominant.

The distribut10n of power appears to ba

balanced w1th respect to internal 1ssues and 1nfluence and 1m
balanced w1th respect to external 1SBUeS and 1nfluence.
Center,and

t~e

Drop in:

agencies are balanced 1n the former, and the agen

cles are,dom1nant 1n the latter.
C~

Exchange Issues::

C.• l. Oonditions :
O.l.a. Resource genera11ty - all o'f the coa11t10n's members sha%!'
ed the general resources of staff time and money.

Wh1le these

were comm1tted w1th varying degrees by the coa11t10n's members,
they were at

lea~t~.

potent1al resources for exchange.

common resource wasorgan1zat1onal endorsement.

Another

The more spe

clf1c resources included commun1ty respectab1lity and 1ntera
gency contact by the serv1ce agencies and youth rapport by Drop
in Center.
C.l.b. Resouroe dependenoy - the oasestudy ind1cates that ooa11
t10n members olearly and openly recognized their pos1tion of 1n
.terdependenoe for resouroes needed for goal

a~tainment.

~t

the

seoond meet1ng of the agency group, the oasestudy notes "1t was
agreed that none of the agenc1es could provide an outreach pro-··
gram on 1t8 .own, '. because ot a lack of funds ,and staft."

It: was

notes that later when Drop in Center became involved in the coal
,it1on; that it became apparent that it wa.s ident1f1ed with "drug
users" and "street people."

Furthermore,. the fam1ly serv1ce a
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gencles were ldentifled as part of the "establlshment tl byyounS_
people.

The consequence was that these other coalltion members

had resources which could compensa.te for each other's de:t'1c'len- ,
cles.

fhe subsequent dlvis10n of labor in the1r proposal in
the result of.bargaln1ng: Drop ln Center was responsl

d1ca~es

ble for youth drop in centers and the family

for a par

~enc1es

ents' drop ,ln center.
0.1.b.1) Mutual exohange - the high degree of co-ordination and
.

,

1nterdependence of the units seems to have been manifested
themutuallty of the exchange in the planning phase.

1~

However,

when resources were actually committed only three of the coall-.
tion members contributed 1n any substant1al way.
O.. l.c. Unlt soals -'the goal'of the

ooal1tion~seems

to have beexr.

directly related to the different units' main areas of concern"
let were an expansion of them.

Furthermore, the two

maln~tac

t10na, ,Drop in Center and the Famlly Serv10eAgencies,

s~ugh"b_

to

,promote their areas of special interest wlthin the broader ooa1i-,·
tional goal.

ThlS, however, dld not result In': a situation of ]o,w

cooperatlon.

Aotua~ly,

there was a high degree ot compat1billty"

contrary to assertion 0.1.c.
e.l.d. Resource oompetitlon - thls coalltion was not charaoterized

by competit1on for resources, nor group conf11ct.
C.l.e •. Member profit - there was definltely a discrepanoy 1n de
grees 01' lnvolvement among Seme 01' the coalit10n's members, and
this was d1rectly related to the amount of resouroes contributed

by each member.

Those who contr1buted more resources 1n th1s

case, also ga1ned more resources 1n that their statf were able
to ut1l1ze pub11c school tac1l1t1es, as well as, the complemen
tary resources (1nclud1ng reputat1ons) of the other more active
members.

The members wh1ch also were act1ve in leadersh1p also

contr1bute"d and shared 1n more ot the benefits ga1ned.
0.2. Costs::
0.2.a. Different1al resource 1ssues - this casestudy demonstrates
how d1fferent 1ssues often require different types of resources.
The 1nternal planning process reveals how the two main segments
of the coa11t1on ut1lized their spec1al resources to obtain the1r
part1cular goal's approval 1n the proposal.

Drop 1n Center had

the resource of rapport w1th youth and got a youth drop in cen
te~·accepted.

Fa.m1ly service agenCies had the resource of com..

mun1ty respectabi11ty and had an adult drop in center 1ncluded 1n:
the proposal.

C.l.b.

They all had the common resources ment10ned

~

In add1t1on, the fam1ly servIce agenc1es lobb1ed the

sQhool board due to the1r good contacts w1th "estab11shed" a
genCies, wh1.le Drop 1n Center's Mr. A. temporarily dropped from_",
act1vity.
0.2.b. Co'ste 1ncurred - the group members incurred the "d1v1sion

cr+

pay-offs"

costs atte'r the, program had been d1vided up betwee~

Drop 1n Center and the serv1ce agenc1es and later when the pro
gram actually began.

"Respons1b1l1ty" costs were 1ncurred by the

'Execut1ve Board of "Bap_U" for their controversIal publiCity pro
gram.

"Intergame~ and "persuasion" costs resulted from the co
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alition's lobbying of the school board members.
C.2.~.

Principles

""7

funotioning as a consensus type of group the

"unanimity princ1ple" seemed to be operative in attempting
maintain a moderate process.

Drop 1n Center was an "indispen

sable member " to the service agencies and vice versa.
external unit, the school
member."

t~

board'w~s

i\s an

clearly an " indispensable

While the school board did not participate (nor was

requested to do so) 1n the on-going coa11tional process, 1ts de
cls10n ultimately
goal.

~etermlned

the fate of the groupls program and

In thiS sense, the board's vote of approval was "indis

. pensable." ,
c.~~

Situations:.

0.3.80. Resource independence of powerful - there are perhaps tw;o
apparent 1ncidents of the more powerful' not need1ng the resources
of the weaker, arid where the weaker employed other commodit1es
for exchange.

In the first example, the school board d1d not

believe it needed the resources of the coa11t1on (1t was a
,

threat), but the coa11t1on changed 1ts tact1cs and used their
resource comlXlodity of good public contacts and persuas10n to
ach1eve their goal.

Another illustrat10n 1s when Drop 1n Oen

ter'a Mr. A. felt himself to be unable to deal with the schooi
board, he reduced h1s status 1n front ot the other members.
Possibly to co'unt.erac.t th1s,: Mr. A. ra1sed the issue about pub
l10ity to rega1n a role of 1nfluence as an 1ndispensable manager
of how the work should be done.

l1tl .

C.3.b. Resource control b;y 120werful - 1n this casestudy, the
coal1tion remained within the process of attaining resources
from stronger (school board) or essentially equal (a.ctive ooa11
t-lon members) units.

One example of seeking alterna.te resourcea

vas the e.st,a.bllshment of a summer program utilizing park depart.
ment tac,111tles after the1r proposal was first rejected by the
school
I).

bo~d.

AnalYtical Questions:

D.l. Power resources:
DROP IN- CENTER

FAMILY SERVICE AGENCIES

Starr time
Funds
Bapport with
_ youth
Vote(s)

Start time
Funds
Rapport with estab11shed agencies::
Image of respectability
Votes

D,,2 •. Kain coalition decision issues and releva.nt resources:

KAI.N·ISSUES
.".

HELEV~NT

RESOURCES

,-

and focus

Votes, staff time •. funds, rapport
:routh, image
of respectability.
.
-

2. Acceptance of
proposal

Votes and resources relevant to the
plans make-up (not given in casestudl).

3. Presentation or
plan to school board
(extra-coalitional
dec1sion)

Respectable image, inclUSion ot school
board, 1nformation,_ staff tlme,~funds.;
promote public image of schools rap~·
port with schools.

4.- . Summer program

Votes, fac1l1ty. staff, funds.

1. Project goal

5. Presentation of
plan to SChool board
(extra-coalitional
decision) •

wit~



Respectable image, inclusion ot board,
information, promote public image ot
schools, rapport with schools.
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KAIlt ISSUES

RELEVANT RESOURCES

6. program
atruc:ture

Votes, maintenance of coalit1on mem~
ber in-put (resource and policy).

D.3. Influencer's) and Influencee(s):
INFLUENCER(S)

INFLUENCEE(S)

1. Project
goal

Drop 1n Center
Agencies

Agencies
Drop in Center

2. Acceptance of
proposal

Not given 1n.casestudy

3. Presentation to
school board

Coalition

4. Summer program
5. Presentation to
school board

Not given in casestudy

DECISION.. ISSUE

School board

Coalltion(agency
members· only)

School board

r

. 6. Program
structure
D.4~

Hot given 1n casestudy

Decis10n issues and relevant member resources.:

DECISIeN'ISSUES
- 1. Project goal

RELEVANT MEMBER

RESCURCES

Drop 1n Center

Vote:, funds, statt
t1mel, ra.pport wi th
l outJl •
Vote. J funds, sta.tt
rappbrt with estab
11shed agencies,i
mage ot respectability_

. Agencies

2. Acceptance of
proposal

Not given in casestudy but above resources
(1) would be relevant again.

3. Presentation to
school board

Coalition

4. Summer program

Not given in casestudy but above re
sources (1) would be relevant again.

Rapport wj "'.h sc hools
(partia.l; exception
Drop in Center), fUnis,
statt time.

120;

DECISION ISSUES

5. Presentat10n to
8choo·1 board

6. Program
structure

RELEVANT MEMBER,

RESCURCES

Respectable image t~
statf time, funds, 1n
format1on, 1nclusion
only)
ot Board, rapPJrt
w1th schools.
Hot g1ven 1n:casestudy but votes and
ma1ntenance ot coalition member in~pu~
(resource and policy).
Coa11 t10n (..a 
gencl members

D.5. Outcome:
...

DECISICN: ISSUE
.......

.,."

DECISION CHOICE

.

1. Project goal

Format1on of drop 1n centers tor pre-
alienated youth and drop 1n centers ,for
the1r parents.

2. Acceptance of
proposal.

~f1rmat1ve

3. Presentat10n to
sohool board.

Rejected

4. Summer program

Aff1rmat1ve - park department fac1l1ty
~nd coalition staff and funds.

5. Presentation to

Aff1rmative - ,drop 1n center plan through
the schools.

sohool. board

6. Program structure

- drop in center plan.

Dec1sion-making execut1ve board and a
coord1nator.

·proj~ct

D.6. Member Posit1on on Issues and Actual Outcome:,.+ = in:,fav,or."

= aga1nst, ? = not
DECISION CHOICE
1. Format1on of drop
1n center plan.

known.
V.tEMBER
D~op

POSITICN

in

Agenc1es

2. Affirmat10n ot

,

3. ReJeotlon by
scbool board

Coalition
SC)hool board.,

plan

+

Center

+



(unamin1ty inferred +)

+
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MEY~ER

PCSITICN

4. Atf1rmation of sum
mer program

?

(unani~1ty

5. AffirmatIon by

Ooalition
School_board

+
+

.• DECISICII CHelCE

-

",'

...

'

board of
plan tor drol' ·1n
schoo~

inferred +)

centers

6. Executive
board and pro

.1

.

(unanim1.ty inferred +)

ject cO.ordinator

D.7 •.Membe'r Goals Comparedwl th FInal Cutccme:
C-oALS

Formati.on of
drop 1n cen
ters in'hlgh'schools for
"pre-alIenated"
youth with an
educationa.l
toous.
Agenciss

FIlIAL OUTCCYlE

Formation at drop 1n
centers in hlghschools
for (apparently) tl pre _
alienated" youth and
their parents with a
focus on problems •.

l?ormation of
drop 1n centers 1n
high schools for
fam11ies of "pre
a11enated" youth
with an educational
tOCHS (latter point
implIed by casestudy).

II. ROQis10n-Making Process Analysis: in order to assess the case

study in relation to typological'and phase issues' assertions"
. each ma1n decision (using above sequent1al numbers) w111 be
placed in a table and discussed later.
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blem
uat.lon
t1ne.

PROBLEM SCLUTICN
Innovative
I NCRElI..ENTAL
ROUTINE
lriforma:tlon adequate inadequate a.dequate 1nadequate adequate inadequate
IJ.dequate
inadequate

r:-emen1;a.l adequate

2.5

6

inadea ua.te
:lovatlve adequate
:1 na.nequate

4t
1

.~

,
1. The problem of dealing with, and providing social service for,:

·"pre-aliena.ted" youth a.nd their families'was a new area for all
coa11tion members.

The proposed

.solu41on~

a plan.. for drop-in

. centers in highachools for this segment of' the population,.; was
an untr1ed method in this.area.

Their overall information ap

peared to be adequate.
2. The problem of decid1ng on the wr1tten proposal was a natural.

outgrowth (incremental) of the overall group process.

The solu

tion was also an outcome (1ncremental) of an earlier consensus
about the coalit1on's goal.

The information seems adequate

i~

l1ght ot the above.

3. For the coalition as a whole, except. for Drop in Center which'
had already subm1tted a Similar plan to the board, the Situation

ot present1ng the plan to the school board was a new (1nnovativa»)
approach.

Their lack of' tactiCS and awareness of dealing with

the school board 1nd1cates 1nadequate informat1on and situat10n
assessment on the1r part.

The solution or choice of the board

in..reject1ng the plan was an adaptation (o.ncremental) to their

12~

earlier decision on a s1milar plan and on adaptat10n to their
political s1tuat1on.

The1r 1nformation and assessment seems

quite aceurate and adequate.

4. The

reJ~ct1cn

of the plan by the board forced the coa11tion:

into a situation of
ternatives.
sessment.
the park

~a~ing·

to adapt (1ncremental) to the1r al

This seems to have been a correct (adequate) as
T~

solut1on of developing a p1lot project through

dep~rtment

and their own resources was a new

(lnno~a-

,

tive) move by the group.

The deployment and outcome of that

plan was assessed as a fa1lure, indicat1ng a lack of 1nforma
tion 1n the solution plan they developed.

5. The re-presentatlon of the plan to the school board, w1th
considerable persuasive ground 'work, was an adaptation( inore.
mental) or the earlier reject10n and reflects an accurate as-·
e8sement and view (adequate) of the s1tuation.

The board's
.

,

solution ot aff1rmat1on'was a developmental result (1ncremental)

ot their changed po11tical s1tuation (also need for add1t1onal
resources) and increased understand1ng (adequate 1nformat1on);

'ot the program.

Q. The need to estab11sh a program governing structure 1s an adap-
.tat1on (1ncremental) to the plan I s acceptance and 1ts need for
1mplementat1on.

The coa11t1on seems to have been aware (ade

quate) 'of th1s.

The actual compos1,tion of the executive board

was merely a rout1ne re-namlng of the plann1ng group.

From the

casestudy, several (especially Drop 1n Center) of the. coalit1on
members were not aware (1nadeqijate) ot the consequences of th1s

1241

solut10n upon

ho~

the program would actually be conducted

(pub~

.licity disagreement).
A. Typolog1cal Issues:
Problem fam1l1arity - the categor1es of problem situation

A~l.

and solution tend to be applicable and provide greater clarity
1n

ana11~1ng

the dec1s10ns.

A distinct10n between total coa11

"

t10n membersh1p and 1nd1v1dual members would be helpful.
A.2. "Patterns - there appearfitd to be no. clear relationsh1p be
-

tween the type of problem s1 tuatlon and solution be1ng the same...
Th1s was the case w1th 3 of the 6 ma1n dec1sions analY,zed.

A.3. Informat1onal adequacy - 1nformat1on adequacy or 1nade
....

~

~

~

.

"

.

quacy was useful in analyzing the coa11tlon's dec1sions.

Th1s

was especially the case 1n 1nstances of 1nadequate information
(problems 3,4,6), wh1ch helped make the process more understand

..

able.
B. Phase Issues:
B.• 1. Innovat1on - only problem 1 was an 1nnovative sltuaticr. w1th
"

an1nnovative solution.

T.he most common problem s1tuations (pro-

,blems 2,4,5,6) and problem solutions (problems 2,:;,5) were 1ncre-
mentally or1ented with numbers 2 and 5 hav1ng both an incremen
tal

s1tuation'~nd

solution.

B.2. Diversity - ,of the ma1n 1ssues, there wa.s no gravitat10n to
ward routine orientations, but 1ncremental or1entations became

1~5

p,edomlnant atter dec1sion 1 (innovative -'innovative).
B.3. Rational -chases - the formation. of the coa11tion seems to
have tollowed rational phases in decision-making.

Both of the

pr1ncipal coalit1onal segments, 1dentified the problem (rational

model step 1) as "pre-alienated youth."

There was

an

effort to

gather 1nformation (step 2) from those 1nvolved about the pro
blem.

They then listed two possible alternat1ve strategies and

solut1ons (step 3), parental drop 1n centers and youth drop

cent.ers.

yolve

ln~

They determined the consequences of each (step 4) ,.

1m.

and family agenc1es only or 1nvolve youth and Drop

p~rents

In:".Center only.

They made a comparat1ve evaluation of the

findings (Step 5), 1ncomplete alone •. They then selected a solUp·
" ~,!!

~

~

..)

,

•

•

tlon (step_ 6 ), combin1ng !,. the twe.
o.

They i~inaliy sO\lg~t- to enact

the solution by (step 7) presenting.lt to the school board for

approval.

this same process seems also to be evident in the co&11
,

.

tlon's decision a.nd process of re-applying to the school board
With an alternat1ve strategy.

The decisions based 'upon inade

quate information (problems 3,4,6) indicate a .lack of. rational
deCiSion-making steps.

Inadequate situat10n

assee~ment

(dec1

alon 3) 1nd10ates poor problem identifica.ticn (ra.tional step 1).
Inadequate solut1on assessment (problems 4,6) 1ndicates poor so

luUon.pl&nn1ng

and

enactment (rat1onal steps 2-7).

13.3.&. Relatlve apn11cab111tr - thls coalition appears to have
demonstrated the variables (1n certa1n instances) ot ratIonal
. deCiSion-making and internal cooperat10n and consensus in goals.
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It. should be noted, however, that those dec1sions wh1chfollow
ad the rational model we're the result of rat10nal cooperat10n.
In tb1s casestudy the rat10nal process was apparently the inde

pendent var1able and cooperation the dependent var1able.

Th1s

1s indlcated by the fact that the 'coa11tion's lrrat10nal dec1
slons (problems 3,4,6) were apparently

~nan1mous'dec1s1cns

(co

operat1on and consens,us) but did not follow rational dec1s1cn
making steps.

Cooperation does not necessar1ly cause a coallt1on.

, to decIde rat1onally.

Rationa11ty does apparently necessItate

cooperation and consensus.
B~4. Ur~t

bias - unit blases were evldent in the declsion-mak1ng

process, espeCially 1n goal and program setting (decisions

1,2)~

and the school board votes (decisions 3,5).

B.S. Coa11tional cohesiveness - th1s casestudy·s coalition wf1,S
characterlzed predom1nantly by 'issue and 1nterest agreement and
consensus w1th sllght

va~iance

of main focus between Drop In

Center (youth) and the Famlly Agencies (family), but these were
,closely lnterrelated.
Critlque; The analytical model generally was useful ln inter
preting the casestudy.

There were, however, problems with scme

speclfic aspects of the model.
One diff1culty arose from the need to analyze the role
the

schoo~

board in the case.

Qr

If it 1s an external unit, 1t ls

dlfficult to assess the transactions betw,een it and coalItion
within the existing analytioal model.

The model falls to ade

quately take into account coalit1onal relations w1th extra-coali
, -:

t27
tlonal units, espec1a.lly those crucial to goal attainment.

If

the Board were to be considered a coalition member, it is dif
ficult to rationalize, since it was not involved in internal
coall'tional operations and policy decisions.
As mentIoned a.bove 1n the analysis of the
assertIon~I.C.l.c.

ings.

"Rap" coa11tion"

appears to be contrary to the casestudy find

There appears to have been a consIderable degree of com

mitment to 'individual unit goals, as well as"a high level of
coa11tional cooperatIon, instead of low cooperat1on as I.C.l.c •
.......

contends would result.
Another model.weakness 1s 1ts 1nab111ty to account tor
l1ab111tIes, as well as, resources.
.

~

Drop in Center and the

~gencles'

This issue ar1ses from

lia.bil1t1es.

In assessing the

fIrst decis10n of the school board" Drop in Center's controver
s1al 1mage was a liability, but the model makes no specif1c re
terence to the role of liabilit1es 1n analyz1ng

dec1aion~making.

An .dditicnal model deficiency develops from its emphasis
upon maIn Issues and decisions.

This results in biaSing a nearlyy

, exclusive analysis of innovatIve and incremental dec1sions.
-.the outcome .1s a f'a11ur.e -to analytically 'account for routine dec1..
!10n

situations and ·solutions.-..

This. could be altered with a

more deta1led casestudy, however, and is not necessariiy an in
herently model based detect.
Also w1th reepec't to decls10n types, it would
1n classlfyir.g casestudy

d'ecisl~ns

b~ helpful

if these -decisions' were analy

zed for theentlre coal1tion as an ent1ty.

Otherwise,

conf'u~lon:

in class1fication could result f'rom decisicns like number 3,
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where the s1t.uation was innovative for the coalition as a whole"
but.1DC~enta~

that :route.
suean

A

for Drop in Center, which ha.d ence before sC?ne'
possible deficiency also under "Typological 1s

1s found with assertion II.A.2.

The. _findings do not reveal

that the m&-tchlng of .the same "problem 8i tuation and- solut"9n!types
1s

necessar~ly.the

general rule.

Aasertlcn II.B.3.&. seems to be inconsistent with the find
ings ab.out the '''Rap'' coalition.

Instead of cooperation deter

min1ng whether rational decisions are possible,
pe&%-S to require cooperation 1n this casestudy.

ratlen~lity

ap

However, the

latter is not necessarily valid. since all of the decisions were
cooperat1on and consensus oriented, and no evidence is provided
by thls case as towhetter rational decisions occur in conflict..

decision processes.

.

.
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CHAPTER 6
Summary and Conclusions

Ha~1ng

analyt1c~lmodel

app11ed the

to four

casestud1es,~

an across casestudy assessment of the usefulness and relevancy

ot''Lhat model w1ll be employed to glve a broader evaluation and
summarization.
model

app~ied

This ..,ill be done through the use of a scallng
to each assertion or propos1tion of the analytlcal

model for each casestudy.

Following this wlll be. a summary state

ment on the findings for each of these assertions.
The terms used for sca11ng were chosen on the basls of ex
pressing whether the

findir~s

were in keeping wlth assert1ons.

In numerous assertlons, a result contrary to the assertion 1s
possible, so the scallng
lity of that phenomenon.

te~s

had to account for the possibi.

AS a result, the baslc terms "Identical"

and "OPPosite" were selected for scaling purposes.

"Identical"

.refers to the sameness of the assertion, and what was found in
the casestudy.

"Opposlte" refers to the contrariness of the as

sertion, and what was found in the

c~sestudy.

Both terms will be

utilized on a Bc.ale increasing in degree from "s11ghtly f
sentially," to "very. 'I

II

to "es_

"Ambiguous n will be used as a term in

termediate of "identical'" and "oPPoslte J

tt

to express a. lack ot

clar1ty or certalnty about the scaling of a f1nding.

The assertions will be scaled

accordl~~

to the casestudy

,
f1ndlngs, andtbis will be followed by comments on individual

assertlons and then on the entire model and study.
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Very Identical

3
S1ghtly Cpposite
-1

Essent1ally Identical
2

Slightly Ident1ca.l Amblgul)uS
1

EssentiallyOPPoslte

0

Ve17 Oppos1te
-3

-2

CASESTUDY FINDINGS
uSlack
iCh1ld
"Mental ":project
Total Mean
Assertton Advocacy" Coa11tion" Health" Rap"
1 •.1.1.

I.A.2.

I.B.l.a.

I.B.1.a.~J

I.B.1.a.2
I.B.l. b•.
I.B.l.c.
I.B.2.a.
I.B.2.b.
1'.B.2.c.
1.B.2.C.l~

I.B.2.c.2
'I.B.2.d.
I.B.2.e.
I.O.l.a.
I.C.l.b.
I.Q.l.b.l)
1.0.1.e.
I .. O.l.d.
I.O.l.e.
1.0.2.&.
I .. 0.2.b.
1.. 0.2.0.
1.0.3.a.
I.C.3.b.
I.D.l.
I.D.2.
I.D.3.
I.D.4.
I.D.5.
I,.D.6.
I.D.1.
~

3
3
3
3
2

3
3

2,

3,
3
3

2
2
2

2
3
2
3
3

3
3'
2
2

2
3
3

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
2
3
3
2
0

2
3
-2

3
3

0

3
2
-1
2
2
3
3

~

l
~

2

1
2
3
3

3

2

2
2

2

.3
3

1

3
3
3

2

1

3
3
-3

2

2

3
3

2

~~

1
0

3

2

3

3

2

3
3
3
1

3

3

3
3

'2

2
-3

3

3

3

3

;

3
-3

0

3
3
3
3
3
1
2

3

3

"

3
2
,3
-3

12
12
12
12
10
11
11

3

3

-

0

12

12
11

3
3

2
2
2
3

2

.8

8
',~
12

3
2
3
3

2
3

11.A..2.
II.A.3.
II .B,. 1 •
II.B.2.
II..B.3.
II.B.3.a.
II ..B.. 4.
II.B.5..
fOUL
. .
,

0

-3
2
1
2
3
1

-95

1

0

2
3
0

85

-1
0
-3
1,
3
3
3
2

75

0'
3
-3
1
3
-1
3
2

75

2

12
12
7
11

2.25
3
3
2.5
3
3
2.50
2.75

,

2
~.~;,

10

':

11.1..1.

1

,'5
10
11
'5
-5
8
11
7
7
'0
7

3
3
3
3
2.5
2.15
'2.75
.25
1.25
2.5
2.75
1.25
1.25
2
2.75 '
1.75
. .1 .75:
0
1.75
3
3
2.75
2

8

6,

-t2

5
7
.6
12
5
330

-3
1.25'
1.75
1.5..:;
3
t,2S'

2.5

"Child
Advooaoy"
2.32

"Blaok
. Coa11 t1on"

"Kental "Pro iect..l
Health" Rap"
~.tal

. 2.07

1}1

Mean: .

2.01

Oomments on Case study Find1ngs
I.A.1.

Th~

assert10n that a positional analys1s would be a viable

method of assesslng the power and 1nfluence of ooalitioD:" members in:!
decis10n-making was very useful 1n the casestudles reviewed.

Th&

data ln the casestud1es was generally adequate in enabllng the eftec.
tlve use of thls analytical method.

Problems did exist in that_there

were data gaps because the case stud1es were
to~nor

accord1ng to the needs

o~,thls

no~.compi1ed

orls+nally

model.

I.A.2.·The assertlorr:advooatlng that a dec1s1onal analysis was a re
vea11Xlg' and useful method of assessing coali tional decislon-mak1ng . was
basicallYJ8ubstant1ated 1n this study.

Th1s was especially the 1m

stance with "exchange 1ssues" and also w1th the "analyt1c.al questions,,"
exce;pt that the casestudy da:ta was frequently 1nsu'ffic1ent to
ut1lize the potentia.l of the analytical quest1ons.

fu~ly:

The def1ciencies:

were clearly more in the lack of data than lnthe quest1ons o
I.B~_~.a.

This a.ssert1on -was highly substant1ated by the f1nd1ngs of

'th1s study.

"Domain" protection and expans10n 1s a s1gnit1cantt
.

coa11t10nal analyt1cal var1able e,
I.B.t.a.l) Interdependency a.s an organizat1onal motive tor tonrdll6
and join1ng coa11tions to promote doma1n protectlon or expanslon=ls
a salient,_dynam1c of coa11t1onal behavior.
I .. B..l.a.2) The assertion: that the autonom;r ot coalit1onal members
i8 relative to the degree: ot coa11tional oontrol of resources and
8Qphlst1cat1on of 1nternal organizat1on was a useful

p~oposit10~
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in- analyzing the casestud1es.

The use of the not1on: of membe%!"- au..

tonomy shoul.d be clar1f1edas referr1ng. to member coalit10nal behav
lor -·b8hav10r w1th respect to coa11t10nal act1vIties and concerns.
I.B.•;1.b. The assertion that the extra-coa11t1onal' relations orcoa

l1t10lr'members can ,be a source ot a cons1dera.ble amount;.. ot thelJl'
influence w1 thin: the. coa11 t10n: 1s strongly 1ndlcated to be the a1.\.
uat1an: in. the tour casestud1es assessed.

sertion would be useful wlth

raspect,.to~

P:ro.bably,. a related as
the extra-c:oa11tlonal rela

tlons of the coalltlon-as a unlt as belllg a s1gnlf1cant facton In:the
coalltion-'s degree of lnfluence In- ach1eving its goal or.-· program.
:l.B.l.c. The proposition-that slnce coalltions are usually; concern
ed only wlth lssues secondary to each
unit;'s primary concern wlthin the

un1~ls

coalitlon~

lnuerests" thatt these
wlll be to protec1L and.

promote 'its prlmary lnterests ls: substantia.ted! In- the cas8study
material.

Thls phenomenon" was apparent:. in: two forms:"

ment or abstens1on: from

Qertaln.~

(~)

curtail

or a.ll aO.allt.1onal operations.. wheJt
i

"

a.contllct:between: \lnlt. and: coa11t10nal act1vltl.es:: arose and (2) in'!'"'
vo~vemenu,

In' coa11t10nal.areas whlc-lt were

sp~oirieally.

relevant. to

member.. unit_lnterests.
LB.2.a. The assertion"

that~rormal

coallt10nal roles carry lltUe

real power was not clearly substant1a.ted- by the casestudy data., 1.t:.
ls' possIble that it;:. could have increased'the external lnfluence 01'
indIv1dual members.' Att best" the result 1s amb1guous.

The

SCOl!1ng

system may have added- some contusion- Since 3 of the 4 casestudles
'rated' the assertion- as related to the data"
stro1'J811.

dltrerent~,result.

but the 1 exceptlo!I! was a...

Since no. clear result.. ls apparent" thIs

&ssertlon:requ1res addltlonal testing and

perhap~

..

'

a

reassessmen~

1}3

oft'data materia.l.
I.B.2.b. The proposltlon that member units may onlY,be
1ng a

segmen~

sl1ght value.

represen~

ot 1ts "parentt.organlzat1on" seemed to have only
In.1ts statement 1t exoludes the pO.ss1b111tf

opposite f1nd1ng by use of' the word

Ilmay.~1

o,~

an:

..

Ltl. only asserts that.

there is the posS1b1l1ty that some un1t members may not;. tully::
representthelr "parent organ1zatlon."
1.B.2.c.1) The

assertion~that

m1Dant~1n;d1tferent

data.

Th1s

-

app~ars

d1fferent aotors w1l1 be more

do~

1ssue areas was very well supported by the
to have a clear- relationship with the 1ssue

ot member'1nterdependency - units Join together to benef1t from:
the resouroes ot each other.

It may also have detrimental

teots relat1ve to the weaker unlt(s)

1n~certain

ef~

ot these instances.

1.B.2.c.2) The assertlon- that"a ocnsiderable amount of testing ot
one another's power. resources w1ll ocou,r" espec.1ally early 1n' a c::o
allt1on:-'s
of the
~.

operatlon-wa~

casestudles~

only part1ally substantiated by the analysla;

This 18 somewhat mislead1ng In'' that 3 out. of the:

cases demonstrated "th1s phenomenon" while one, ~"Mental Health, II

re~

vealed a small degree of testlng, and this occurred relatlvely late
in:-the c?alitlon's operatlons.

Th1s group_ had not as yet entered

trul, confllctual lssues whlch were to ar.:1se.

Up to the p01nt ot

when the case was written, it had operated predomlnantly as a c.cn
sensus'coallt10n, whloh seems to have minimlzed testing.

It:~is

abo

'poss1ble that prior external relations among memhers made member,:'
power resources known.
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I.B.2 •. d. !he asssr'ticn that if a single leader (formal or in
tormal) emerges in a coalItion, that this ind1cates a h1era.r
chical "1mbalance-' w1th1n the coal1t1on was slightly-evident in
the casestudy ma.terial.

Th1s assertion is similar to

I.B.2.b.,~

in that it has no oPPosite, s1nce 1ts conditions are internal,
1.e. when

~ere

1s a single leader, there 1s imbalance.

I.B.2.e. The assertion that if there are several coalition
leaders, this indicates

a.

"balanced" d1stribution of power re

sources, seemed to be in keeping with the findIngs.

This

asser~

tion 1s llke I.B.2.b. and I.B.2.d. in its internal validity, i.e •..
it there are severa.l leaders,

thiS indlcates "balanced'· power.

As.sertions I.B.2.d. a.nd I.B.2.e. could ·be combined in that a
coalition's leadership will be e1ther singular or d1stribu-' . . .
~ed,

and this 1s indicative of imbalanced or balanced control of

.resources respectively.

This should a.lso be assessed sepa.rately

tor formal and informal leadership and resources and then possi
bly together as an overall view of the ccalition's leadership
struoture.

part of the confUSion with the findings fer these

two propOSitions was that coalitions could have both ba.lanced and
imbalanoed leadersh1p and resource distribution

depend1r~

upon

whether the reference point was formal or 1nforn:al leadersh1P.
and resources.
I.O.l.a. The proposition that the more general a resource lS,·
.

,

the broader its appl1cability was
study data.

well supported by the case-

This 1s somewhat an indisputable assertion,.but

serves well the function of highlighting a signif1cant variable

of potier analysis o:t coal1tional behav1or.
I,.C.2.b., The proposition that resource dependency fosters

coord1~

atlonand exchange .by means of barga1ning was essentially substant1
&ted by the data.
whleh

~

There ,was one marked exception; "Black voa11 t10n. "

ah1gh degree of internal conf11ct.

It could be argued

l,hat l,hls wasessent1ally an 1deolog1cal conflict. whic·h was imp8%!
.vious

t,c

pragtuatlc resource dependency.

ne1~her'lead1ns memb~r

thus resulting

~~a

Itt. was also the case that.

had resources sufficient_for 1ts own tasks:

loss of leadersh1p confidence

which would also. undermine supposed dependency.

i~eachothen,.

It..\. is also possi

ble tha.t thelrgoal was coord1nated by the use of' conflict- taeMas.
I.C.l .b. 1) The assertlon- tha.t., the greater the coord1natioa and In.
terdepe~dencet

the more relat10ns w1ll take the form of mutual ex-,

change was well supported by'the research findings.

The only excep

t10D::was'the "B1a.Ck Coal1t10n" to which assertion: 1.0.1 .b. 1) is

nou.

really relevant" because 1t was characte:rized by little ooordlna.
t.ion.' and considerable oonflict.

The 'tChild Advocacy" case also

had elements of conflict, and lack of cooperation. ,

I.C.l.c. The proposition that the grea.ter the commitment to unitt

goals, the lower the level of cooperation- was not s'ubstant1ated nor..
re~uted

by the casestudy data.

Ambiguity was the outoome.

seems to be a more basio issue 1nvolved for wh1ch th1s

tlon.tal1s to account:.

un1t'~ls

h1ghly committed to its

then the member w1ll be

a8se~-

The real issue 1s whether a unit!s

interest.,ln~those

h1ghly;cooperatlve,~

goals~

If they. are., and

are cons1stent with those of the coalItion.
the

There

goals,

e.g. the "Mental

Health Center." and "project Rap" casestud1es.

If' a unit!s go_ala
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are contrary to the coa.11tion's goals and the unit 1s highly
committed to 1ts own, ther. the

membe~

will engage 1n a low level

of' cooperation (posSibly even _conf11ct).

I.C.l.d.. The assertion that the greater the competit1on for re
souro-es. the greater' the conf11ct was substantiated by the
s~udy

mater1al.

case~

Th1s assertion 1s bas1cally concerned with

cor~

rel.&tlng -resource competition and conf11ct, and where they d1d

occur it was relevant, but where they d1d not, noth1ng was estab11sh
ed:nor refuted•.
I.O.l.e. The'proposIt1on that the greater the relationsh1p be
.

,

tween the rescurces a.va1lable through coa11tional membersh1p and
the unit's goals, the higher the level of the un1t's involvement
in the coa.11t1on was well eStab11shed by the casestudy data.
This

exchar~e

assertion 1s closely related to the external

struc~

tural issue assert1on-, ~ I .B.1 .a., wh1ch deals wi th doma1n'; concerns
as

prompt.~ng

un1t coa11t1onal membersh1p.

I.C.2.a. The assertion :that different 1ssues often require the
exe-rolse ot different resources is well Bupported by the case
study data.

This has clear 1mpl1cat1ons for the relat1ve 1n

fluence ameng those who control these resources.
I .C.2 .b. The proposi tien that there are d1fferent type-s of' costs 
.
.
which can be 1ncurred by a coa11tional unit, subgroup, or full
coalltlon(and the types of costs suggested) was well susta1ned
by the casestudy ma.terial.

Of all of the "cost" types found

ln~

the data, three were most common: "respons1bi11ty," "inter-game,"
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and "d1v1sion ot pay-otts."
1.0.• 2.0. The a.ssertion-: tha.t there are certain- "dec1sion

cost~

pr1nciples which can alter the degree ot the cost,. incurred (s1ze"
unan1m1ty, and 1ndispensable member) was substant1ated by the a
nalys1s of the cases. The frequency ot each pr1nciple 1n-all
tour cases was s1ze (1), unan1m1ty (4), and indispensable mem
ber C3).
1.0.• 3.&. The proposition that ln cases where the 'more powerful do
not need the resources of the weaker,. the potential receptor(s), the
weaker, may employ 1ts other resource potentlals, 1nclud1ng external"
as commod1t1es for exchange was upheld by the results.

Th1s was

clearly a poss1ble response which was resorted to by weaker coali
tion members in at least two instances 1n: each case.§tudl.

I.C.3.. b.. The propos1t1on that ln instances where the more power.
tul control the resources needed by a potent1al receptor(s)" the:
wea~er

un1t may try . to develop alternatlve resources as1de from

the stronger un1t was sustained by casestudy

eY1d~nce.

Th1s

was a power strategy that was present ln each casestudy.
It 1s conce1vable

11sted under

tt

tha~.assertlons

1.0.3.&. and b. could be

condlt1ons" 1nstead of "situ a tlons," slnce they

const1tute bas1cally exchange "cond1tions" of 1nequallty.

Another'

possibillty would be to reclass1fy some .of the assertions

curren~

11 under "cond1t1ons" wh1ch are descr1b1ng s1tuat1ons of 1nter
depe.ndency and mutual eXChange and categor1ze them under "situa
t1ons."

1.•1). The I.D. series of seven "analytical questions" will be
rated on the same scale as the rest of the material but with the
. altered meaning of the terms "1dentical" 'and "opposite" to refer

to the degree of continuity between the question and the degree
of relevant material 1n:the casestudy.

If the question is rele

vant and useful for analysis, then there is an identicalness·of
the question and the material.
LD. 1 .-7~ There was cons1derable case material available for all

of the analytical questicns.

The two questions wh10h had the

least data were 3 (t1who exercised or attempted to in·fluence whom
issue?~)

In' each decision

take

and 6 (" vlhat pos1tion did each unit

decision issue as compa.red to the outcome of the

on~:each

decis1on-making process?")

Both of these questions were highly

useful analytioally when the data was available.
. was in t.he occaSional lack Of. ca'sestudy" data, not
questicns.

The problem
jjl

the analj7t1cal.

These quest10ns explicated the 'data and. key decision

al and power issues so clearly that it would be more product1ve

to have them proceed section I.C. "Exchange Issues" 1nstead of
follOWing it.

Th1s would help clarify the data to be assessed

by the "exchange"

assert1on~.

II.A.1. The assertion that the degrees of fam1liarity with pro
blems and with solutions are conce1vable within a continuum of

routine, 1ncremental, and 1nnovatlve'was_ supported
study results.

by the case

It should be clar1fied that in th1s assert10n

the fam1l1ar1ty ot the ooa11tion as an entity is what
measured, not that

or

each unit member.

1s

be1ng

The app11cation of th1s

139

assert10n does require a certain arb1trar1ness, but 1t should be
done w1th caut10us rationality.

II.A.2. The assertion that problem s1tua.tion and solut1on types
are usually 1dentical was slightly supported by the data.
one case 1nd1cates the opposite; while one case

In tac't."

indicate the

two variables as identical; and yet two:·casesare ambiguous. A
bro~der sa~plins

may be necessary to further

:afl~~1'S

the basis

for th1s d1screpancy, but it does appear that a more viable as
sertion might be ftwhile problem situation a.ndsolut1on types

may be 1dentical"any combination of types can, :and frequently
does occur."

II.A.3. The assertion that the variable of informational ade
quacy was useful as related.

~o

the sufficiency of understanding

ot the demands of the problem situation and of the consequences
lot the problem solution for what they are: innovat1ve, 1ncre
mental, or routine had mixed support from the caseatudy mat.er
ial.

It was very helpful 1n the cases where obvious inadequacy

ex1sted in problem 'sltua.tio:Q.S and solutions, a.nd the concept
helped clarity the case material.

In the cases where no lack

ot 1nformation was apparent, the notion seemed to be of no
obvious value.

Actually, its value cculd have been that it·

specifIed that the informatIon was adequate.

This notion does

seem to have analytical value.
II.B.l. The assertion that in application to 1nterorgan1zational
.
.
coal1t1ons, it is probable that nearly all problem situations and
solut10ns·w1ll be innova.t1vely or1ented was overwhelmingly un
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s~bstantiated

Out of all of the 37 case

by the casestudy data.

study dec1sion issues classified, only 8 were consistent with
the assertion and 7 of these occurred quite early 1n coa11tional
operat1ons.

This ind1cates e1ther a 'faulty application of the

assert1on, or 1nadequate and/or inaccurate casestudy material, or
an invalid assertion.
apply"bu~

These concepts tend to be d1fficult to

the extens1veness of the data's refutation of the as

sertion as 1t 1s stated makes its valid1ty highly questionable
the least.

1~

The assertion seems to have failed to account for

the predominance of routin1zed
alition's decision issues.

~nd

adaptive dimens10ns of a co

A coal1t1on appears to quickly ac

qu1re" 1ts own modus operand1 and purpose' as 'an erganlzat1on".
II... B.2. The proposition that once basIc ground rules are esta

.

.

b11shed and the coal1tion galns exper1ence, the other orienta
tions (incremental and routine) will become operative was s11ghtlr
supported by the analy:sis of the data.

The results were "slight"

1n their confirmation of the assertion; because, while the extreme-
ly early decision( s) ot each coa11 tion was innovat1ve-ir.novative"
very few 1nnovat1ve-innovat1ve 1nstances took place and an ins1g
nificant number of routine deciSions.

The latter is, however,

probably the result of the analytical model's bias ot asses
s1ng "main decisions" which tends to preclude rout1ne problems.
In additIon the case materia.l tended

~o

be,

cur~gry,which

failed

to relate minor details and routineoccurrencea. The assertion"
subsequently, seems to have vIability and relevance, but add1
tional analysis of 1t would be helpful.
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Ii.• B.3. The

propositlon~

that certain procedures or phases in: dec 1

81o~making

seem to be relatively cons1stent_1n most sltuat1ons:where

ratlonallty is regarded as s1gniticant by the partic1pants was re
latlvelywell substantiated by the data.

The relativeness ot-the:

,..,substantiation is the result ot the tact that those cases ln whlch
part1c1pants valued rat10nall ty d1d demonstrate cons1stent phases
·or steps ln decis1on-making.

At the same time, those two cases

whlch lnd1cated low participant valuat10n ot ratIonality could
1ndlcate nothlng about the

vall~ity

ot an assertion whlch only

assesses 1nstances ot a rational process.

ILB.3.'s.. The assertion that the appllcabil1ty of the ratlonal
model 1s probably relat1ve to the degree ot cooperation ot con
tllct of-goals and 1nterests ot the units comprising the inter
organizational coal1t1on was supported by the casestudy tindlngs.
fhe evidence 1ndicates that

interes~and

goal cooperation and con

" -tliet.., are cond1 tions, but> not;~ the causes, ot whether ratlonal'
dec1sion-making takes place or not.
casestudy whlch was a

predom1nant~y

Th1s is 1ndleat.ed by. one
consensus operation.,

but~

whlch

1n several 1nstances used lrratlonal decis1on-mak1ng procedures.
Whlle cooperat1on', existed 1 t d1d not necess1 tate or cause ration...
allty, lt Just made 1t poss1ble.

Interest and

goa~

oontl1ct

tend to make.. the rat10nal de,cls1on-mak1ng_ phases imposslble,. be
cause coalltion alternat1ves are viewed w1th min1mal objectivity.

th1s does

not~mean,~however,

that an individual unit's goals are

not rational.1n terms ot lts selt interest.1n a rational sense.
II.B.4. The assertion that 1n

coal1t1onsJ~strong

un1t blases

should be expected to be operat1ve in the deo1s1on-making phases
was extremely well supporte'd 1n'the casestudy results.
.:

This is
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not. 1nconsistent with the findings related to assertion II.B.3.a.,
becauee units can be seeking to protect and promote their domain
and bias, but can achieve this in a rational process under con
d1t1ons of cooperat1on and 1nterdependency.

II.B.S. The proposition that 1ssue and 1nterest agreement or
disagreement among units are both compatible w1th the format1on

ot a coalition was only "slightly" confirmed
data.

by the casestudy

The problem is primarily; that, while both interest. and
;

.

issue agreement and disagreement are compatible w1th coal1tion
formation, serious and fundamental disagreement may not be com
patible with the maintenance of the coalition.

Th1s ambigu1ty·

needs to be olar1fied and can be w1th the add1t1on of the asser
tion:: tII.B.5.a.):

"rundamenta~

and serious issue and 1nterest

disagreement tends to be 1ncompat1ble w1th the ma1ntenance and
cont1nued ex1stence of coal1t1onal membersh1p,:especially 1f 1t..
1s 1n confl1ct w1th the member's goals. 1f
-:

...

'". .

. .""

.'

~

_

; r-' ,:.~ ~ ", r

~.

.\.

.

. -'

Cummulat1ve Mean Scores:- 1nd1cate a s.lgn1f1cant degree ot oonststen
cy. and ldent1.ty: between the analyt1ca'! model and the casestudy

:r~ings.

Summarz of Recommended
Analytical Model Mod1fications
These recommendations are the result of the casestudy t1nd
1ngs and comments upon them, wh1ch 1dentified.several medel pro
positions that were defio1ent in whole or 1n part and several 1n
stances of needed model restructuring.

S1nce the cr1t1c1sms

were l1sted 1n the above comments, only the affected assert10ns

143. ',-,

.lllbe g1Yen here with the1r suggested alterat1ons:

I..B.1.a.2)It appears that the autonomy,w1th1n the coa11t1on,ot

.

.

coa11t1on members 1s lessened relat1ve to the coalition's control

or

resources and sophistication of 1nternal organ1zation.

I.B.1.b.l) It is probable that in certain instances the extra.
coalItIonal rela.t1ons of the coalit1on as an ent1ty could 816
~tlcantll

lnt1uence lts dec1sions and act1ons.

I.B.l.d. Whlle a slng1e formal leader in a coat1t1on 1nd1cates
«

•

'

an 1mbalance of formal power within the coa11t1on, several for
mal leaders in a coa11tion ind1cates a balance of formal· power

w1thin the coalltion.:
I.B.l.e. While a single 1nfo.rmal leader in a coa11 t1en 1nd1cates

an imbalance of informal power withln the coalition, several In
formal leaders in a coalition indicates a balance of formal po
wer withln the coalltion.
I.B.l.f. While a slngle leader (formally and informally) in a co
alit10n 1ndicates an imbalance of overall power w1th1n the 00&11-

tlon, several leaders (formally and/or informally) ln a

coa11tlo~

indicates ,a balance of overall. power w1thin the coalltion.
I.B.2.a. Formal coalltlonal roles, lf they are establ1shed, u
.

.

sual1y carry little real power, internally.
I.B.2.a.1) When formal coalit1onal roles do carry real power, 1t
usually 1s the consequence of those in formal leadersh1p also
concurrently controlllng S1grtlflcant informal power resources.
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I.D.1-7. Analyt1cal Quest10ns to go before I.C. Exchange Issues.
I.O.l.C. Un1t goals and unit cooperativeness 

I.el,.c.,) It a un1t's goals are cons1stent with

~e coa11tlonl~~

&nd!the unlt is highly committed to lts interest in those

goals~

the higher the level of cooperation of that member.

1.0.1.0.2) It a unitts goals are contrar,r to the coalition's and
theunlt is h1ghly committed to its interest in those goals, the
lowe~

the level of cooperation of that member (dlsruptive, con

tllctual behavior 1s 'quite poss1ble).

1.0.3.&. and b. should be placed in between assertlons I.O.1.d.

anci e. and the category "S1tuations" under ttExchange Isaues u
should be eliminated under 1.• 0.3. and the sectlon

I.O.l~,

should

read: "Oondltions and Situations."
II.A.1. Degrees'of coalitional famillarity wlth problem sltua
tions and solutlons (or decislons) are concelvable wlthin a
-

continuum of routlne, lncremental, and innovative.
II.A.2. Whlle problem sltuatlon and solution types may frequentl!'
be ldentlcal, any combination of types also can, and frequently
do.as, occnir.
II.B.l. Among the early main declsions of a coalltion, there u
sually are ene.or more problem sltuations and solutions which
are both 1nnovatively oriented (innovative-innovative).
II.B.3.b. While cooperatlon does not necessitate ratlcnal decl
slon-mak1ng, it tends to be situationally conduclve for its occur

renee; whlle conf11ct tends to have the opposlte result:.
II:.B.5.a. Tundamental and ser10usly overt lssue and lnterest.,
dlsagreement tends to be 1ncompatlble w1th the ma1ntenance and
contlnu~d

exlstence of coalltiona.l membershlp, especlally/ l t 1t.,

1s in conflict w1th the member's goals.
COHCLUSIOW~,

The development and testing of these dec1s1on-maklng power
and process assert10ns to the four casestud1es helped to focus
the theoret1cally analytical onto the emplrlcally testable.

The.~

result of this was a. general subst.antiatlon ot the proposed as
sertlons w1 th the spec1flc revis10n of c'erta1n ot the propos1
tions.

The model d1d provide a usefu,l

~cheme

for clar1ty-lng

and expllcat1ng the decision-maklng ot the coalltlons.
er app11catlonof

~he

,A broad

model to addlt10nal casestud1es could fur

ther the testlng and revlslng of it in'order to develop a more
re11able instrument for assessment.
fbe study sought to expand the body of knowledgeot lnter
organlzational behavior in: the spec1f1c area ot, coa11tlonal deci
slon-making.

Th1s study has advanced that understanding and

helped relate the theories and methods of social sclence to It.
The purpose of the study was not to estab11sh "the analytlcal
model

bu~

to help' 1nitlate the 1nquiry lnto the fleld

organizational

decis1o~makir~

o~'

lnter.

behavior with a set of assertions

that m1ght help to assess that phenomenon and to test-.those asse%'.
t10na.

t.rh1s was done and, rev1s1ons, were made inwhat.&ppeared to

be a relat1vely sa11ent analytlcal model.

Addit10nal testing

1-46

and the development of d1rferent and alternate assertions and
models would further help analyze the little studied and under
stood context and content of lnterorganizational behavior.

To

ward this goal, a further rev1ew and assessment of the l1tera
ture glyen in Cha.pter 1, and additional relevant wr1t1ngs,
would assist in prov1d1r..g subsequent a.nalytical mod1f1ca.t1ons
and

&l~ernat~ves

to the model developed

1~

this study •.

--
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1!be whole

COllC'&pt

process to the student
80

ot a prae·tleum emphas1jzea the. value of the learnlng
in".

doing research.

central to this project., 1t,. would

ed tram the exper1ence.

be

Beejause "practice

remise not to assess

learnlng~'
what~

was.:.

was lea:cn..

!h1s concern w11l be viewed from thr.ee perspectlves:

(1) what -the researcher le&rned,.~ (~). what others might do ln l1ght, of this ••
and (3) what the, pro~esselon of Soclal 'Work might_ learn.

What the researcher learneid.
I

perhaps the most slgniflcant learnlng 01' the whole process was the
real1zatlon'of the lImitations of any method of research.

There tends to

be a myth a.bout . the irrefutability of the scle.ntlflc method.
p,rlence 1t is clear that this was not the case here.

From th1s ex-

Thls ls· not, completely

the fault of sclentific analysis"lt is also because of the' llmltations or
all1 slngle ap-p11caticnot this method.

The oonstruotive aspect ofthls

reallzation·.ls that frequently many of the flaws in· a
deslgn~

res~arch

method and

can be minimized once lts limltations are rec.ogn1.zed.

W1th speclfic

refe~ence

to thls research

projec~,;

weaknesses 1n the. model which later became apparent...

there are

severa~

These weaknesses are:

slgnlflcant not:.. only tor thefr impact on- the study but also upon, what the
researcher learned about soclal sclence research.
One of these reallzations conoerned how the research was lnltiated.
fhe method of ldentifying·key c.oncep1:.s and variables for the analytlcal
model wa.s through a review of pertinent:,. material in- the llterature.

This-;

focus was malnta.lned until the model was fully tormulat.ed before the case
studies were referred to by the researcher.
dlstance between the model and the data.
~vo

areas: (1) unolear

ooncepts,~

Thls resulted in a oonceptual

This was espec1ally evldent in

and (2) too narrow a focus upon the model.

W1th respect to polnt (l) ,; there were severa1 concepU which were

,
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either 1nsuff1ciently dellneated or were too broad or.: , too narrow' In'.
meaning and appllcation.
to

re~er

nat1ves.

RAt1ona11ty was one such t:erm.

I..t was meantt,

to "obJectlv1ty" 1n: an-: 1mp.a.rt1:al assessment of goals and alter
This" however"'referred to the coa11tion; as a Whole and did

not:.,accountL fer the var1able of rat1onalitywh1ch descr1b.es
oft'

goa~

and alternative assessment and choice by,'

th~

behav.,1or

lndlvldual,~member: un1t.s,~

acc.ord1ns. to their. best:_, selt lnterest:" whlch could be considered qu1te
jrratlonal. from the v1ew po1nt:. of the total
,

coall~1on; y~t.

trom-. the member's perspective.

rat1ona~.

Another.:" d1ff1culty with :rat"1onality also

stems from the peculiar strategy whlch a coalit1on'
at1on~

qu1te

,

mlght~

C~o·oper.-.

pursue.

tends to appear to be more rational" .wh1le contllc;tt tends 'to appear"

tQ. be more random and unplanned" yeu, both c:an: be equally as
p~su1t:

of" a'coal1t1onal 89 a 1.

.

ra~1ona1

1:ft

Th1s is' par:ticular.ly ev.ident. in: the "lU.ack.
,

Coalit1on" casestudy" wh1ch appeared highly:, lrrational ln. many. of its',
subgoal' dec1sions~: (communi ty school_" boycot.t", etc .'); but.:. wh1c.h was·: r.a.thel!"'
.

8uccess.ful

1n~

.

attaining 1ts bas1c- goals:

(~hang~s

~

and more lnf'luence

thee school . system and greater un1f1cation: of the black commun1ty).
Another 1na.dequat,ely developed partL of' the conceptual structure
the. model concerned the not1ons of conf11c11 and cooperation.

were used to

rere~:

own.:member-· un1ts.

These terms.:

to the 1nternal operat1ons of the coa.11 tlon~ amon&.
Of equal signif1cance" but ~left_ undeveloped,:

these same cottcepts as applied to the strategy of
whole toward 1ts externa.l target" and the

upon: the 1nterna.l operat1ons of. the coa.lltion'.

Even

1b.~

were~

thecoalitlon'~s

s-1gnlf1ea.nc~

or'

a

of th1,s" in: turn"

Wlth_~

resp,ec"tt, t:o. in

ternal dynamics, what"appeared to be cooperat1on could eas1ly have been:
a sltuat1on: of confllct.

An~

examp;Le is the "Child Adv,ocacytt case' wh1ch

had elements' of c.ooperat1on" but;.. which was also. c.ha.racter1zed. by consider.....
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able conflict;.ot 1nterests and goals" butt, wh1ch also·':r.equl'red op_era
tiolr.

illC

order '1#0

att,al~

the

goa~

of' ac qu1ring pl"O Jeo t .funds •

.AaoLher -variable wh1ch was defined ar-d analyzed too narrowly
ex'ter.nalresources.

re1:at.lve
un1t'a~

pos1t.1on~

It was accounted for wl th resp_eot:_ to. lnfluenclng_ the

of .strength of members wl thin': the coalltlon'" butL a,

belong1Dg to the coalltion was not seen'l: in'. turn" as bSlng,

bTmembers': for:' the purpose of: increasing their external strength.

awareness

have given a dlfferent:.

cou~d

members t coal1t10nal

fbe

hehavio~

lnterpreta.tion·~

US:edi

'Dh1a

to some of the·

- espec1ally the.. less s 19n1:f'1cant: members:.

to more broadly apply some of these var.1ables: 1a·: also.

f'a1~ure

relat.ed to p01nt;..
ln~

was:~

(~)::

t'eo narrow' a focus upon', the model.

Th1s

resulted~

an attempt to make the data. f1t: the. model" when' f.req\lent:ly .1tL was.

a d1fferent..

broader.'meaning.

ClOnfllct~,

(e.g.
were::

or~

l~ored.

As a result" some of these

or

~ar1ables

(loa11tlozr membershlp~ foIt' extennal ga1n" ratJiona11ty" sue.)

The: model,: from

th~

theoretical v·lews up0n-' whlch it was

constructed, was biased toward more of a strlctly ,ratlona:J., consensus
perspectlve,~

19noring confllct theory and analysis.

the model resulted in a too limlted data analysls

Th1s st,1cklng to

and,~

therefore l1mlt,..

ed what wa.s learned for "exploratory" purposes.
This all polnts toward the need for the development and use of a
broader and more flex1ble model.
p~ach,
~ore

I~·the

researcher had used this

hls learnlng would have been conslderably greater and

a~

pr~bably

productlve.

What, others might do in light of

this~.

I:r'&ll1one were to undertake a study of the same toplc area or were
to use a s1mllar deslgn and method of research, 1 t would be helpful to_
correct" or at least.. aVOld,: some of the problems that resulted in
study.

th1s~
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.In;

order, to co.mpensate tor the limitations ot developing an'

cal. model.. -trcmthe

llterature~;

1t would greatly

~essen

the

analy;t1~

conceptua~

cUstancebet,wee:c. that model and the data, l t the researcher were to pre.
t,est~

that model..

This should be done before the' model ls finalized 'and
.

':

app~ed

to material s1m11ar to that.whlch wlll be assessed' irr'the re.

search.

Realistic modificatlons can then be made ln the conoepts and

theoretlcal framewo'rk of the model before fully undertaking the study.
fills wou1d help to develop a more adequate set of concepts.

HoY,..·

ever,.to more tu11y correct this weakness,. it: would be helpful to re.
t,&1na position'ot theoretica.l flexiblllty whl1e gathering and analy
zing t.he data..

This would also respond to the problem of ut1l1z1ng a.

model too narrowly.

Thj.s could also be remed1ed wi th the initlal use.

ot,;·,a, model wh,1ch was more

compreher..s~ve.

~n":

thls 1nstance" a model

wh1ch could account tor both cooperation and contlictwould have allowed
greater: analytical flex1bility.· It would also be more produa.tlv.e 1t L
researcher were to concentrate on' what does net flt the model and why.".
rather than" forcing the data to

fl~

Some of the problems of this study could have been mlnimized, 1t" a
more concise and 1nternally and the oretlcally consistent. model had been
u~lzed.

This would have allowed for greater concentration on the more'

s1gn1:f1cant variables and possible alternatives to them.
'. What!. the profession of Social Work might learn.
",

-

}

As 'was mentioned 1n the preface to this study, coalitional b,ehavior

18 a common'; but 11ttle understood phenomenon.. Coa11t1on8 are also fre..
quently .ut1lized In". the soc1al work,; communi ty organizat1on, m1l1eu •. '-'his
is olear.1y evident when conslder1ng the tour casestud1es
Eaoh one tnvolved soc1al welfare 1ssues and actors.

1n~

this proJec.t:..

It seems obv1ous

tbatL&ny pract1ce

as well as theoretical knowledge,.whlch could

ak11~st

be extracted 'from this study would be of use to soclal workers in coal1

tional situations.

Thls" however,;, was not the

cent~al

purpose of this

st.udy and w1ll mostly be lett to inference or to further, analysls.

There are certain genera.l polnts"

however,~

which SholiLd be commented u

pon in" order.' to avo1d being neg11gent.
Probably the most, 1mportant. polnt., to, b.e learned by the so'clal work
er trom this Study 1s that he or she needs to be aware of the 1nteror
gan1zat1onal

~J.e1d

1n~coalitlons.

in order to best promote h1s gO.als and 1nterests

The data emphas1zed the s1gn1ficance of self

these coalitions.

w1th~

interes~tn;

Soclal workers tend to recede from Situations of manL.

pulatlon,:confllct,:or anyth1ng that falls to uphold the value domi"nance
or: altruism.

However,t

1n.~

coa11t;1onal . behavior,) 1t 1s

cruc1a~

to be aware
.

of the goals" -hidden agendas," and resource manipulat10ns that usually
character1ze the 1nterorgan1zat1cnal fleld.

Not_to engage

culat10n·ot the tactlcs of others, , and the use of
mount _to outr1ght. concesslon

01'

th~

i~such

cal

same"is tanta

one IS' own"'1ntsrest.

The next lssue'is whether In-: fact.. the interest of soclal workers,
merlts the above type tact1cs and behaVior.

For within the coalitlonal'

t1eld"being aware ot the vulnerabillty of others ls not so much to re
medy them (casework therapy) as
own: 1nterests and goa.ls.
latic value"

1rr~that

dual involved.

1t~1s

to man1pulate the same for one's

This: 1s "not _solely" w'ithout": altruistic or humam

lt w11l be up to the moral dlscretion ot the'lndivi

Furthermo.re, ,the welfare of the pub11c, espec lally the

ppor"ls often the least cons1dered lnterest in many. policy and

p~og~

dec1sions" and soclal workers" can assume thelr role as an effectlve ad
v.ocate tor these people only it ca.lculat.ed and reallst1c coalitional:
practices are employed.

F~om

the findlngs: of the study:,; th1s would

1n~

;a

c~u4e

de11berate assessment', and use of. tact1cs dealing wi th such things

as reoaaa1Z1ng eachmemberJs domain and the implications

o~

part1oula.r coalition and its goal and possible resources.

that:. to_ this

Itt would be

important to know the external resources and rela.tionsh1ps ot other mem
bers, In.clud1ns other ties among member units and the importance of the1r
membersh1~

in the coalition to their interests external to the

coa11t1o~

Who. is more influentia.l on wh1ch 1ssues and where to most effect1vely
use one·s· own 1nfluence is a key problem.
what~other

I.t is also cruc 1al to know',

units value for eXChange purposes.

The role and use of con

f11ct and cooperat1on by others and oneself 1nterms ot when they are

a~~

propr1ate and what they mean when they occur are of cons1derable value
to the pract1tloner,.as well as are other numerous aspects of coalition..
al behaVior wh1ch have been exam1ned by th1s and other stud1es.
It~ls

.

.an~11sis

hoped that th1s study w1ll stimulate further exploration and

.

of 1nterorganizat1onal coa11t1ons.

It 1s also hoped that it.

has raised as many, it not more, questions and issues as 1t has
ea

'LO

cons1der and answer.

a~temp~

What has been learned, as mentioned above,

should :not be overlooked in, '. future 1nqu1r1es and

p~ract.1Q.e.•
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